Free Will (The nature of a \'Creator\')

by dhw, Friday, September 10, 2010, 15:40 (5190 days ago) @ dhw

I have asked Romansh to jettison his definition of "free will" and consider the implications of my own ("an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity"). I'm now somewhat concerned that this may have caused offence, which was the last thing I would have wanted to do. If it has, please accept my apologies.-In the meantime, I've been following my own instructions, and in particular considering David's addition ("within the boundaries") which ties in with BBella's metaphor of the playpen.-Romansh had interpreted his own version as defining free will out of existence, and of course one might argue that all decisions are dependent on constraints beyond our control. Nevertheless, we all FEEL that we have free will, and one of the problems Romansh has raised is that we can't find a rational basis for that feeling. I think David's amendment would actually make such a basis possible, though I'm not keen on introducing the word "boundaries" since constraints ARE boundaries. Supposing we restructure my definition as follows: "an entity's ability to make its own conscious decisions within constraints beyond its control"?-If we're in a restaurant, we'll decide which item to choose from the limited menu. If we're composing a song, we'll decide what notes to use, provided they remain within the range of the human voice. If we contemplate the inconclusive evidence, we'll (oh so sensibly) decide to remain on our agnostic fence. Freedom of choice will always be limited, but free will relates to the decision, not to the situation. (Matt's robot fails to qualify, because it is not conscious.) Even if all decisions can be traced back to an endless chain of influences, one does not need to be conscious of influences in order to take a conscious decision. This applies equally to external constraints and internal (genetic make-up and other physical and mental factors). We can, I think, quite rationally argue that our individual identity evolves from the continual interplay between external and internal influences, and so all constraints, whether we're aware of them or not, contribute to the nature of the will that makes the decision, as well as to the decision itself. But the will is still ours, and ours alone. Does that bring us any closer to a consensus?