A Sense of Free Will: the consciousness quagmire (Introduction)

by dhw, Saturday, September 19, 2015, 12:30 (3353 days ago) @ romansh

Dhw: I do not accept your “supposedly”. For me, the concept of free will is inseparable from conscious choice/decision. 
ROMANSH: We should be discussing the properties of this supposed consciousness, not whether we have it or not. -Why? You refuse to accept the link between consciousness and free will, and even claim to be unaware of what you write. I can only repeat that in my view zombies cannot have free will even in the context of my identity approach. The properties, nature and source of consciousness are a different subject.-ROMANSH: To use David's analogy is our brain more of a broadcaster than a receiver? If we accept that cause and effect are true, then our consciousness is at the end of the causal chain. So does this consciousness cause our actions and propagate the causal chain or is it simply an awareness (instrument panel view) of the workings of the brain? Either way it is part of the causal flux that is going on as the universe unfolds.-I don't know how often I have to repeat that I accept the cause and effect argument. Whether the brain is a broadcaster or a receiver makes no difference to the two approaches that I have been trying to discuss with you.-ROMANSH: Juxtapose your two statements dhw:
we do not have conscious control of our decisions ... I do have conscious control of my decisions. 
Do you understand why I might think your position might contain an oxymoron?-Forgive me, Romansh, but this is getting silly. I have offered you two DIFFERENT approaches to the subject of free will. Once more: the cause and effect approach leads to the conclusion that we do not have free will. The identity approach leads to the conclusion that we do have it. I find both approaches equally valid. Similarly, when I consider different arguments, I can accept that God may exist or God may not exist. That is why I am an agnostic. Seeing both sides of an argument does not constitute an oxymoron.-DHW: No it [the subject of our discussion] isn't. Originally it was on whether we have control over our decisions, and how our wills are formed (cause and effect) was the approach you chose, but now the subject has become whether freedom from cause and effect is the only criterion by which we can make a judgement. 
Romansh: It is for me. And many other philosophers. -So do you and those who share your beliefs have a monopoly on the truth?
 
ROMANSH: I will give an example. If you put me in handcuffs, this will limit the choices of actions I might take. But it does not affect what I might have wanted to do. I still have to make decisions on whether to struggle, escape or not. These are all determined by my surroundings past experiences and my perception of my capabilities.-This example incorporates the given constraints in my definition (handcuffs, my surroundings, my capabilities), awareness of the conditions and options (essential to the consciousness that forms part of my definition and not yours), but surprisingly mentions only one of the causes governing my decision (past experiences); you forgot to mention that according to your definition my decision also depends on the existence of the universe. I accept all the various causes related to my decision as being beyond my control. On the other hand, my experiences are mine and nobody else's etc. etc. and my decisions will be taken with the aid of a consciousness that is mine and mine alone.
 
As regards machines, I personally do not believe they are conscious, but it makes no difference either way. If humans have free will, free will exists, regardless of mechanical consciousness or non-consciousness. “We have no way of verifying this belief”. Good, you have discovered the great pitfall of epistemology. There are certain areas of existence where we have no way of verifying our beliefs. We can only consider the different approaches and draw our subjective conclusions. You are only prepared to consider one approach and so you draw your one unverifiable, subjective conclusion.-ROMANSH: We draw an arbitrary line around something and call it a self. Admittedly it is a useful line.
 
I don't regard what I know of my “self” to be arbitrary, and I don't even think of my identity in terms of drawing a line. I am a mass of actuals and potentials, and of countless influences, some of which I am not even aware of, which constitute the cause and effect argument against free will. But I am still me etc. etc. and so “I can still say that I have the conscious ability to control my decision-making (my definition of free will). It is the age-old epistemological problem of different premises.”
ROMANSH: While you can say it, it does not make it true.-Of course not. And while you can say cause and effect are the only criterion for judging whether we have free will or not, it does not make it true. If we knew what was true, we would have nothing to discuss.