Science of Self (Humans)

by romansh , Saturday, March 15, 2014, 00:00 (3905 days ago) @ dhw
edited by unknown, Saturday, March 15, 2014, 00:06

Since we do not know what "reality" is, all our concepts are models. I don't understand the rest of your sentence.
Sorry DHW I wrote it a bit hurriedly. I think David said it fairly succinctly:
>>>Emergence is not a helpful word because it is used to express something we do not understand. We describe not understood concepts this way all the time.
The difference with synergism is that we do have some understanding of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts or at least the understanding we feel is within grasp.
 
> We draw boundaries round ourselves and others, but I'm not sure how arbitrary they are. Of course we can never know 100% of anyone's character (including our own), but that doesn't necessarily mean that what we know is without foundation (which I take to be the implication of "arbitrary"). I agree with the rest of what you say, but the totality of my parts is still me, temporary though they and I undoubtedly are.-So what it the boundary for say dhw? Your skin? Particular body parts? Your brain, do you include your nervous system in that? Is it your thoughts? I understand the pragmatic view that the self exists. It's the philosophical belief of the self exists I don't understand.- 
> Yes, we do, but my argument continued: "...your contention seems to be that our thoughts are the product of our bioelectrochemistry as well", which to me means that our bioelectrochemistry manipulates our bioelectrochemistry. 
Is there not plenty of evidence that at least this true. We can apply things that manipulate our biolectrochemistry ... oxytocin and a nice single malt are a couple that come to mind.-> Of course the whole discussion centres on dualism versus materialism. I think you are right to question the former, but you have ignored the problems that arise out of the latter. I did not defend dualism but asked you to explain how you think cells can be conscious of cells being conscious of cells manipulating cells.
Remember Dhw I am not claiming consciousness. I take a look at Choprian (and David's) view of conscious and contrast it with Blackmore's where by implication we might assume nothing is conscious and ask what is the difference.-I can't help thinking they are just different sides of the same coin.-
> Of course it doesn't. I wrote: "You may quite rightly argue that whatever unconscious factors influenced that decision may have been beyond my control, and that is why I say I do not know if I have free will." You have said you were in a hurry, so perhaps when you have a bit more time, you might put my arguments back in their contexts! (I do sympathize, though. You have complained before, I think, about the length of my posts!)-If our definition of free will is we make conscious choices ... assuming consciousness exists we have free will. No problem. But hard determinist asks is there any thing in our lives that is independent of cause? -If not, how is that free? If yes, how is that not random and consequently somehow free?
This is an ancient dilemma and nothing new. But if we still insist on freedom, even a little bit of limited free will, we end up in the world of libertarian of free will!-Unless we move back to a different definition. But the problem does not actually go away. This is why James (who believed in free will), called compatibilism a quagmire of evasion and Kant called it a wretched subterfuge.