https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-body-independent-muscle-sensors.html

"Voluntary movements are prepared before they are executed. For example, such preparation occurs in the period between seeing a coffee cup and starting to reach for it. Neurons in many areas of the brain change their activity during movement preparation in ways that reflect different aspects of the goal, such as the intended movement direction.

"It is well-known that preparation improves reaction time and the overall quality of movements, but it has been unclear how preparatory brain activity gives rise to improved motor performance. There have been no evidence of goal-related preparatory changes in muscles. However, a new study from Umeå University has identified a specific preparatory neural mechanism that can lead to improved motor performance.

"'Our study demonstrates a preparatory change in the sensitivity of muscle spindle receptors and the motor reflexes they enable," says Dr. Michael Dimitriou who headed this study and is a Research Fellow at the Department of Integrative Medical Biology of Umeå University.

***

"'When preparing to reach in a particular direction, we found that reflex sensitivity and muscle stiffness is selectively decreased in muscles that are about to stretch. To facilitate reaching the goal, the nervous system seems to independently modulate the 'breaks' in an advantageous manner before initiating movement," says Dr. Dimitriou. "Beyond its role in movement preparation, the independent control of sensory receptors may be another way in which the nervous system routinely exerts goal-dependent control, in addition to the top-down control of muscle force and the selective processing of sensory signals."

Comment: No surprise, just more confirmation of the efficiency pf neve muscle controls.

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/beautiful-minds/the-neuroscience-of-free-will-a-q-...

"I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Iona College where I also serve as a faculty member for the Iona Neuroscience program. I have previously worked in the Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind program at Franklin and Marshall College as well as previous appointments as a Lecturer at King’s College London and University of Alabama.

***

"...it seems to me that at least at times I could have decided to and done something else than what I did. I decided to go for a run this afternoon, but no one made me and I wasn’t subject to any compulsion; I could have gone for a coffee instead, at least it seems to me.

"Philosophers take these starting points and work to construct plausible accounts of free will. Broadly speaking, there is a lot of disagreement as to the right view of free will, but most philosophers believe that a person has free will if they have the ability to act freely, and that this kind of control is linked to whether it would be appropriate to hold that person responsible (e.g., blame or praise them) for what they do. For instance, we don’t typically hold people responsible for what they do if they were acting under severe threat or inner compulsion.

***

"The current neuroscience of free will traces its lineage back to an influential experiment by Benjamin Libet and his colleagues.

***

"It was known since the 1960’s from work by Kornhuber and Deecke that there is slow buildup of negative brain activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA) and pre-SMA measurable by electoencephalography (EEG) just prior to voluntary (i.e., movement initiated by the participant) bodily movement. This brain activity, called the readiness potential (RP), was taken to be neural preparation to move for spontaneous movements and starts about a half second before time of the movement

***

"One shouldn’t jump to the depressing conclusion, though, that we don’t act freely or don’t really deserve any of the moral reactions others have to our actions; there is a healthy discussion on how the original Libet results can be interpreted as consistent with that picture of us humans as self-governing and free and moral persons.

***

"Libet argued that W-time within a reasonable range was reliable since we can see how accurately participants in the lab estimate the time of other events, such as skin shocks. The reliability of W-time has recently been challenged yet again with a new study that concludes that depending on the order in which participants complete certain tasks in the experiment, W-time can be strikingly different (i.e., there is an order effect.

***

"Two of the hottest topics seem to be, first, what exactly the RP, that negative build-up of brain activity pre-movement, really signifies and, second, how we can make our voluntary actions in the lab more ecologically valid. As to the first, the past decade has seen researchers investigating if we have evidence that the RP really does stand for a decision to move or, alternatively, if the RP just is the brain’s being biased to move in some way (say, left, instead of right) without the commitment to do so.

***

"But many, myself included, have voiced concern that when to press a button or whether to press a left or right button, just isn’t the right kind of action to stake a claim that we as agents don’t initiate our actions via our conscious intentions to act. Hence, some of the ongoing work involves making the choice of which button to press or when to press it meaningful via rewards or penalties for skipping ahead or value-laden options, such as charity donations.

***

"...one of the aspects of our lives that seems the most undeniable is that we really do experience ourselves as in control of our movements and their effects in the world. There is a large body of work in cognitive neuroscience which focuses on this sense of agency"

Comment: Long and complex discussion in which it appears that the form of the experimental design definitely affects the time interval of the readiness potential. The author favors free will but admits the experiments have not been totally definitive

https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-03-tackles-neuroscience-free.html

"For several decades, some researchers have argued that neuroscience studies prove human actions are driven by external stimuli—that the brain is reactive and free will is an illusion. But a new analysis of these studies shows that many contained methodological inconsistencies and conflicting results.

"'Score one for skepticism of claims that neuroscience has proven—or disproven—any metaphysical position," says Veljko Dubljevic, co-author of the paper and an assistant professor of philosophy at NC State who specializes in research on the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience and technology.

"'The problem is that neuroscientists in training are being taught these studies provide definitive proof of the absence of free will, and instructors aren't being careful about looking at the evidence that supports the claims that are made," Dubljevic says. "Teaching uncritical thinking like this in science courses is both unscientific and socially dangerous."

"At issue are studies like those pioneered by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, which assessed brain activity in study participants who were asked to perform a specific task. Libet found brain activity preceded a person's actions before the person decided to act. Later studies, using various techniques, claimed to have replicated this basic finding.

"But in the first-ever qualitative review of these studies, researchers are finding that the results are far from conclusive. The review analyzed 48 studies, ranging from Libet's landmark 1983 paper through 2014.

"'We found that interpretation of study results appears to have been driven by the metaphysical position the given author or authors subscribed to—not by a careful analysis of the results themselves," Dubljevic says. "Basically, those who opposed free will interpreted the results to support their position, and vice versa."

"The researchers also found significant variability across studies. For example, a subset of studies that actually looked at where activity was taking place in the brain, and whether it was related to will (or intent to complete a task), often found conflicting results.

"'Meanwhile, the journal articles that drew the most forceful conclusions often didn't even assess the neural activity in question - which means their conclusions were based on speculation," Dubljevic says. "It is crucial to critically examine whether the methods used actually support the claims being made."

"'Numerous studies suggest that fostering a belief in determinism influences behaviors like cheating," Dubljevic says. "Promoting an unsubstantiated belief on the metaphysical position of non-existence of free will may increase the likelihood that people won't feel responsible for their actions if they think their actions were predetermined."

"And this isn't a problem solely within the neuroscience community. Earlier work by Dubljevic and his collaborators found challenges in how this area of research has been covered by the press and consumed by the public.

"'To be clear, we're not taking a position on free will," Dubljevic says. "We're just saying neuroscience hasn't definitively proven anything one way or the other.'"

Comment: So free will may exist.


> 1)	Nature and/or the situation
> 2)	Factors connected with the decision-making process itself (e.g. our own genetic make-up)
> 
> Clearly the article links up with the second of these, which of course is the one that causes all the problems. If the source of consciousness ... and of the will which we think is able to direct consciousness ... is indeed the cells of the brain, could we not argue that those cells themselves are "given constraints" over which we have no control, and so ultimately there is no free will since no decision can be independent of those cells? -We don't know what we do know and also what we don't know. Note my previous comment about parallel circuits in the brain. The brain is an extremely complex computer and even if we have rough ideas about each area of control, there are underlying interactions going on that confuse interpretations. If a thought brings anger, for example, adrenalin is released and that affects every cell in the body.- 
> I don't see how these experiments can differentiate between electrical impulses creating thoughts and electrical impulses responding to and conveying thoughts. If there is a self (I think we need to consider identity as well as will) which somehow transcends its physical container, all its thoughts would need to be translated into physical impulses for them to be given physical expression ... e.g. through language, gesture, action. Can neuroscience be precise enough to make such a distinction?-No it can't. These button experiments are studying impulses in the motor strips of the brain. In mapping the brain, there is a little person outline on each strip. It is that exact. So your finger moves seemingly too long after the impulse. What does that really prove? Thinking and decision making is also preceding the movement. Does that have a delaying effect on the impulse? We don't know. My attitude is that I have free will, electrical effects prove nothing, and I'm with the philosophers, the best thinkers on Earth. Some little brains think too much. (Angels on the head of the pin and so forth)

For me the question of free will is simply part of the even more complex one of identity, concerning which we had a long discussion this time last year. Just what is it that directs our minds to take decisions? Brain cells directing brain cells? Or the ghost in the machine?-My vote is for the ghost!

MATT (to Romansh): Maybe I'm just hitting the same problem you have. Something within the universe can't exactly [be] independent of the universe.
> 
> My original definition has undergone several revisions, as a result of these discussions. Even the one that you originally seconded has been jettisoned, and I'm wondering if perhaps you missed the last one:
> 
> An entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints.
> 
> Does this cover all the options? Of course the real issue is whether we have it or not, but we've probably exhausted all the arguments now and still don't know the answer. (That may well apply to all our discussions, though perhaps we can say we now have a better idea about why we are so ignorant!)-Yeah, I just realized late last night that I had neglected this thread. -I would agree with that definition as it stands.

OK properties necessary for free will
> 1) to exhibit or experience will or wants. (Do zombies have consciousness?)
> 2) that will should be independent of the universe.
> 
> The one thing I an aware of, the definition I'm using defines free will out of existence. Unless we are all possesed by magical gods called souls which direct our chemistry and physics? And even then there is some doubt these souls would not succumb to cause and effect. Alternatively we can define free will in a way which defines it into existence, by giving it properties (or a definition) that are a reflection of our experience of free will. Hence my use of the word "anthropic".-As for zombies--without meaning to sound pedantic--what kind of zombies are we talking about? Romero-type zombies? Or Voodoo zombies? -So; the definition you're using is what I would say is one that isn't possible. I read free will as being able to decide or innovate upon existing options, replete with the ability to choose to do nothing, or to make the situation worse. But there are still constraints; maybe I'm just hitting the same problem you have. Something within the universe can't exactly independent of the universe.

I think the experiments with Amy the Gorilla would shoot that statement down pretty quick. She was able to identify herself with sign language.-The concept of "I" as a reference isn't the same as being conscious of being conscious.

I think the experiments with Amy the Gorilla would shoot that statement down pretty quick. She was able to identify herself with sign language.-I had forgotten her. Good point, but her awareness is just a tiny fraction of ours. My poodle knows he is in the mirror, my rottie didn't. but the animals don't do introspection. Self-recognition is really a minor issue.


> I just started reading a book that attacks materialism, and one of the author's definitions of consciousness contains a subcomponent called being "self-aware," meaning "the entity is aware that it is conscious." 
> 
> I think that in the case of Man v. the rest of Mammalia, this is the deciding factor.-Self-awareness has always been a major component of the definition of human consciousness. Agreed.

I was thinking about consciousness earlier, having read many posts about it recently. And while this is slightly off topic, I am beginning to think that consciousness is not the point that separates man from animal. Even animals seem to a certain extent, self aware. 
> 
> My musings lead me to two things that animals do not posses, however, and have forced me to reevaluate my position on consciousness, and my hierarchy of life. Plants contain life, but no consciousness. Animals contain consciousness, and limited reasoning skills, but no creativity(imagination, abstract reasoning skills). Human's contain life, consciousness, creativity, and free will. They are not inseparable, but they are sequentially dependent. You the inanimate can not be conscious, the unconscious(non-sentient, not to be confused with the layman vernacular) can not create, and without creativity, you can not make the abstract reasoning necessary for freewill, because you would always be subject/slave to your instincts.-I just started reading a book that attacks materialism, and one of the author's definitions of consciousness contains a subcomponent called being "self-aware," meaning "the entity is aware that it is conscious." -I think that in the case of Man v. the rest of Mammalia, this is the deciding factor.