Information and free will (Introduction)

by dhw, Wednesday, October 12, 2011, 17:58 (4791 days ago) @ romansh

I defined “free will” as “an entity’s conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints” (the constraints being Nature and/or the situation, and factors connected with the decision-making process itself, e.g. our genetic make-up).

ROMANSH: Your definition needs work I think, what does nature imply – genetics, bacteria, chemistry, England’s pastures green?

Originally your objection was to the prerequisite of consciousness, so I’m pleased to see you’ve now shifted your ground. No matter how much freedom I have, I cannot make decisions that will go against the constraints of Nature, which includes my own nature as it is now: I can’t decide to fly, jump fifty metres, become dictator of the world, or eat a thousand bars of chocolate at one go. None of these “decisions” are within the compass of my current identity, and so they represent given constraints. Similarly with situation: if I’m locked up in prison I can’t decide to go shopping. I can, however, decide whether to sing “Please Release Me” or “Baby, It’s Cold Outside”.

ROMANSH: My computer running a spreadsheet makes choices all the time, depending on the keyboard inputs. […] I do ask is not the computer, in some rudimentary way, aware of the key strokes and its memory registers?

I explained what I meant by consciousness: “awareness of one’s own thoughts, perceptions, actions and environment.” Do you disagree with this definition? I like your cautious “rudimentary”, but if you think your computer fulfils the conditions of my definition of consciousness, then you believe it’s conscious, and if you think it’s able consciously to control its decision-making process within given constraints, then you believe your computer has free will. I don’t.

ROMANSH: Beyond our control this is eactly what we are trying ascertain whether we do control (our poorly understood) wills. So for me your definition sort of reduces to will that is free except what they are not free from.

That is indeed what it boils down to. Even a believer in free will won’t claim freedom to do absolutely anything, so we have to mention unavoidable constraints. But I think you’re confusing the definition with the argument. The definition cannot say whether we do or don’t have control. That is the subject of the argument. I’ve offered you two opposing views – allowing for the given Nature/situation constraints – based on my definition: 1) the decision-making process itself depends on uncontrollable factors such as our genetic make-up, upbringing etc., so we do not have free will; or 2) the factors governing the decision-making process are what constitute our personal identity, and so it is “I” (my personal identity) who make the decision. In other words, the choice will depend on what I am and not on the factors that made me what I am. Therefore “I” do have free will – though the degree will depend on the situation. In case you complain that this means my will is dependent on me, let me point out that my will IS me, along with my consciousness, emotions, imagination, memory etc.

ROMANSH: So you are agreeing that we are caused by the universe?

If by that you mean we wouldn’t be here if the universe wasn’t here, yes of course I agree. But that doesn’t mean that I’m not “free” to choose which TV programme to watch. I gave you a concrete example, in which I had to choose between my own preference and my wife’s, and I asked you two questions: a) why consciousness was not integral to the decision-making process, and b) given this information, in what way my decision would be forced on me by influences beyond my control.

ROMANSH: Again I would argue it is incumbent on those arguing for free will to show the wills and hence choices are independent of said information.

This doesn’t answer my questions, and I don’t understand your reply. Yes, the choices are dependent on the information. The information is what constitutes the choices between which we must decide by using our will! The whole point is whether, when we have a choice, we are free or not to decide what choice to make.

ROMANSH: Appealing to quatum indeterminism won’t cut it for me either as an argument.

Sorry, but I don’t understand this comment.

ROMANSH: The homunculus argument (even when expressed as a soul) is the most difficult to defend. The homunculus needs to get its information from somewhere and it too gets its information from its immediate environment and therefore is dependent. This is not freedom in anyway.

“I” (identity, homunculus, whatever) am indeed dependent on the information I get from the environment. But if I have free will, it relates to my conscious ability to use that information in order to make my decision. Your argument here boils down to saying if we didn’t have a choice between x and y, we wouldn’t have the ability to choose between x and y. X and y are the given constraints (here, the situation), and free will is the conscious ability to make the choice between them.

ROMANSH: The only way to get “free” will is to redefine it so that it is compatible somehow.

The definition of “free will” has to be neutral. Then we can discuss whether we do or do not have it.