Ruth & Rindler (General)

by dhw, Saturday, August 03, 2013, 11:43 (4132 days ago)

RUTH (under Ruth's "real" possibilities): Dh, I think I understand what's bothering you. I take as my starting point Heisenberg's comments, but keep in mind that he is assuming that 'real' = 'physically real'. I refer to Heisenberg's formulation, but I do differ with it in that I don't assume that because something is not physically real, that it is unreal. Note that in my figure 7.2, I don't say that category III is 'unreal', I just don't take it as physically real. -What bothers me is not reality/unreality but comparative reality as in more real/less real. That's why I thought it might be less confusing to say Heisenberg's 'potentia' are less physical (instead of 'less real') than events in the actual world, but more physical (instead of 'more real') than thoughts. But I now understand what you meant, so thank you for the clarification. If it's OK with you, I'd like to move on to my second set of questions, which concern 7.3.2: The puzzle of 'Rindler quanta'.-You wrote: "The phenomenon of Rindler quanta has serious implications for the question of the 'reality' of quanta, since it seems to tell us that not only the properties of quanta but even whether or not there are any quanta is a purely 'contextual' matter ... i.e. dependent on the observer and what types of measurements he/she chooses to make."-Your response is: "From the PTI standpoint, the problem evaporates. There are no independently existing 'quanta' in either case [= accelerating or inertial observer], there are simply possible transactions."-As I understand you, a transaction cannot take place without an emitter and an absorber. If there are no independently existing quanta, what might possibly be emitted and absorbed in your possible transactions?-Quote: "In both cases, a transaction occurs; it is simply interpreted differently by the different observers" (because they see it from different perspectives). Is it the transaction that is interpreted differently, or the quanta that underlie the transactional process? If it's the latter, how does this differ from the properties and even existence of the quanta being "dependent on the observer and what types of measurement he/she chooses to make"?-You conclude: "Since transactions, and the possibilities leading to them, are the fundamental ontological entities in TI ... rather than quanta ... TI has no trouble accounting for the phenomenon of Rindler quanta."-I don't understand how transactions can be the fundamental ontological entities independently of the 'quanta' that form the basis of the transaction. Again it seems that the properties of the quanta depend on the observer, and I can't see how your argument does or does not tell us whether the quanta actually exist. It's as if you are simply saying their existence is irrelevant. -This whole post may well be a total misunderstanding of your argument, but if so, my hope is that it will give you some idea of how easy it is for the potential reader of your 'popular' book to get confused. So once again I hope you won't be too put off by my obtuseness.