Free Will (The nature of a \'Creator\')

by dhw, Wednesday, September 14, 2011, 22:24 (4818 days ago) @ David Turell

DAVID: Over a year ago we discussed free will. Labet's studies were mentioned. The mind seems to prepare for an answer before the finger strikes a key. But could there be parallel brain activity which confuses the neuroscientists? The philosophers don't like the neuroscientists' evidence, and don't believe the interpretations are correct. Excellent recent review with new NS evidence. Is it any better?-http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/full/477023a.html-Thank you for this fascinating article. I've had a look at last year's discussion, and see that we spent most of the time arguing over a definition. There was a sort of grudging acceptance of my final offering: "an entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints." The constraints were imposed by:-1)	Nature and/or the situation
2)	Factors connected with the decision-making process itself (e.g. our own genetic make-up)-Clearly the article links up with the second of these, which of course is the one that causes all the problems. If the source of consciousness ... and of the will which we think is able to direct consciousness ... is indeed the cells of the brain, could we not argue that those cells themselves are "given constraints" over which we have no control, and so ultimately there is no free will since no decision can be independent of those cells? That seems to be the implication of the experiments reported here, but as we weigh up the Dawkins and the Turell, the Obama and the Palin, the rum'n'raisin and the mint choc chip, absolutely nothing suggests to us that we are not considering the pros and cons independently of any uncontrollable inside influence.
 
I don't see how these experiments can differentiate between electrical impulses creating thoughts and electrical impulses responding to and conveying thoughts. If there is a self (I think we need to consider identity as well as will) which somehow transcends its physical container, all its thoughts would need to be translated into physical impulses for them to be given physical expression ... e.g. through language, gesture, action. Can neuroscience be precise enough to make such a distinction?