Darwinist ignorance, confusion & epigenetics (Introduction)

by David Turell , Tuesday, November 23, 2010, 00:49 (5114 days ago) @ David Turell


> Your imagined method leaves much to chance. How quickly an experimental God solves problems, we don't know. I can't accept religions' omni- everyting God. If the UI thinks and experiments as we do, time is lost. Your method uses chance exclusively, and the time is short. With directed DNA, chance is a side issue. That is the underlying reason I like my theory over yours.-My method of thought looks at probabilities, but not as precisely as Matt desires. Philosophical probability is not to be sneered at.-This quote from a review of a book presents my point:-Another matter deserves our attention- the criticism (in my opinion questionable) of Tomist metaphysics and of the evidential force of his five arguments for the existence of God. According to the author such arguments imply the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God deductively. The author displays a partiality towards inferring the existence of God in probabilistic terms in accordance with the abductive line of reasoning put forward by Charles Sanders Pierce. A consideration of God's existence through probability rather than certainty, the latter being in accordance with a deductive mode of reasoning, has important ramifications. For example, a discourse on the foundations of morality on God would only fit into the religious context of revelation and would require from us additional efforts if we were to find an exclusively rational explanation, understood as an unavoidable commitment to action that could elude the subjectivist and relativist trap to which we would be destined.
Regarding this point the author reveals himself to be a partial doubter of the Kantian epistemology and criticism of the Tomist arguments. In his view, the Kantian criticism is made up of two parts that need to be differentiated. On the one hand we are to reflect on the fact that the deductive process for a cosmological argument is inconsistent given that it assumes an identification of the ideal concept of the necessary being with the being of realism even though such a connection is not rationally admissible. On the other hand, Kant concludes equivocally, taken by an arbitrary epistemological limitation, that transcendent ideas are inaccessible to reason. Although accurate the Kantian criticism of the Tomist approach, notes the author, the idea that God is not foreign to our rational state and the Kantian conclusion of unknowability, does not necessarily follow. What needs to be defined is an adequate method of reasoning that takes us to a primary cause and its connection with sensible knowledge.