Free Will, Consciousness, Identity (Identity)

by dhw, Monday, July 30, 2012, 20:11 (4498 days ago) @ romansh

Romansh, I shan't answer you point by point, as your main concern is how I defend the possibility of free will. However, let me first deal with your comment on David's post concerning "responsibility", as this illustrates the fundamental difference between us. If we do have free will, in my view it can ONLY come into play when we have to make a conscious decision. In your dog example, you were responsible for leaving the meat exposed, but you did not take a conscious decision to do so (it was an "unguarded moment"). According to my definition, the will is therefore not involved. I believe that dogs don't have our levels of consciousness and so are far more at the mercy of their instincts (conscious control of these being an important facet of free will). I would assume that the dog acted instinctively, but animals can be trained to master their instincts, e.g. not to shit on the carpet, and this requires a level of consciousness that points to a limited degree of free will. Your continued opposition to incorporating consciousness into the definition is therefore an insurmountable obstacle to our understanding of each other, and in effect means that free will is possible by my definition ("an entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints"), and impossible by yours ("the ability to act on or make choices independently of the environment or of the universe"). I wonder which comes closer to other people's definitions.-Both sides of the argument seem equally convincing to me, but while your focus is on cause and effect, mine is on the decision-making process itself, as this alone is when my concept of the will (whether free or not) operates. In my youth, I believed that our identity was formed solely by heredity, environment, past events and chance ... all beyond our control. Therefore all my decisions were shaped by these forces, and control was illusory. This may be true. The opposing, much more complex view, which may also be true, is that my identity is unique to me, and no matter what influences have shaped it and continue to shape it (identity is an on-going process), I am aware of a level of consciousness, over and above all other levels, that puts "me" in control of "myself" and makes conscious decisions according to "my" priorities. I may not control the forces that have shaped me, and I may not control the factors between which I have to choose (my definition includes "within given constraints"), but it is this overriding level of "my" consciousness ... under "my" control, free from all other constraints ... that makes the decisions.
 
The great question, of course, is what gives me the various levels of consciousness I believe I have. (If you honestly believe that your own consciousness and mine are an illusion, our discussion is pointless.) If it turns out that all "my" thoughts are dictated by chemical processes in the brain, I will disbelieve in free will. But so long as the source of consciousness remains a mystery, I shall remain open-minded. In this context, I'm as dismayed by your blanket dismissal of mystic and psychic experiences like NDEs as you are by my refusal to dismiss them. Forgive me, but "once we turn on the scientific scrutiny they are not there" seems to me to be an assumption considerably less convincing than our assumption that a brick is not as conscious as a human being.
 
This leaves us with the unknown (and possibly non-existing) form of energy that does not depend on the material world as we know it, but which is hinted at by mystic and psychic experiences. The inference is that will/consciousness/identity may not depend on the brain cells, and a god (if it exists) certainly won't depend on the materials we know. That does not mean that the will or even a god are not subject to the chain of cause and effect, which is part of the on-going process of identity-shaping. It means that the endless chain of events giving rise to the options between which I have a choice may still leave "my" conscious will free to make that choice. One can trace causes and effects prior to and subsequent to the decision, but the latter itself is not predetermined. My will determines it by consciously weighing up the options in accordance with the priorities of the person who is uniquely "me". This in my view is the argument that makes free will possible.
 
Finally, in your PS you write that you have never said you disbelieve in free will. I'd be interested to know, then, what stops you from disbelieving.