Different in degree or kind (Introduction)

by David Turell , Tuesday, November 12, 2013, 20:00 (4029 days ago) @ dhw


> DAVID: It infers that we do not know if animals have any degree of phenomenal consciousness, defined as: Phenomenal consciousness: The subjective, feeling part of any conscious sensation.
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> dhw: Since Marian Stamp Hawkins is apparently concerned about animal welfare, I doubt if she would go along with that. In her conclusion she writes: "It is this search for real evidence that the Colorado biologist Marc Bekoff has wrongly interpreted as my "dismissing" many current studies. What I hope he will come to understand is that my concern is to make the case for animal emotions as watertight as possible and thereby to strengthen it." Marc Bekoff, another expert in the field, is far more insistent on the reality of animal conciousness. Perhaps you should read his article too, which is accessible through hers.-I read it, as I assumed you would. What is apparent is that the research is inconclusive, and we don't know how much phenomenal consciousness they have. We have two experts arguing with no decision, but you and I are broadening our knowledge of how animal research is approaching the problem.
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> dhw: As for anthropomorphism, as I have said repeatedly, this approach puts carts before horses. Social animals came before social humans, and they laid the ground rules. ..... We are not imposing human values on them ... we inherited those values from them.-That is a huge leap of faith on your part. From our horses I know that they do not experience pain like we do, from the injuries we have cared for, but they can tell us when they hurt by their movements or posture. Horses herd together by instinct and have pecking orders, but they don't act like ant colonies. Ant colonies are a whole different ball of wax. Our inheritence from them is nil, judging by the social inventions of organisms at our level. Talk about anthropomorphising!!!
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> DAVID: Torley makes much of the problems in research on animals and these terms they use make it clear to me why he does.
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> dhw: I much prefer Torley's own distinction between primary consciousness (or the moment-to-moment awareness of sensory experiences and internal feelings such as emotions) and higher-order consciousness (also called self-awareness)...We can really do without the highfalutin terminology, but I'm glad something is clear to you.-These distinctions are important because they help us "mind the gap' as in London subways. You want to close the gap as something that simply happened in evolution for no reason. I am trying to explain the sudden appearance of the human intellect/consciousness. Your approach can't, nor do you seem to want an explanation.