AgnosticWeb.com

Back to the forum index

Linear

We are discussing whether / to what extent we have free will, and for this we obviously need a definition.-ROMANSH: The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe.-DAVID: I would fully agree, and if you don't mind I will use that brief sentence as my definition also.-This definition excludes even the possibility that our actions and choices may be determined by factors within ourselves that are beyond our conscious control.-(It may be too late, but I've started this new thread because 'What exactly IS Intelligence?' has become somewhat overcrowded.)

6613 views

We are discussing whether / to what extent we have free will, and for this we obviously need a definition.
> 
> ROMANSH: The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe.
> 
> DAVID: I would fully agree, and if you don't mind I will use that brief sentence as my definition also.
> 
> This definition excludes even the possibility that our actions and choices may be determined by factors within ourselves that are beyond our conscious control.-
Your inference is correct. We are influenced by our learned background of events throughout our lives, but with that background in place, my choices of action or thought are my choices. We can nit pick back to my genetics for influences, but ultimately, I choose my actions or thoughts. We develop our personalites which become our choice makers.

6590 views

Romansh has defined free will as: "the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe." I have pointed out that this definition excludes even the possibility that our actions and choices may be determined by factors within ourselves that are beyond our conscious control.-DAVID: Your inference is correct. We are influenced by our learned background of events throughout our lives, but with that background in place, my choices of action or thought are my choices. We can nit pick back to my genetics for influences, but ultimately, I choose my actions or thoughts. We develop our personalities which become our choice makers.-I hesitate to enter your very own field of medicine, but is it not true that there are certain brain and glandular disorders that can drastically affect or change people's personalities (and hence their actions and choices)? Although I believe the cause of schizophrenia is still unknown, would you say schizophrenics are able to choose all their thoughts? If diseases, disorders, narcotics and medications can affect the brain and thus affect behaviour, how can we totally dismiss the possibility that our genetic inheritance is directly responsible for at least certain aspects of our conduct? Romansh has quoted Pinker, who claims that 40%-50% of our behavioural traits might be ascribed to genetics (which we cannot change). I don't know how he can be so precise, but I don't know how you can be so precise either.-Romansh disagrees with my interpretation, and thinks "this definition leads us (well it did me) to doubt the very existence of the self."-Once again, I think you're trying to argue on two different levels at once. The first level is purely semantic. You introduced the term "free will" into our discussion on intelligence, and have now said what you mean by it. Your definition presupposes the existence of the environment and of the universe, while the ability to act or make choices clearly presupposes the existence of individual human beings. If the environment and the universe might make our decisions dependent, how can you argue that the given, uncontrollable elements of human beings are not just as capable of doing so? My own definition (1 September at 14.42) is "the conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond one's own control". No-one has taken a blind bit of notice (I feel a strange kinship with Cassandra!) but I don't think it's THAT bad. At least tell me what's wrong with it.-The second stage of the argument is whether you believe free will ... according to your definition ... is possible or not. This is where I'm going to have to try and decipher your cryptic statement. I hope you'll correct me if I fail to read your mind, but I suspect this is another example of your preoccupation with boundaries (that is not meant negatively). What I think you're saying is that human beings can't be separated from their environment and the universe, and therefore we can't separate the self. It's the mystic "All is One". Consequently there can be no such thing as free will. The Strawson quote ... again please correct me if I'm wrong ... suggests that eventually all our thoughts must go back to something we can't control, which is a bit like saying we don't know what governs our subconscious (though I don't want to be drawn into a discussion on boundaries between conscious and subconscious). Some religious people might argue that it's God, while the rest of us must at present be content with the answer "we don't know". This is also my answer to the question of the existence or extent of our "free will". However, as is now becoming habitual in our discussions, I have to say that on a pragmatic level, I feel that I have an individual self and I feel that I have a free will, and even if reason may suggest otherwise, I know from experience that reason is not always the best guide.

6560 views

Once again, I think you're trying to argue on two different levels at once. The first level is purely semantic. You introduced the term "free will" into our discussion on intelligence, and have now said what you mean by it. Your definition presupposes the existence of the environment and of the universe, while the ability to act or make choices clearly presupposes the existence of individual human beings.
Although dhw, you and I, may be the figment of some being's or Matrix's imagination, and I have no method of proving otherwise; it does seem pointless and churlish to assume my perception is other than a reflection of my environment and the universe. -While my definition of free will does presuppose human beings, at least in my mind's eye; the definition itself does not. It applies to machines, bricks, computers, plants, animals etc.
>>The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe.-> If the environment and the universe might make our decisions dependent, how can you argue that the given, uncontrollable elements of human beings are not just as capable of doing so?-Just exactly do you mean by controllable/uncontrollable? My next part of the question (sorry boundary bound) where does the the human being begin and end - sorry? I find thinking/reasoning about free will leads me to question the typical dualistic perception of the universe - "There's me and then there is the rest of the universe."-> My own definition (1 September at 14.42) is "the conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond one's own control". No-one has taken a blind bit of notice (I feel a strange kinship with Cassandra!) but I don't think it's THAT bad. At least tell me what's wrong with it.
For me it bring's in the extra imponderable - consciousness - and it very definitely implies a human being with "one's", it implies boundaries - which is OK. To me the discussion on intelligence and free will has been very "anthropic", which of course is OK we are humans. 
 
> What I think you're saying is that human beings can't be separated from their environment and the universe, and therefore we can't separate the self. It's the mystic "All is One". Consequently there can be no such thing as free will. 
No it's not mystic - I like to think of it as reasoned. I'm not sure "All is one" is a good description but it's heading that way. Scientific monism might be a better description.-On a day to day basis or pragmatic level I would describe myself as a pluralist. And I suppose dualism has it's place for the quick decisions, yes-no, right-wrong, good-bad, stop-go and so on.-> The Strawson quote ... again please correct me if I'm wrong ... suggests that eventually all our thoughts must go back to something we can't control, which is a bit like saying we don't know what governs our subconscious (though I don't want to be drawn into a discussion on boundaries between conscious and subconscious). 
More or less - it's a reworking of a Schopenhauer thought. Though if I remember correctly Strawson aims his comments at "will" rather than "thoughts".
> However, as is now becoming habitual in our discussions, I have to say that on a pragmatic level, I feel that I have an individual self and I feel that I have a free will, and even if reason may suggest otherwise, I know from experience that reason is not always the best guide.-Again I don't disagree with this approach - the moment I stop thinking about free will I go into my unconscious free will mode. But (my) reason does tell me I should not blindly assume the existence of free will.-To be clear, I do not believe in free will - ie I do not hold a belief in free will. As an agnostic I do not disbelieve in free will either. I appear to experience it but I am awaiting for someone to point out a rational mechanism for it, because I cannot find one. I feel I experience the colour 'blue', though when I think about it, I suspect 'blue' may not be what it seems.-And as a further aside, as an agnostic I try to avoid beliefs - fail miserably of course

6643 views

Romansh,-Once again my preoccupation with Nietzsche leads me to a powerful argument concerning free will:-"There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are "immediate certainties"; for example, "I think," or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, "I will"; as though knowledge here got hold of its object purely and nakedly as "The thing in itself," without any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a contradictio in adjecto, I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!
 Let the people suppose that knowledge means knowing things entirely; the philosopher must say to himself: When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence "I think," I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove; for example, that it is I who think, that there must be necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an "ego," and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking--that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could i determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps "willing" or "feeling?" In short, the assertion "I think" assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further "knowledge," it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me." (Beyond Good and Evil, section 16.)-It seems that the assertion of free will is definitely tied to the assertion "I think." Thus, the question of free will is one that to Nietzsche is one that we can have no certainty on; In the same book, N suggests that free will lies only at the center of where all our drives intersect.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6592 views

I am dissatisfied with Romansh's definition of free will as "the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe", because it excludes the internal influences over which we have no control.-ROMANSH: While my definition does presuppose human beings, at least in my mind's eye; the definition itself does not. It applies to machines, bricks, computers, plants, animals etc.-My objection still stands. Machines, bricks, computers, plants, animals etc. may also be subject to internal influences over which they have no control. I will now be very daring and suggest that a brick might perhaps not have free will because so far as we know it has no brain, is incapable of thought, movement, conscious action, conscious choice etc. We needn't argue about whether all this is so, because I've said "might perhaps". My point is the possibility that internal factors (whether present or absent) may determine whether or not it has free will. I will be equally daring and say that animals have a brain, are capable of movement, and may be capable of conscious action and conscious choice (personally I suspect that they are). But I do not know to what extent their actions and choices are dictated by their genetic make-up or other factors beyond their control, and so I do not know whether or to what extent they have free will. -As far as humans are concerned, I argued that if the environment and the universe might make our decisions dependent, why not also the given, uncontrollable elements of human beings too? You do not know what I mean by uncontrollable. I mean any part of us that directs our behaviour without our being conscious of it or able to change it ... e.g. certain physical / mental disorders, our brain cells, our whole genetic make-up. I think it is perfectly possible that such factors limit our freedom of will, but you have discounted them in your definition.-You don't seem to have too many objections, though, to my own definition (which, of course, does encompass internal constraints). The extra imponderable of consciousness, which I defined earlier, seems to me to be integral to the concept, but I agree that "one's" is too anthropic. How about: "an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity." (N.B. I'm only looking for a definition here ... whether you believe there is such a thing as an entity or as free will is a different matter.) Is this or is this not what we mean when we talk of "free will"?-Your reasoning leads you "to question the typical dualistic perception of the universe ... "There's me and then there is the rest of the universe."" That is precisely how I interpreted your argument ("human beings can't be separated from their environment and the universe, and therefore we can't separate the self"). I don't have a problem with such questioning, I agree with you completely that we should not "blindly assume the existence of free will", and like you I neither believe nor disbelieve in it. As regards waiting for a rational mechanism, I can't find one for consciousness, memory, emotion, imagination, will etc. Nothing but brain cells sparking off one another? What makes them spark? Some sort of immaterial me? Hardly rational, is it? (Sorry, but I can't discuss these things with you unless I think I'm me and I think you're you). So hey ho, I remain in rational limbo, but am happy to carry on feeling I have all these attributes. -You finish: "as an agnostic I try to avoid beliefs ... fail miserably of course." Great line. But your various references to our "anthropic" discussion suggest that you're trying to avoid being confined to your humanity. If you could really identify yourself with a brick or an amoeba or a duck-billed platypus, if you really knew the answers to all our questions, or if you really went through life not believing in anything, you'd probably be literally out of your mind. I wouldn't regard it as "miserable failure" that you're not.

6607 views

I am dissatisfied with Romansh's definition of free will as "the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe", because it excludes the internal influences over which we have no control.
Hey I object - where exactly in the definition does it exclude my or my excludes the influences? Which part of my my internals are not part of the universe? --- :joke: sort of. -> My point is the possibility that internal factors (whether present or absent) may determine whether or not it has free will.
Agreed - they may compromise whatever free will we think we have.-> As far as humans are concerned, I argued that if the environment and the universe might make our decisions dependent, why not also the given, uncontrollable elements of human beings too? You do not know what I mean by uncontrollable. I mean any part of us that directs our behaviour without our being conscious of it or able to change it ... e.g. certain physical / mental disorders, our brain cells, our whole genetic make-up. I think it is perfectly possible that such factors limit our freedom of will, but you have discounted them in your definition.-By uncontrollable you seem to include our unconscious which controls much of our behaviour. And by controllable you appear to mean the behaviours we think we are aware of? Again I'm not sure how the definition I have chosen limits these possibilities. It certainly does not specify any particular entity for inclusion or exclusion.
 
> You don't seem to have too many objections, though, to my own definition (which, of course, does encompass internal constraints). The extra imponderable of consciousness, which I defined earlier, seems to me to be integral to the concept, but I agree that "one's" is too anthropic. How about: "an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity." 
OK just to be clear, say I were to lock up this said entity in a box, it would not change the entity's free will (or lack of it) one iota. It would limit it freedom of action. that's all. If that is what you meant by constraints?-If by constraints you meant genetics, evolution, chemistry and physics - then fair enough. -My only objection would remain the inclusion of conscious. Here's a quote from Steven Pinker from How the Mind Works:
>>> The philosopher Georges Rey once told me that he has no sentient experiences. He lost them after a bicycle accident when he was fifteen. Since then, he insists, he has been a zombie. I assume he is speaking tongue-in-cheek, but of course I have no way of knowing, and that is his point.
 
> (Sorry, but I can't discuss these things with you unless I think I'm me and I think you're you). So hey ho, I remain in rational limbo, but am happy to carry on feeling I have all these attributes. 
Strange, not knowing something has never stopped me talking about it. -> You finish: "as an agnostic I try to avoid beliefs ... fail miserably of course." Great line. 
Thanks :)-> But your various references to our "anthropic" discussion suggest that you're trying to avoid being confined to your humanity.
Should our definitions be in our image?-> If you could really identify yourself with a brick or an amoeba or a duck-billed platypus, if you really knew the answers to all our questions, or if you really went through life not believing in anything, you'd probably be literally out of your mind. I wouldn't regard it as "miserable failure" that you're not.-Again I'm lucky I can dissociate my reasoning from my pragmatic existence. The two do not have to correlate. No I can't pragmatically identify myself with a brick. But with some really good anthropomorphization, I can identify with my fellow kind (wives are a bit more difficult) and probably most importantly, pragmatically speaking, I can identify with myself.

6593 views

Romansh has defined free will as "the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe."-ROMANSH: Which part of my internals are not part of the universe? ... joke: sort of.-Well, it's not really, because you then quite rightly assume that my reference to "uncontrollable" includes our unconscious, "which controls much of our behaviour", and yet you're not sure how your definition "limits these possibilities". Your definition quite specifically entails a separation between the ability and the environment/universe (how else can it be independent?), so how does your definition include the entity's ability to act independently of elements of the entity itself?-You say that locking a person up in a box limits his freedom of action, not his freedom of will. Any confusion here is purely of your own making, since your definition of free will includes the ability to ACT independently of the environment ... which in this case would be the box. Your definition therefore conflates freedom of action with freedom of will (the "crime" of which you accused George). In terms of my own definition, the man in the box clearly can't decide that he will leave the box (so even if there is such a thing as free will, it can't be exercised), but he can decide what to do while he's in the box (scream, contemplate the nature of free will, play with the spiders). The environment will elicit a decision, but we don't know to what extent the decision will be determined by factors of temperament that are beyond his own control.-You write: "If by constraints you meant genetics, evolution, chemistry and physics ... then fair enough." These, and more besides (e.g. the subconscious, the effects of disease). -You still object to the inclusion of consciousness as part of the definition. I'm afraid I can't see the relevance of the Pinker quote. The "zombie" Georges Rey's loss of sentient experiences does not stop him from being conscious of the loss, from communicating his consciousness of the loss, and from living his life. However, it may well have had an effect on the decisions he has made during that life, in which case the quote proves my own point: that our freedom of will may be limited by internal factors as well as external.-You ask: "Should our definitions be in our image?" I'm not sure what you mean by definitions "in our own image". We have created the terminology. Consciousness, intelligence, free will do not come in neatly labelled packages. We have given these names to things we observe in ourselves, and we then look around to see if there are similar phenomena outside of humanity. We ask if a brick, an amoeba, or a duck-billed platypus has the same mental faculties as we have. Do you envisage any other procedure?-You are able to dissociate your reasoning from your pragmatic existence. I suspect that all of us on this website play the same game, which in fact is essential if we are to keep our sanity. We know virtually nothing for certain, but we act as if we did because the alternative would indeed be to become a zombie. "Most importantly, pragmatically speaking, I can identify with myself." Yes, sir. You have discovered the reality of the self ... even if your reason tells you there is no such thing.

6602 views

You say that locking a person up in a box limits his freedom of action, not his freedom of will. Any confusion here is purely of your own making, since your definition of free will includes the ability to ACT independently of the environment ... which in this case would be the box. Your definition therefore conflates freedom of action with freedom of will (the "crime" of which you accused George). 
Point taken, I consider myself as chastized, and back off with tail between legs - apologies to George.-But on further consideration I will hold on to my definition a little longer. Fortuitously the definition does not have any difficult to define concepts embedded. And ultimately it is not a circular definition. No one seemed to disagree when I suggested that intelligence, consciousness, life and free will are entwined.-> In terms of my own definition, the man in the box clearly can't decide that he will leave the box (so even if there is such a thing as free will, it can't be exercised), but he can decide what to do while he's in the box (scream, contemplate the nature of free will, play with the spiders). The environment will elicit a decision, but we don't know to what extent the decision will be determined by factors of temperament that are beyond his own control.
By this same argument I can't exercise my will to be an eagle either. Of course we are limited by our physical condition. I'm just drilling down as far I as I can go for my will to be free and I am finding road blocks to free will at every point.-> You still object to the inclusion of consciousness as part of the definition. I'm afraid I can't see the relevance of the Pinker quote. The "zombie" Georges Rey's loss of sentient experiences does not stop him from being conscious of the loss, from communicating his consciousness of the loss, and from living his life. However, it may well have had an effect on the decisions he has made during that life, in which case the quote proves my own point: that our freedom of will may be limited by internal factors as well as external.-Well I would agree our will is limited by both externally and internally. I'm just looking for a point at which it become free and I'm not finding one. Regarding Rey - I know pretty well what my experience of consciousness is (I think) but I can only assume mine is similar to yours.
 
> You ask: "Should our definitions be in our image?" I'm not sure what you mean by definitions "in our own image". We have created the terminology. Consciousness, intelligence, free will do not come in neatly labelled packages. We have given these names to things we observe in ourselves, and we then look around to see if there are similar phenomena outside of humanity. We ask if a brick, an amoeba, or a duck-billed platypus has the same mental faculties as we have. Do you envisage any other procedure?-A slightly more rigorous one perhaps. Physchology and psychiatry are tough sciences. I was hoping for a simpler approach, something akin to chemistry or physics.
 
> You are able to dissociate your reasoning from your pragmatic existence. I suspect that all of us on this website play the same game, which in fact is essential if we are to keep our sanity. We know virtually nothing for certain, but we act as if we did because the alternative would indeed be to become a zombie. "Most importantly, pragmatically speaking, I can identify with myself." Yes, sir. You have discovered the reality of the self ... even if your reason tells you there is no such thing.-Some might say I have observed the illusion of the self?

6608 views

By uncontrollable you seem to include our unconscious which controls much of our behaviour. And by controllable you appear to mean the behaviours we think we are aware of? Again I'm not sure how the definition I have chosen limits these possibilities. It certainly does not specify any particular entity for inclusion or exclusion.
> 
> > You don't seem to have too many objections, though, to my own definition (which, of course, does encompass internal constraints). The extra imponderable of consciousness, which I defined earlier, seems to me to be integral to the concept, but I agree that "one's" is too anthropic. How about: "an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity." 
> OK just to be clear, say I were to lock up this said entity in a box, it would not change the entity's free will (or lack of it) one iota. It would limit it freedom of action. that's all. If that is what you meant by constraints?
> 
> If by constraints you meant genetics, evolution, chemistry and physics - then fair enough. 
> 
> My only objection would remain the inclusion of conscious. Here's a quote from Steven Pinker from How the Mind Works:
> >>> The philosopher Georges Rey once told me that he has no sentient experiences. He lost them after a bicycle accident when he was fifteen. Since then, he insists, he has been a zombie. I assume he is speaking tongue-in-cheek, but of course I have no way of knowing, and that is his point.
> -Having worked in a hospital, he is probably referring to the fact that due to brain injury, you can really want and will to do something, but your body refuses to do what it is that you want. I don't think it's tongue-in-cheek at all. But the fact remains that there is an entity that is willing; and this is our target. -
> > But your various references to our "anthropic" discussion suggest that you're trying to avoid being confined to your humanity.
> Should our definitions be in our image?
> -How can they not? Nietzsche's assault on Kant was precisely that it is not possible for any observer to be objective; in the broader term, if you choose to study something, than you have a passion for it, yes? His implicit argument is that it is impossible to separate objectivity and subjectivity. -But a better question would be for me to challenge you on how free will can exist without consciousness. I do not see how they are separable.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6599 views

But a better question would be for me to challenge you on how free will can exist without consciousness. I do not see how they are separable.-Funnily enough I agree with this statement strongly! This why I continue to avoid "consciousness" in my definition.-If we come to the conclusion we do not have free will, then our perception of consciousness is not what it seems. If we have no free will then what is my "self" that rattles around in my brain that thinks it does have free will?

6620 views

But a better question would be for me to challenge you on how free will can exist without consciousness. I do not see how they are separable.
> 
> Funnily enough I agree with this statement strongly! This why I continue to avoid "consciousness" in my definition.
> 
> If we come to the conclusion we do not have free will, then our perception of consciousness is not what it seems. If we have no free will then what is my "self" that rattles around in my brain that thinks it does have free will?-I can understand your hesitation--but I come from the world of mathematics: and just like a triangle cannot be a triangle if it has more or less than three lines, neither can free will exist without consciousness. In some things we need to be comfortable with axioms--statements that are true because they must be. -This part will be old hat to the other regulars, but considering that I am aware that "a thought comes when IT wills" and not when I will it--I understand that the concept of "free will" is one that necessarily has some constraints. But this shouldn't shock anyone.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6524 views

Xeno
So you think you cannot have an unconscious will?
Are all your "wills" conscious ones?
I suspect not.

6543 views

Romansh,
> Xeno
> So you think you cannot have an unconscious will?
> Are all your "wills" conscious ones?-Think about that. How could an unconscious will be "free will?" It is exactly this question that makes ME question how much free will I as a person actually have. -The simplest form of Zen has you sitting still and simply recognizing thoughts. The visual model is that you are a mountain, and the thoughts are clouds passing you by. You aren't to stop the thought, only recognize it and do your best to return to the state of observation. This simple exercise underlines probably 80% of Zen philosophy, and you'd be amazed at how much our brains "chatter." It takes some time, but gradually you can come to the point where the brain slowly stops chattering so much. Its like dialing out the noise. Before I take an exam--this is exactly the process I do in the hour or so leading up to it. -I told you that to tell you this:
To what extent can an unconscious will operate in this scenario? At best it can fire clouds past the mountain, but only the mountain is the final arbiter. Think of why your body shuts down motor action while you sleep: because it knows that the unconscious will is dangerous. Everyone from Hindus, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Freud, and Jung all have guarding philosophies against those functions that seem to be unconscious. -[EDIT]I must also deliberately point out that in the practice of Zen mediation, there is a clear distinction being made; the observer realizes that he CAN stop the thoughts, he isn't to do so. This exercise so firmly ties together consciousness and free will that I do not see how you could possibly separate them. -I hope this better answers my distinction and my insistence that free will must be defined as having consciousness.-[EDITED]

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6503 views

Think about that. How could an unconscious will be "free will?" It is exactly this question that makes ME question how much free will I as a person actually have. 
Frankly, I can't see any mechanism for will of any flavour being "free". So I don't need to hold the belief of will being free. Just because we "live" in our consciousness, I don't see the need to limit the definition to our conscious will. Not specifying consciousness as a requirement does not preclude it from my definition.-If we have any firm evidence that our unconsciousnesses can (or cannot) be independent of the universe then I'd be happy to consider the conscious within the definition. Until then it remains an unnecessary constraint - in my opinion.-> The simplest form of Zen ...
I think Buddhism may hold some interesting reflections on reality. But I'm ignorant when it comes to Buddhist teachings.
 
> To what extent can an unconscious will operate in this scenario? At best it can fire clouds past the mountain, but only the mountain is the final arbiter. Think of why your body shuts down motor action while you sleep: because it knows that the unconscious will is dangerous. Everyone from Hindus, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Freud, and Jung all have guarding philosophies against those functions that seem to be unconscious. -I would not be "me" without mine. -> This exercise so firmly ties together consciousness and free will that I do not see how you could possibly separate them. -I would seem so - but this is purely an anthropic interpretation. 
Does any atom or fundamental particle, behave in a way that is independent of the universe. Do any collection of molecules behave independently of the universe? Does any immensly complicated collection of molecules behave independently? I don't actually see this happening and I can see no reason to assume the universe behaves in this way. -Call it determinism, materialism, physcalism, naturalism - whatever - I see no reason to assume my particular complex collection of molecules is independent of the universe either. In fact the boundary between the universe and me is likely illusory as well. It's what I decide to define it.

6506 views

Think about that. How could an unconscious will be "free will?" It is exactly this question that makes ME question how much free will I as a person actually have. 
> Frankly, I can't see any mechanism for will of any flavour being "free". So I don't need to hold the belief of will being free. Just because we "live" in our consciousness, I don't see the need to limit the definition to our conscious will. Not specifying consciousness as a requirement does not preclude it from my definition.-But my whole point is that you cannot reduce free will to a component that doesn't have consciousness. They are properties which go hand in hand. If you cannot actually separate them, than they must go together. Again, going back to triangles; you have these properties:-1. Three points.
2. Three lines connecting the three points together to form a contiguous shape. 
3. Interior angles at each point. -You can have four points, and as long as 2 and 3 are met, you can still have a triangle. But the moment you change 2 or 3, you no longer have a triangle. -Free will requires:-1. An agent capable of making choices. This necessarily dictates consciousness, but for the purposes of definition it must be stated explicitly. -
> If we have any firm evidence that our unconsciousnesses can (or cannot) be independent of the universe then I'd be happy to consider the conscious within the definition. Until then it remains an unnecessary constraint - in my opinion.
> 
> > The simplest form of Zen ...
> I think Buddhism may hold some interesting reflections on reality. But I'm ignorant when it comes to Buddhist teachings.
> 
> > To what extent can an unconscious will operate in this scenario? At best it can fire clouds past the mountain, but only the mountain is the final arbiter. Think of why your body shuts down motor action while you sleep: because it knows that the unconscious will is dangerous. Everyone from Hindus, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Freud, and Jung all have guarding philosophies against those functions that seem to be unconscious. 
> 
> I would not be "me" without mine. -Maybe you mistake what I was saying here? I was simply pointing out that all of these philosophies stress some kind of conscious control over our unconscious will. In all scenarios this dictates the unconscious must be at least at some instances, a subservient part of our psyche. -> 
> > This exercise so firmly ties together consciousness and free will that I do not see how you could possibly separate them. 
> 
> I would seem so - but this is purely an anthropic interpretation. -How? Consciousness/Free Will are two things that we have only ever attributed to human beings. Human beings at minimum have Consciousness; and without it we would be no different than any other ape, incapable of symbolic reasoning and unable to affect our environment. It isn't anthropic, it's an observation!-> Does any atom or fundamental particle, behave in a way that is independent of the universe. Do any collection of molecules behave independently of the universe? Does any immensly complicated collection of molecules behave independently? I don't actually see this happening and I can see no reason to assume the universe behaves in this way. 
> -You're talking about something different than Free Will. Define "independently," this has many connotations. I recognize that I exist because farmers grow and kill my food, people work on oil rigs to supply my car manufactured by other human beings... that I can put on a coat and use fire to keep myself warm in climates that would be otherwise hostile. We aren't independent, but we still make choices: I started college as a pharmacy major and ended up in computer science. That was a conscious choice, and I had the freedom to choose it. -> Call it determinism, materialism, physcalism, naturalism - whatever - I see no reason to assume my particular complex collection of molecules is independent of the universe either. In fact the boundary between the universe and me is likely illusory as well. It's what I decide to define it.-You know more about Buddhist philosophy than you say.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6495 views

I was thinking about consciousness earlier, having read many posts about it recently. And while this is slightly off topic, I am beginning to think that consciousness is not the point that separates man from animal. Even animals seem to a certain extent, self aware. -My musings lead me to two things that animals do not posses, however, and have forced me to reevaluate my position on consciousness, and my hierarchy of life. Plants contain life, but no consciousness. Animals contain consciousness, and limited reasoning skills, but no creativity(imagination, abstract reasoning skills). Human's contain life, consciousness, creativity, and free will. They are not inseparable, but they are sequentially dependent. You the inanimate can not be conscious, the unconscious(non-sentient, not to be confused with the layman vernacular) can not create, and without creativity, you can not make the abstract reasoning necessary for freewill, because you would always be subject/slave to your instincts.

6540 views

I was thinking about consciousness earlier, having read many posts about it recently. And while this is slightly off topic, I am beginning to think that consciousness is not the point that separates man from animal. Even animals seem to a certain extent, self aware. 
> 
> My musings lead me to two things that animals do not posses, however, and have forced me to reevaluate my position on consciousness, and my hierarchy of life. Plants contain life, but no consciousness. Animals contain consciousness, and limited reasoning skills, but no creativity(imagination, abstract reasoning skills). Human's contain life, consciousness, creativity, and free will. They are not inseparable, but they are sequentially dependent. You the inanimate can not be conscious, the unconscious(non-sentient, not to be confused with the layman vernacular) can not create, and without creativity, you can not make the abstract reasoning necessary for freewill, because you would always be subject/slave to your instincts.-I just started reading a book that attacks materialism, and one of the author's definitions of consciousness contains a subcomponent called being "self-aware," meaning "the entity is aware that it is conscious." -I think that in the case of Man v. the rest of Mammalia, this is the deciding factor.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6451 views

I think the experiments with Amy the Gorilla would shoot that statement down pretty quick. She was able to identify herself with sign language.

6527 views

I think the experiments with Amy the Gorilla would shoot that statement down pretty quick. She was able to identify herself with sign language.-I had forgotten her. Good point, but her awareness is just a tiny fraction of ours. My poodle knows he is in the mirror, my rottie didn't. but the animals don't do introspection. Self-recognition is really a minor issue.

6498 views

I think the experiments with Amy the Gorilla would shoot that statement down pretty quick. She was able to identify herself with sign language.-The concept of "I" as a reference isn't the same as being conscious of being conscious.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6469 views

Over a year ago we dicussed free will. Labet's studieswere mentioned. The mind seems to prepare for an answer before the finger strikes a key. But could there be parallel brain activity which confuses the neuoscientists? The philosophers don't like the neuroscientists' evidence, and don't believe the interpretations are correct. Excellent recent review with new NS evidence. Is it any better?-http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/full/477023a.html

6216 views

DAVID: Over a year ago we discussed free will. Labet's studies were mentioned. The mind seems to prepare for an answer before the finger strikes a key. But could there be parallel brain activity which confuses the neuroscientists? The philosophers don't like the neuroscientists' evidence, and don't believe the interpretations are correct. Excellent recent review with new NS evidence. Is it any better?-http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/full/477023a.html-Thank you for this fascinating article. I've had a look at last year's discussion, and see that we spent most of the time arguing over a definition. There was a sort of grudging acceptance of my final offering: "an entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints." The constraints were imposed by:-1)	Nature and/or the situation
2)	Factors connected with the decision-making process itself (e.g. our own genetic make-up)-Clearly the article links up with the second of these, which of course is the one that causes all the problems. If the source of consciousness ... and of the will which we think is able to direct consciousness ... is indeed the cells of the brain, could we not argue that those cells themselves are "given constraints" over which we have no control, and so ultimately there is no free will since no decision can be independent of those cells? That seems to be the implication of the experiments reported here, but as we weigh up the Dawkins and the Turell, the Obama and the Palin, the rum'n'raisin and the mint choc chip, absolutely nothing suggests to us that we are not considering the pros and cons independently of any uncontrollable inside influence.
 
I don't see how these experiments can differentiate between electrical impulses creating thoughts and electrical impulses responding to and conveying thoughts. If there is a self (I think we need to consider identity as well as will) which somehow transcends its physical container, all its thoughts would need to be translated into physical impulses for them to be given physical expression ... e.g. through language, gesture, action. Can neuroscience be precise enough to make such a distinction?

6239 views


> 1)	Nature and/or the situation
> 2)	Factors connected with the decision-making process itself (e.g. our own genetic make-up)
> 
> Clearly the article links up with the second of these, which of course is the one that causes all the problems. If the source of consciousness ... and of the will which we think is able to direct consciousness ... is indeed the cells of the brain, could we not argue that those cells themselves are "given constraints" over which we have no control, and so ultimately there is no free will since no decision can be independent of those cells? -We don't know what we do know and also what we don't know. Note my previous comment about parallel circuits in the brain. The brain is an extremely complex computer and even if we have rough ideas about each area of control, there are underlying interactions going on that confuse interpretations. If a thought brings anger, for example, adrenalin is released and that affects every cell in the body.- 
> I don't see how these experiments can differentiate between electrical impulses creating thoughts and electrical impulses responding to and conveying thoughts. If there is a self (I think we need to consider identity as well as will) which somehow transcends its physical container, all its thoughts would need to be translated into physical impulses for them to be given physical expression ... e.g. through language, gesture, action. Can neuroscience be precise enough to make such a distinction?-No it can't. These button experiments are studying impulses in the motor strips of the brain. In mapping the brain, there is a little person outline on each strip. It is that exact. So your finger moves seemingly too long after the impulse. What does that really prove? Thinking and decision making is also preceding the movement. Does that have a delaying effect on the impulse? We don't know. My attitude is that I have free will, electrical effects prove nothing, and I'm with the philosophers, the best thinkers on Earth. Some little brains think too much. (Angels on the head of the pin and so forth)

6174 views

Here is the link:

https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-03-tackles-neuroscience-free.html

"For several decades, some researchers have argued that neuroscience studies prove human actions are driven by external stimuli—that the brain is reactive and free will is an illusion. But a new analysis of these studies shows that many contained methodological inconsistencies and conflicting results.

"'Score one for skepticism of claims that neuroscience has proven—or disproven—any metaphysical position," says Veljko Dubljevic, co-author of the paper and an assistant professor of philosophy at NC State who specializes in research on the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience and technology.

"'The problem is that neuroscientists in training are being taught these studies provide definitive proof of the absence of free will, and instructors aren't being careful about looking at the evidence that supports the claims that are made," Dubljevic says. "Teaching uncritical thinking like this in science courses is both unscientific and socially dangerous."

"At issue are studies like those pioneered by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, which assessed brain activity in study participants who were asked to perform a specific task. Libet found brain activity preceded a person's actions before the person decided to act. Later studies, using various techniques, claimed to have replicated this basic finding.

"But in the first-ever qualitative review of these studies, researchers are finding that the results are far from conclusive. The review analyzed 48 studies, ranging from Libet's landmark 1983 paper through 2014.

"'We found that interpretation of study results appears to have been driven by the metaphysical position the given author or authors subscribed to—not by a careful analysis of the results themselves," Dubljevic says. "Basically, those who opposed free will interpreted the results to support their position, and vice versa."

"The researchers also found significant variability across studies. For example, a subset of studies that actually looked at where activity was taking place in the brain, and whether it was related to will (or intent to complete a task), often found conflicting results.

"'Meanwhile, the journal articles that drew the most forceful conclusions often didn't even assess the neural activity in question - which means their conclusions were based on speculation," Dubljevic says. "It is crucial to critically examine whether the methods used actually support the claims being made."

"'Numerous studies suggest that fostering a belief in determinism influences behaviors like cheating," Dubljevic says. "Promoting an unsubstantiated belief on the metaphysical position of non-existence of free will may increase the likelihood that people won't feel responsible for their actions if they think their actions were predetermined."

"And this isn't a problem solely within the neuroscience community. Earlier work by Dubljevic and his collaborators found challenges in how this area of research has been covered by the press and consumed by the public.

"'To be clear, we're not taking a position on free will," Dubljevic says. "We're just saying neuroscience hasn't definitively proven anything one way or the other.'"

Comment: So free will may exist.

4302 views

A careful even-handed discussion:

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/beautiful-minds/the-neuroscience-of-free-will-a-q-...

"I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Iona College where I also serve as a faculty member for the Iona Neuroscience program. I have previously worked in the Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind program at Franklin and Marshall College as well as previous appointments as a Lecturer at King’s College London and University of Alabama.

***

"...it seems to me that at least at times I could have decided to and done something else than what I did. I decided to go for a run this afternoon, but no one made me and I wasn’t subject to any compulsion; I could have gone for a coffee instead, at least it seems to me.

"Philosophers take these starting points and work to construct plausible accounts of free will. Broadly speaking, there is a lot of disagreement as to the right view of free will, but most philosophers believe that a person has free will if they have the ability to act freely, and that this kind of control is linked to whether it would be appropriate to hold that person responsible (e.g., blame or praise them) for what they do. For instance, we don’t typically hold people responsible for what they do if they were acting under severe threat or inner compulsion.

***

"The current neuroscience of free will traces its lineage back to an influential experiment by Benjamin Libet and his colleagues.

***

"It was known since the 1960’s from work by Kornhuber and Deecke that there is slow buildup of negative brain activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA) and pre-SMA measurable by electoencephalography (EEG) just prior to voluntary (i.e., movement initiated by the participant) bodily movement. This brain activity, called the readiness potential (RP), was taken to be neural preparation to move for spontaneous movements and starts about a half second before time of the movement

***

"One shouldn’t jump to the depressing conclusion, though, that we don’t act freely or don’t really deserve any of the moral reactions others have to our actions; there is a healthy discussion on how the original Libet results can be interpreted as consistent with that picture of us humans as self-governing and free and moral persons.

***

"Libet argued that W-time within a reasonable range was reliable since we can see how accurately participants in the lab estimate the time of other events, such as skin shocks. The reliability of W-time has recently been challenged yet again with a new study that concludes that depending on the order in which participants complete certain tasks in the experiment, W-time can be strikingly different (i.e., there is an order effect.

***

"Two of the hottest topics seem to be, first, what exactly the RP, that negative build-up of brain activity pre-movement, really signifies and, second, how we can make our voluntary actions in the lab more ecologically valid. As to the first, the past decade has seen researchers investigating if we have evidence that the RP really does stand for a decision to move or, alternatively, if the RP just is the brain’s being biased to move in some way (say, left, instead of right) without the commitment to do so.

***

"But many, myself included, have voiced concern that when to press a button or whether to press a left or right button, just isn’t the right kind of action to stake a claim that we as agents don’t initiate our actions via our conscious intentions to act. Hence, some of the ongoing work involves making the choice of which button to press or when to press it meaningful via rewards or penalties for skipping ahead or value-laden options, such as charity donations.

***

"...one of the aspects of our lives that seems the most undeniable is that we really do experience ourselves as in control of our movements and their effects in the world. There is a large body of work in cognitive neuroscience which focuses on this sense of agency"

Comment: Long and complex discussion in which it appears that the form of the experimental design definitely affects the time interval of the readiness potential. The author favors free will but admits the experiments have not been totally definitive

2394 views

Muscle movement shows preparation time:

https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-body-independent-muscle-sensors.html

"Voluntary movements are prepared before they are executed. For example, such preparation occurs in the period between seeing a coffee cup and starting to reach for it. Neurons in many areas of the brain change their activity during movement preparation in ways that reflect different aspects of the goal, such as the intended movement direction.

"It is well-known that preparation improves reaction time and the overall quality of movements, but it has been unclear how preparatory brain activity gives rise to improved motor performance. There have been no evidence of goal-related preparatory changes in muscles. However, a new study from Umeå University has identified a specific preparatory neural mechanism that can lead to improved motor performance.

"'Our study demonstrates a preparatory change in the sensitivity of muscle spindle receptors and the motor reflexes they enable," says Dr. Michael Dimitriou who headed this study and is a Research Fellow at the Department of Integrative Medical Biology of Umeå University.

***

"'When preparing to reach in a particular direction, we found that reflex sensitivity and muscle stiffness is selectively decreased in muscles that are about to stretch. To facilitate reaching the goal, the nervous system seems to independently modulate the 'breaks' in an advantageous manner before initiating movement," says Dr. Dimitriou. "Beyond its role in movement preparation, the independent control of sensory receptors may be another way in which the nervous system routinely exerts goal-dependent control, in addition to the top-down control of muscle force and the selective processing of sensory signals."

Comment: No surprise, just more confirmation of the efficiency pf neve muscle controls.

1982 views


> I just started reading a book that attacks materialism, and one of the author's definitions of consciousness contains a subcomponent called being "self-aware," meaning "the entity is aware that it is conscious." 
> 
> I think that in the case of Man v. the rest of Mammalia, this is the deciding factor.-Self-awareness has always been a major component of the definition of human consciousness. Agreed.

6514 views


> I hesitate to enter your very own field of medicine, but is it not true that there are certain brain and glandular disorders that can drastically affect or change people's personalities (and hence their actions and choices)? Although I believe the cause of schizophrenia is still unknown, would you say schizophrenics are able to choose all their thoughts? If diseases, disorders, narcotics and medications can affect the brain and thus affect behaviour, how can we totally dismiss the possibility that our genetic inheritance is directly responsible for at least certain aspects of our conduct? Romansh has quoted Pinker, who claims that 40%-50% of our behavioural traits might be ascribed to genetics (which we cannot change). I don't know how he can be so precise, but I don't know how you can be so precise either.-Pinker is quoting what is taught in med school: personality is 40% genetics, 40% familial influence in growing up and 20% personal conclusions from experience when independent of family. As far as chemicals and illnesses messing with brain function, I thought we were discussing normal people, defined as not with a disease. Obviously you make a good point. I'm sure I am more normal than you are. ) We certainly may have unrecognized quirks, and I view free will as within those limts for that person.
> 
> Romansh disagrees with my interpretation, and thinks "this definition leads us (well it did me) to doubt the very existence of the self."
> 
> Once again, I think you're trying to argue on two different levels at once. The first level is purely semantic. You introduced the term "free will" into our discussion on intelligence, and have now said what you mean by it. Your definition presupposes the existence of the environment and of the universe, while the ability to act or make choices clearly presupposes the existence of individual human beings. If the environment and the universe might make our decisions dependent, how can you argue that the given, uncontrollable elements of human beings are not just as capable of doing so? My own definition (1 September at 14.42) is "the conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond one's own control".-I think your definition is very fitting, as I suggested above.-> 
> The second stage of the argument is whether you believe free will ... according to your definition ... is possible or not. This is where I'm going to have to try and decipher your cryptic statement. I hope you'll correct me if I fail to read your mind, but I suspect this is another example of your preoccupation with boundaries (that is not meant negatively). What I think you're saying is that human beings can't be separated from their environment and the universe, and therefore we can't separate the self. It's the mystic "All is One". Consequently there can be no such thing as free will. The Strawson quote ... again please correct me if I'm wrong ... suggests that eventually all our thoughts must go back to something we can't control, which is a bit like saying we don't know what governs our subconscious (though I don't want to be drawn into a discussion on boundaries between conscious and subconscious).-I'll accept the mystic 'all is one'. I think my 'self' is 'me'. I am separate from the universe, and my environment. I obvserve both, but I have been markedly influenced by both, especially people in my environment. I think my 'self' has free will within the boundries described.

6568 views

Pinker is quoting what is taught in med school: personality is 40% genetics, 40% familial influence in growing up and 20% personal conclusions from experience when independent of family. 
In his latest book The Blank Slate Pinker suggests the influences are about 40% genetic, about 50% peers, and maybe 10% family. Surprisingly low on the family side?-> As far as chemicals and illnesses messing with brain function, I thought we were discussing normal people, defined as not with a disease. Obviously you make a good point. I'm sure I am more normal than you are. ) We certainly may have unrecognized quirks, and I view free will as within those limts for that person.-How many whiskies do I have to have before I loose my free will? Just enough to pass out?-I have read that about half of our non-coding DNA appears viral in origin? Is this correct?

6612 views

Pinker is quoting what is taught in med school: personality is 40% genetics, 40% familial influence in growing up and 20% personal conclusions from experience when independent of family. 
> In his latest book The Blank Slate Pinker suggests the influences are about 40% genetic, about 50% peers, and maybe 10% family. Surprisingly low on the family side?-Pinker and I are at different ends of political thought, which influences both of us. As a very conservative person, I filter out peer pressure and I'm sure he doesn't, as a post-modern liberal.
> 
> > As far as chemicals and illnesses messing with brain function, I thought we were discussing normal people, defined as not with a disease. Obviously you make a good point. I'm sure I am more normal than you are. ) We certainly may have unrecognized quirks, and I view free will as within those limts for that person.
> 
> How many whiskies do I have to have before I loose my free will? Just enough to pass out?-Less than that: whisky is the enemy of inhibitions.
> 
> I have read that about half of our non-coding DNA appears viral in origin? Is this correct?-In my interpretation of the reports, no. Some of the viral markers are being used by us. Junk DNA is a bad term as the original 97% was so-identified. Even duplications are important as modifiers. I don't think we know the percentage of non-useful DNA/RNA as yet. There is useful RNA all through our DNA. -I go away on a horse show trip for three days and the whole site is stirred up, and I have to sit and try and catch up. You have been a marvelous probe to activity. )

6514 views

Pinker and I are at different ends of political thought, which influences both of us. As a very conservative person, I filter out peer pressure and I'm sure he doesn't, as a post-modern liberal.
I'm sorry David, this statement exemplifies why I want consciousness out of any definition of free will. We are leaving the fox in charge of the hen house.-From what I have read of him, he is anything but a post modernist, and I would agree he would be liberal in some aspects, as I suspect as are you. I used to think I was conservative until I started measuring myself against political criteria.-I don't know if it has been posted here before, but this is a bit of political fun. 
http://www.politicalcompass.org/
I scored about -5,-5 ... and I thought I was conservative.
May be worth a new thread.-> I go away on a horse show trip for three days and the whole site is stirred up, and I have to sit and try and catch up. You have been a marvelous probe to activity. )-It's OK we did not have a choice.

6651 views


> From what I have read of him, he is anything but a post modernist, and I would agree he would be liberal in some aspects, as I suspect as are you. I used to think I was conservative until I started measuring myself against political criteria.
> 
> I don't know if it has been posted here before, but this is a bit of political fun. 
> http://www.politicalcompass.org/
> I scored about -5,-5 ... and I thought I was conservative.
> May be worth a new thread.-
I am libertarian right, according to the site, mildly so at 1.63 an 1.33. The book I wrote 10 years ago was strictly libertarian.

6518 views

dhw This definition excludes even the possibility that our actions and choices may be determined by factors within ourselves that are beyond our conscious control.-I would disagree with this interpretation. I think this definition leads us (well it did me) to doubt the very existence of the self.-> David Your inference is correct. We are influenced by our learned background of events throughout our lives, but with that background in place, my choices of action or thought are my choices. We can nit pick back to my genetics for influences, but ultimately, I choose my actions or thoughts. We develop our personalites which become our choice makers.-Again in what way are your choices "free" and more importantly how is your "will" to make those choices free?-This is a nice transcript of an interview with Galen Strawson, which takes a less deterministic point of view to throw doubt on free will.-Here's the relevant passage:
I suppose it's possible that you might have acquired the first want, that's the want for a want, because you wanted to! It's theoretically possible that you had a want to have a want to have a want. But this is very hard to imagine, and the question just rearises: where did that want come from? You certainly can't go on like this forever. At some point your wants must be just given.-from
http://www.naturalism.org/strawson_interview.htm

6644 views

I think we have a very limited free will, if that is not a self-contradiction. Most of the decisions that we can make are within very limited parameters fixed by our environment and previous history. -If I go for a walk and come to a division in the path I can decide on a whim to take one direction rather than another, perhaps because I went the other way last time and would like to have a change. -If I switch on my computer thinking of making some improvements to my website I can find myself diverted into other lines by an email I have just received, or by a message I've read on a forum I often visit. So how far my decision to respond to the message is free or how far it is just a reaction to circumstances is debatable. I shall now exercise my free will and leave, to make the improvements to my website that I intended to do in the first place!

--
GPJ

6603 views

George-With all due respect, I think you are conflating free will with freedom of action.-Where did the will to improve your website come from?-rom

6594 views

With all due respect, I think you are conflating free will with freedom of action.
>-One has a certain limited freedom of action, which action one takes within that scope is presumably where "will" comes in.-> Where did the will to improve your website come from?-From my previous history, which has defined what I am now.

--
GPJ

6588 views

With all due respect, I think you are conflating free will with freedom of action.
> >
> 
> One has a certain limited freedom of action, which action one takes within that scope is presumably where "will" comes in.
> 
> > Where did the will to improve your website come from?
> 
> From my previous history, which has defined what I am now.-George I'm not sure how this gives us free will - for me it sems to point away.
rom

6556 views

We are discussing whether / to what extent we have free will, and for this we obviously need a definition.
> 
> ROMANSH: The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe.
> 
> DAVID: I would fully agree, and if you don't mind I will use that brief sentence as my definition also.
> 
> This definition excludes even the possibility that our actions and choices may be determined by factors within ourselves that are beyond our conscious control.
> 
> (It may be too late, but I've started this new thread because 'What exactly IS Intelligence?' has become somewhat overcrowded.)-Some old questions about free will will definitely prove of interest to us here, to help us shape what free will is, and is not. -First, I find ROMANSH's definition only intuitively correct. Considering that we do not have a solid picture on the question of nature vs. nurture, we don't have a clear picture on how independent we truly are from our environment. This gets more complex when we move beyond the physical environment (what I assume ROMANSH was talking about) and include the social environment. I would also go so far as to say that humans at this level are a kind of superorganism; there is a group will as well, centered on ideas, and is self-perpetuating. The most troubling thought of all is Nietzsche's pointed observation that a thought comes when IT wills. So to what extent do we actually control? Also troubling to me is any assertion that we do anything independently of nature or the universe. We have a reptilian brain that we are always responding to. And if your basic needs aren't being met, you'll never get to the point where you'll be able to ponder free will. -I would offer that the definition that should be used for free will contain these elements:-1. An explicit assertion of conscious control. 
2. An ability to create. 
3. An ability to do something contrary to solid reasoning. -
The first is obvious--free will must be tied to conscious thought. To what extent a subconscious filter restricts things makes this a murkier question, but must be acknowledged. The second and third points are absolute: Only a being with free will could for example, sacrifice food and shelter to create a sculpture. As I am also always tied to keep things into territory that we can know something about; this implies the ability to create art for no reason but leisure. We can only guarantee free will to a being that can say "I did X just because." -So using these three points I'll take my first stab at the definition of free will.-FREE WILL: Free will is the ability to alter circumstances of some situation through innovation. -This statement brings in my point #2. The definition espoused by Romansh and David doesn't take into account the human ability to act in innovative way. Choosing among options is far too simplistic for what humans are capable of doing--and lest one forget--the power of spontaneous intuition is something that can never be set aside. And as a definition, it is broadly applicable.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6744 views

Matt has chosen (of his own free will?) to join the definitions game, and offers three essential elements: 
1.	An explicit assertion of conscious control.
2.	An ability to create.
3.	An ability to do something contrary to solid reasoning.
His proposed definition is:
Free will is the ability to alter circumstances of some situation through innovation.-I agree 100% with 1. As for 2 and 3, they should certainly be incorporated into our definition, but to restrict free will to innovation seems to me even more exclusive than the Romansh definition. An integral element of free will has to be the ability to make choices independently of constraints. If I go to a restaurant and select a meal from the 50 items on the menu, I like to think my choice is voluntary, unforced, spontaneous (although it will certainly be directed by subconscious influences like taste), but it can hardly be called an innovative alteration of circumstances. This applies to most of the decisions we take in our everyday lives in the belief that we are exercising free will. An ability to create is no more a sign of free will than an ability to destroy. An ability to do something contrary to solid reasoning is no more a sign of free will than an ability to do something contrary to intuition. -A definition of free will has to encompass all decisions and all influences that might prevent decisions from being "free". I wonder if it wouldn't be worthwhile looking at poor old dhw's definition, which everyone has ignored apart from Romansh, who has sort of come round to not entirely rejecting it (he doesn't like the "conscious" bit). Let's see if the revised version includes your criteria: -"An entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity".
 
Conscious control? Yes. An ability to create? Making decisions incorporates all choices and actions, including creative and non-creative. To do something contrary to solid reasoning? Yes indeed, or contrary to intuition, a government decree, the ten commandments, social etiquette, or your wife's precise instructions. It also encompasses your extremely pertinent reference to and comment on Nietzsche's "pointed observation that a thought comes when IT wills. So to what extent do we actually control?" Nietzsche alone seems to have considered the influence I have been repeatedly trying to draw attention to, which is that we are subject to internal constraints as well as external. We do not know to what extent our decisions are controlled by our own "givens". -The definition must encompass all of these. Once we have it, we can start examining ourselves, other creatures, the environment, the universe, to see if or to what degree this conscious ability may be said to exist. I find Romansh's definition incomplete, and your own anything but "broadly applicable". So now tell me what's wrong with mine!

6601 views

dhw
> A definition of free will has to encompass all decisions and all influences that might prevent decisions from being "free". I wonder if it wouldn't be worthwhile looking at poor old dhw's definition, which everyone has ignored apart from Romansh, who has sort of come round to not entirely rejecting it (he doesn't like the "conscious" bit). Let's see if the revised version includes your criteria: 
> 
> "An entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity".
> -No--I didn't mean to forget you, but I would say that your definition certainly encompasses the criteria I set forth. It gives us an upper and lower bound.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6597 views

I have defined free will as "an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity".-MATT: No - I didn't mean to forget you, but I would say your definition certainly encompasses the criteria I set forth. It gives us an upper and lower bound.-Thank you. The main stumbling block between Romansh and myself seems to be the inclusion of consciousness in the definition. I find the whole concept of free will inconceivable without it, but it would be interesting to know if others agree.

6537 views

I have defined free will as "an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity".
> 
> MATT: No - I didn't mean to forget you, but I would say your definition certainly encompasses the criteria I set forth. It gives us an upper and lower bound.
> 
> Thank you. The main stumbling block between Romansh and myself seems to be the inclusion of consciousness in the definition. I find the whole concept of free will inconceivable without it, but it would be interesting to know if others agree.-It's an interesting discussion, I think the questions to then consider is "What are the properties necessary for free will, and can we account for them without relating to consciousness?"-I too do not see how it is possible to discuss free will without consciousness, because consciousness itself is something that is a necessary condition for us to even be able to ponder the question. They are inexplicably intertwined.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6577 views

OK properties necessary for free will
1) to exhibit or experience will or wants. (Do zombies have consciousness?)
2) that will should be independent of the universe.-The one thing I an aware of, the definition I'm using defines free will out of existence. Unless we are all possesed by magical gods called souls which direct our chemistry and physics? And even then there is some doubt these souls would not succumb to cause and effect. Alternatively we can define free will in a way which defines it into existence, by giving it properties (or a definition) that are a reflection of our experience of free will. Hence my use of the word "anthropic".

6551 views

ROMANSH: The definition I'm using defines free will out of existence. [...] Alternatively we can define free will in a way which defines it into existence, by giving it properties (or a definition) that are a reflection of our experience of free will.-I don't know why you think either definition entails existence or non-existence. Your definition ("the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe") was originally approved by David, who believes in free will! You only say you've defined it out of existence because YOU don't think it's possible to act or make choices independently. My own definition ("an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity") is similarly non-committal. You can say there's no such thing as an entity, consciousness is "imponderable", we are dependent on chemistry, genetic make-up etc. and so free will does not exist. A conventionally religious person who believes in the "soul" will argue that his soul does have this conscious ability and can override the constraints, and therefore free will does exist. David believes in the self and in what I take to be a limited conscious ability to make decisions independently. None of these views invalidates the definition.***-When you say you find "road blocks" in your search for free will, I can't say I'm any different. There's no end to the chain of cause and effect (read Tristram Shandy!) and it's impossible to draw a line that will establish independence of all constraints. But that is reason talking, and since reason (of which I take science to be a supreme form) has so far failed to solve most of our mysteries, like the origin of life, will, consciousness, emotion, memory, imagination etc., I remain sufficiently sceptical to allow intuition to have its say. Intuition leads me to FEEL that when I make a decision, it is MY decision ... not that of my cerebral cortex, or my grandmother's chromosomes, or Pisces, or the guy that set off the Big Bang. At present, I don't know whether reason or intuition has the right answer. Eventually science may tell us.-*** I have just read your extraordinary response to Matt: you strongly agree that free will can't exist without consciousness but have avoided it in your definition, because if we conclude that we do not have free will, "then our perception of consciousness is not what it seems". If you agree, how can you leave it out of your definition? Once we have a consensus on what we mean by "free will", we can discuss whether or to what extent we have it, and what are the implications, especially for the "self" that rattles round our brains. The implications, of course, are enormous, but aren't they the purpose of the discussion?
 
Abandon false definitions, my friend, 
And follow an argument through to its end.
 (Thus Spake dhw)

6539 views

OK let's try this for the sake argument:-Assume I had an unconscious want or will, and let's assume that this could be satisfactorily demonstrated that it independent of my environment and of the universe. -Then this particular want could not be described as "free will" because it was an unconscious want, is this your intent?

6600 views

ROMANSH: "Assume I had an unconscious want or will, and let's assume that this could be satisfactorily demonstrated that it independent of my environment and of the universe. Then this particular want could not be described as "free will" because it was an unconscious want, is this your intent?"-I wish you would make your example more concrete, but as it stands, I have no idea what you are trying to prove. This may be my fault, in which case I apologize in advance, but I will give you my response and you can then correct any misunderstandings.-First of all, I don't like your attempt to equate want with will. I take want to mean desire, whereas in this discussion we are using will as the part of the mind which takes conscious decisions. Your use of these terms can only confuse the issue.-Secondly, I don't see how any want, conscious or unconscious, can be satisfactorily demonstrated to be independent of the environment or the universe. What might I want consciously or unconsciously that is not within the universe? But that has nothing to do with the independence of the will. The will may determine whether or not a want is to be satisfied. To answer your question, if the want remains unconscious, then I certainly can't relate it to free will, which I believe can only work on a conscious level. It might, however, affect decisions made consciously. For instance, I may be offered a choice between chocolate and ginger, and although I have no idea what subconscious forces have fashioned my taste, I will feel that my choice of chocolate is made freely. -I'd like to return to the problem I raised in my post of 7 September at 12.37, as this post seems to reinforce it. (Again, though, that may be because I've missed your point.) You strongly agree that consciousness is integral to free will, and yet you're clinging to your own definition which excludes consciousness - my own definition of which you have accepted - as well as the internal factors that separate the owner of the ability from his/her/its environment. Furthermore, your phrase "independently of the environment or of the universe" seems to me far too ambiguous. On one level, nothing in life can be independent of the environment and the universe (hence your belief that you have defined free will out of existence), but on another the phrase can be interpreted as meaning actions or choices made independently of the direct influences imposed, for instance, by the laws of Nature or of society (hence David's initial acceptance of your definition, and see also my example of chocolate and ginger). I must admit that the discussion is immensely stimulating, and you are making me think very carefully about the subject, but I feel we are now going round in circles attacking/defending your definition when we could be digging deeper into the complex implications of my own. For instance, you have argued that if we do not have free will (i.e. if it is impossible ... using my terms ... to make conscious decisions independently of constraints beyond our control), "then our perception of consciousness is not what it seems." This cries out for further explanation. You wrote: "If we have no free will then what is my "self" that rattles around in my brain that thinks it does have free will?" That question alone may shed light on the degree of influence exercised by the uncontrollable constraints (e.g. our genetic make-up, the laws of Nature). We did run a thread on the subject of "identity", but I suspect that you and the rest of us can add a great deal to this. Time, then, to move on?

6514 views

I have asked Romansh to jettison his definition of "free will" and consider the implications of my own ("an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity"). I'm now somewhat concerned that this may have caused offence, which was the last thing I would have wanted to do. If it has, please accept my apologies.-In the meantime, I've been following my own instructions, and in particular considering David's addition ("within the boundaries") which ties in with BBella's metaphor of the playpen.-Romansh had interpreted his own version as defining free will out of existence, and of course one might argue that all decisions are dependent on constraints beyond our control. Nevertheless, we all FEEL that we have free will, and one of the problems Romansh has raised is that we can't find a rational basis for that feeling. I think David's amendment would actually make such a basis possible, though I'm not keen on introducing the word "boundaries" since constraints ARE boundaries. Supposing we restructure my definition as follows: "an entity's ability to make its own conscious decisions within constraints beyond its control"?-If we're in a restaurant, we'll decide which item to choose from the limited menu. If we're composing a song, we'll decide what notes to use, provided they remain within the range of the human voice. If we contemplate the inconclusive evidence, we'll (oh so sensibly) decide to remain on our agnostic fence. Freedom of choice will always be limited, but free will relates to the decision, not to the situation. (Matt's robot fails to qualify, because it is not conscious.) Even if all decisions can be traced back to an endless chain of influences, one does not need to be conscious of influences in order to take a conscious decision. This applies equally to external constraints and internal (genetic make-up and other physical and mental factors). We can, I think, quite rationally argue that our individual identity evolves from the continual interplay between external and internal influences, and so all constraints, whether we're aware of them or not, contribute to the nature of the will that makes the decision, as well as to the decision itself. But the will is still ours, and ours alone. Does that bring us any closer to a consensus?

6483 views


>I think David's amendment would actually make such a basis possible, though I'm not keen on introducing the word "boundaries" since constraints ARE boundaries. Supposing we restructure my definition as follows: "an entity's ability to make its own conscious decisions within constraints beyond its control"?-
A boundry is a fixed limit, while constraint implies wiggle room. My dog on a lease is constrained, but he can move around until I tug. A nation's boundries require a visa to cross them, except in the southern US where endless desert allows free passage on foot. But the intent is 'fixed'. I still like boundry.

6527 views

I have proposed a revised definition of "free will": "an entity's ability to make its own conscious decisions within constraints beyond its control"?-DAVID: A boundry is a fixed limit, while constraint implies wiggle room. My dog on a lease is constrained, but he can move around until I tug. A nation's boundries require a visa to cross them, except in the southern US where endless desert allows free passage on foot. But the intent is 'fixed'. I still like boundry.-It's a good distinction, and shows that my earlier comment "constraints ARE boundaries" was in fact the wrong way round! Thank you. But the example of the dog is an excellent illustration of why I think "constraint" is the right word. Just like the man in the restaurant with a limited menu, or a sculptor with a block of marble, or an agnostic considering inconclusive evidence, the dog can make its own conscious decisions (if we accept that dogs have a degree of consciousness) within the given restrictions ... in this case, of the leash. In some situations there will be fixed boundaries (e.g. natural and social laws, the body) and in others "wiggle room", so we need a word that will cover all of them. Boundaries are constraints, but constraints are not necessarily boundaries.

6486 views


> In some situations there will be fixed boundaries (e.g. natural and social laws, the body) and in others "wiggle room", so we need a word that will cover all of them. Boundaries are constraints, but constraints are not necessarily boundaries.-Countries have very strict boundries: don't send your army across my boundry unless invited. But if I am in your country on visa I can wiggle all I want within it's boundry. I can wiggle all I want within my country's boundry. Boundry is a strict limit, constraint on a leash is not.

6538 views

David and dhw-Boundaries are far from strict - they are whatever we choose. -Is the boundary between England and Wales strict? Not at all.
We define boundaries into existence and then somehow think of them as real.-Boundaries are time, observer, context dependent, ultimately I would argue they are illusory (as opposed to delusional).

6523 views

DAVID: Boundry is a strict limit, constraint on a leash is not.
ROMANSH: Boundaries are time, observer, context dependent, ultimately I would argue they are illusory (as opposed to delusional).-The reason for this particular discussion is that we're trying to fix an acceptable definition of "free will". I've revised my earlier one to: "an entity's ability to make its own conscious decisions within constraints beyond its control." David wants to substitute "boundaries" for "constraints" because he thinks it's stricter. I think "constraints" is better for precisely that reason. If we are to argue that a dog on a leash has free will to do what it likes within the range of its leash, then we should use "constraints". The examples I used for what David calls "wiggle room" were items on a menu, a sculptor's block of marble, the inconclusive evidence confronting an agnostic. My examples of boundaries were natural and social laws, and the body. I would say, however, that all of these represent constraints within which an entity may make its own decisions (if there is such a thing as free will), whether the boundaries are "illusory" or not.-As regards the problem I raised in an earlier post, Romansh writes: "I retract my statement ... it must have been my pragmatic self and not reason that prevailed." Sadly, I have to assume that the statement you are retracting is your strong agreement that free will cannot exist without consciousness. You now ask Matt (= xeno): "Are all your wills conscious ones?" Matt has explained his own views with extremely interesting references to Zen, but I fear he may have missed the equivocation in your use of "wills". (Sorry if that sounds impolite, but I can't think of a better word. I'm not accusing you of trying to deceive us!) When we use the expression "free will", it is in the sense of volition, i.e. "the ability to make conscious choices or decisions" (Encarta), or "the faculty or capability of conscious choice, decision and intention" (Collins). This form of the noun is uncountable. Following the example of Strawson, you are now using it synonymously with "want", in the sense of desire or need, and as such of course it can be unconscious.

6542 views

an entity's ability to make its own conscious decisions within constraints beyond its control." David wants to substitute "boundaries"-"I" as defined is an entity, I would appear to be conscious, though there are dissenting voices (Susan Blackmore), I make decisions, those decisions are within the constraints of my control - ergo I appear to have free will?-I'm not too fussed about boundaries/constraints. -> Romansh writes: "I retract my statement ... it must have been my pragmatic self and not reason that prevailed." Sadly, I have to assume that the statement you are retracting is your strong agreement that free will cannot exist without consciousness.
Why sadly? But correct.-Here exactly is the statement I initially strongly agreed to.
>> But a better question would be for me to challenge you on how free will can > exist without consciousness. I do not see how they are separable.
Funnily enough I agree with this statement strongly! This why I continue to avoid "consciousness" in my definition.-This is in-line with free will, intelligence, life, and consciousness being entwined. Is it not? Intuitively, free will and consciousness seem inseparable, I agree, but on deeper reflection this is a totally based on our human experience. -So if they are, then where ever we find free will, then we will find consciousness and conscious is unnecessary within the definition.-> This form of the noun is uncountable. Following the example of Strawson, you are now using it synonymously with "want", in the sense of desire or need, and as such of course it can be unconscious.-So how would you describe "will" without using the word "will"?

6607 views

ROMANSH: Intuitively, free will and consciousness seem inseparable, I agree, but on deeper reflection this is totally based on our human experience.-Our human experience and our observation of other animals. (I agree with B_M that other animals have a degree of consciousness and reasoning skills.) What else can we base it on? You say: "[..] if they are [inseparable], then where ever we find free will, then we will find consciousness and conscious is unnecessary within the definition." But if we omit "conscious" from our definition, we will allow in other forms of decision. Matt has already given you the example of robots, which can make decisions but are not conscious; drugs, hypnosis, alcohol may also leading to decisions made without conscious control. (One part of my definition of consciousness is awareness of oneself.) If you don't believe me, try arguing with a drunkard who insists that he is fit to drive, and then ask him the next day in hospital what he remembers. -You ask how I would describe "will" without using the word "will". Ah, this is good probing, but you have asked the wrong question. I have already given you an answer in my last post with two dictionary definitions (but remember, this is the form of "will" used in the expression "free will", as opposed to its many other uses): "The ability to make conscious choices or decisions" (Encarta). But you have indirectly torpedoed my revised definition! You should have asked what is the difference between will and free will. By enthusiastically incorporating David's addition (forget the boundaries/constraints disagreement), I jettisoned the distinction I had tried to make in my first definition. The problem with that was that it is impossible to make decisions independently of the constraints, if only because the constraints themselves are often part of the decision. For instance, I must choose from 50 items on the restaurant menu. My decision is made within those constraints, but is not independent of them. We make conscious decisions all the time within the various constraints, and our definition needs to incorporate the fact that these decisions may or may not be within our control (since no-one can know for sure whether we do or don't have free will). Humbly I withdraw my revised revision, and launch yet another, brand new attempt:
 
An entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints.-Testing: do we know the extent of our control? No, since we don't know how far we are directed by internal and external influences. Does this definition allow for creativity and innovation? Yes, since there will always be limitations on what we can create (the sculptor's block of marble, the range of the musical instrument, the laws of Nature). Do we exclude robots? Yes, as they are not conscious. No fanfares, and I'm not claiming that $64,000 prize. Yet. (I've learned my lesson!) Keep probing.

6520 views

I'm sorry, but I will exclude robots. (ducks the flying tools...) Robots, no matter how complex are ultimately not capable of making an abstract choice. Present a robot with two choices that he has never seen, and has no direct reference to, and you will get a "does not compute" error. The problem is that a)they are limited to what data they have, a human is not. b) They are unable to make decisions from abstract information that may or may not be related. c) They are limited to the creativity of the programmer(s). d)They are unable to assign value based on anything other than statistical analysis(i.e. they lack emotion and intuition) and that is as important in the decision making process as data, and perhaps more so.

6543 views

BALANCE_MAINTAINED: I'm sorry, but I will exclude robots (ducks the flying tools...) Robots, no matter how complex are ultimately not capable of making an abstract choice. Present a robot with two choices that he has never seen, and has no direct reference to, and you will get a "does not compute" error. The problem is that a) they are limited to what data they have, a human is not. b) They are unable to make decisions from abstract information that may or may not be related. c) They are limited to the creativity of the programmer(s). d)They are unable to assign value based on anything other than statistical analysis (i.e. they lack emotion and intuition) and that is as important in the decision making process as data, and perhaps more so.-Either I have misunderstood you, or you have misunderstood me! It was an essential element of my definition of free will that it SHOULD exclude robots. Romansh does not want to include the word "conscious", but without it, my definition would grant robots free will, because they are able to take (some) decisions within given constraints.

6559 views

ROMANSH: "Assume I had an unconscious want or will, and let's assume that this could be satisfactorily demonstrated that it independent of my environment and of the universe. Then this particular want could not be described as "free will" because it was an unconscious want, is this your intent?"
> 
> I wish you would make your example more concrete, but as it stands, I have no idea what you are trying to prove. This may be my fault, in which case I apologize in advance, but I will give you my response and you can then correct any misunderstandings.
Just to show "consciousness" is unnecessary in the definition if not undesireable.- 
> First of all, I don't like your attempt to equate want with will. I take want to mean desire, whereas in this discussion we are using will as the part of the mind which takes conscious decisions. Your use of these terms can only confuse the issue.
Not just mine - Galen Strawson for example also equated them.
> Secondly, I don't see how any want, conscious or unconscious, can be satisfactorily demonstrated to be independent of the environment or the universe.
I agree whole heartedly - that's why I said "assume"
 
> I'd like to return to the problem I raised in my post of 7 September at 12.37, as this post seems to reinforce it. -I retract my statement - it must have been my pragmatic self and not reason that prevailed.

6563 views

OK properties necessary for free will
> 1) to exhibit or experience will or wants. (Do zombies have consciousness?)
> 2) that will should be independent of the universe.
> 
> The one thing I an aware of, the definition I'm using defines free will out of existence. Unless we are all possesed by magical gods called souls which direct our chemistry and physics? And even then there is some doubt these souls would not succumb to cause and effect. Alternatively we can define free will in a way which defines it into existence, by giving it properties (or a definition) that are a reflection of our experience of free will. Hence my use of the word "anthropic".-As for zombies--without meaning to sound pedantic--what kind of zombies are we talking about? Romero-type zombies? Or Voodoo zombies? -So; the definition you're using is what I would say is one that isn't possible. I read free will as being able to decide or innovate upon existing options, replete with the ability to choose to do nothing, or to make the situation worse. But there are still constraints; maybe I'm just hitting the same problem you have. Something within the universe can't exactly independent of the universe.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6491 views

MATT (to Romansh): Maybe I'm just hitting the same problem you have. Something within the universe can't exactly [be] independent of the universe.-My original definition has undergone several revisions, as a result of these discussions. Even the one that you originally seconded has been jettisoned, and I'm wondering if perhaps you missed the last one:-An entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints.-Does this cover all the options? Of course the real issue is whether we have it or not, but we've probably exhausted all the arguments now and still don't know the answer. (That may well apply to all our discussions, though perhaps we can say we now have a better idea about why we are so ignorant!)

6468 views

MATT (to Romansh): Maybe I'm just hitting the same problem you have. Something within the universe can't exactly [be] independent of the universe.
> 
> My original definition has undergone several revisions, as a result of these discussions. Even the one that you originally seconded has been jettisoned, and I'm wondering if perhaps you missed the last one:
> 
> An entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints.
> 
> Does this cover all the options? Of course the real issue is whether we have it or not, but we've probably exhausted all the arguments now and still don't know the answer. (That may well apply to all our discussions, though perhaps we can say we now have a better idea about why we are so ignorant!)-Yeah, I just realized late last night that I had neglected this thread. -I would agree with that definition as it stands.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6470 views

I would have to ask the question, 'What constraints? And what enforces those constraints?' though. Other than that, the definition seems pretty solid.

6572 views

Matt accepts my latest definition of free will as: "An entity's conscious ability to control its decision-making process within given constraints."
 
Balance_Maintained asks "What constraints? And what enforces those constraints?"-As I see it, there are two types of constraint: 
1) Those imposed by the situation or by Nature. 
2) Those imposed by factors connected with the decision-making process itself. It's the second category that determines our judgement as to whether or not we have free will.-As regards 1), the constraints might be the restricted number of items on the menu, the size and shape of the block of marble, the range of the musical instrument, the limited evidence available, the laws of Nature. As someone (Romansh?) pointed out, I can't decide that I want to be an eagle. -It's 2) that's the problem. The obvious constraint is our genetic make-up, because we simply don't know to what extent our inborn characteristics determine our behaviour. Nor do we know to what extent our inborn characteristics determine our response to our upbringing (another "given constraint"). Nor do we know to what extent our parents' genes and upbringing determined our own upbringing, and so on. There's no end to the process of cause and effect. Other such constraints may be the impact of illness, accidents, chance encounters (all beyond our control), and once again, we don't know the extent to which our responses to these are influenced by our genes, upbringing etc. We all believe INTUITIVELY that we make our decisions independently, but REASON tells us there are so many subconscious elements at work that our freedom is at best limited. And so now, in accordance with the limited evidence available, we have to decide whether reason or intuition is our best guide to deciding whether our decisions are free. Alternatively, we can decide - as I have done - not to take a decision!-That is far from being the end of the argument, though. For me the question of free will is simply part of the even more complex one of identity, concerning which we had a long discussion this time last year. Just what is it that directs our minds to take decisions? Brain cells directing brain cells? Or the ghost in the machine?

6451 views

For me the question of free will is simply part of the even more complex one of identity, concerning which we had a long discussion this time last year. Just what is it that directs our minds to take decisions? Brain cells directing brain cells? Or the ghost in the machine?-My vote is for the ghost!

6498 views

Not to contaminate the other thread too much
> Are you arguing within the confines of mathematical chaos theory? 
I'm not sure what you means with in the "confines" 
> If you are arguing "chaotic" as in "human beings exhibit disorder," then humans have free will. The opposite of "free will" is determinism, and in this view human beings are nothing but predictable finite automata. -While this is possibly a common view of determinism, any determinist who has thought about the subject for more than five minutes we understand that the universe is not determinable but in any trivial sense. Would not chaos thery alone preclude determinability? -I do not see the logic in your statement above at all. Determinism is an argument against free will. -> Human behavior has shown itself to be unpredictable in all but the most grandly generic scales. The only way to argue that humans are determinable is to ultimately resort to Chaos Theory which is blocked above. -> Either way--at this juncture you have nothing to argue. But I'll go further...
> 
> In terms of other kinds of evidence, as I said before the entire body of Zen Buddhism (and much of Hinduism) is rooted in the deliberate practice of free will. If you learn how to focus, you can tell the difference between your mind and your consciousness. The mind is a chatterbox. The consciousness is serene.
> 
> In the OCD case & neurosurgery case I discussed, people were aware that they were being controlled. These two bits of evidence are two more slams against the notion that human behavior is deterministic.
> 
> And last but not least... the entire field of psychology. The only attempt to bring "order" from "disorder" in the human world. It too fails to explain human behavior. (Economics does a much better job of that.)-Xeno - I find your arguments here absolutely illogical. This surprises me greatly, as I agree with much what you have written before on differnt subjects.-We have to look outside of our perceptions of our mind to determine whether we have free will. Otherwise we may as well let evangelical Christians cite the Bible for Noah's ark and the Flood.

6325 views

I have defined free will as "an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity".
> 
> MATT: No - I didn't mean to forget you, but I would say your definition certainly encompasses the criteria I set forth. It gives us an upper and lower bound.
> 
> Thank you. The main stumbling block between Romansh and myself seems to be the inclusion of consciousness in the definition. I find the whole concept of free will inconceivable without it, but it would be interesting to know if others agree.-Agreed.

6572 views


> "An entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of constraints beyond the control of that entity".-I would say: 'an entity's conscious ability to make decisions independently of, yet within the boundries of constraints beyond the control of that entity'.

6507 views

First, I find ROMANSH's definition only intuitively correct. Considering that we do not have a solid picture on the question of nature vs. nurture, we don't have a clear picture on how independent we truly are from our environment. This gets more complex when we move beyond the physical environment (what I assume ROMANSH was talking about) and include the social environment. 
I struggle a little with this. While I can understand the nature/nurture debate, I can't help thinking the two are a false dichotomy. Am I somehow independent of my chemistry and the layered fundamental physics. So I ask again for those of us who assert we have free will, where does my ability overide the "descriptive laws" of chemistry and physics.-"Beyond the physical environment" - While I agree it is useful to compartmentalize the various aspects of our lives, morality, society, genetics etc, which of them are not a product or a subset of the physical?-> I would also go so far as to say that humans at this level are a kind of superorganism; there is a group will as well, centered on ideas, and is self-perpetuating. The most troubling thought of all is Nietzsche's pointed observation that a thought comes when IT wills. So to what extent do we actually control? Also troubling to me is any assertion that we do anything independently of nature or the universe. We have a reptilian brain that we are always responding to. And if your basic needs aren't being met, you'll never get to the point where you'll be able to ponder free will. 
I have not read any Nietzsche knowingly. 
But the relevant questions seem to be asked here. 
> I would offer that the definition that should be used for free will contain these elements:
> 
> 1. An explicit assertion of conscious control. 
> 2. An ability to create. 
> 3. An ability to do something contrary to solid reasoning. 
> 
> So using these three points I'll take my first stab at the definition of free will.
> 
> FREE WILL: Free will is the ability to alter circumstances of some situation through innovation. 
So we are back to having an intelligence so we can innovate, reason and create?
Plus we need a consciousness. Two more imponderables? We should throw in life as the final imponderable as well to complete the set. Sorry I don't mean to be a :wiseguy: :)-
> This statement brings in my point #2. The definition espoused by Romansh and David doesn't take into account the human ability to act in innovative way. Choosing among options is far too simplistic for what humans are capable of doing--and lest one forget--the power of spontaneous intuition is something that can never be set aside. And as a definition, it is broadly applicable.-Not surprisingly I tend to disagree. Speaking personally I'm not aware of anything innovative that I have created. I have used my education, experience observation and combined various concepts which could be considered by some as innovative. -So according your defintion if I decide to continue doing nothing , then I'm not exerting my free will?

6635 views

First, I find ROMANSH's definition only intuitively correct. Considering that we do not have a solid picture on the question of nature vs. nurture, we don't have a clear picture on how independent we truly are from our environment. This gets more complex when we move beyond the physical environment (what I assume ROMANSH was talking about) and include the social environment. 
> I struggle a little with this. While I can understand the nature/nurture debate, I can't help thinking the two are a false dichotomy. Am I somehow independent of my chemistry and the layered fundamental physics. So I ask again for those of us who assert we have free will, where does my ability overide the "descriptive laws" of chemistry and physics.
> 
> "Beyond the physical environment" - While I agree it is useful to compartmentalize the various aspects of our lives, morality, society, genetics etc, which of them are not a product or a subset of the physical?
> -This is countered with a question of where exactly, is the line where chemistry ends and consciousness begins? Consciousness as a pure product of matter is a position that can only be taken by a raw materialist; and even for them the burden of proof is currently on explaining exactly how matter becomes "conscious." Since this is an open question, and its answer is necessary for your question--we can set that concern aside. -> > I would also go so far as to say that humans at this level are a kind of superorganism; there is a group will as well, centered on ideas, and is self-perpetuating. The most troubling thought of all is Nietzsche's pointed observation that a thought comes when IT wills. So to what extent do we actually control? Also troubling to me is any assertion that we do anything independently of nature or the universe. We have a reptilian brain that we are always responding to. And if your basic needs aren't being met, you'll never get to the point where you'll be able to ponder free will. 
> I have not read any Nietzsche knowingly. 
> But the relevant questions seem to be asked here. -Schopenhauer but not his star pupil? For shame!!! -If you're familiar with Freud, Freud said of Nietzsche "I read a little bit of him and refused to read more for fear I'd be accused of plagiarism." So if you're familiar with Freud, you have a basic understanding of Nietzsche's thought. -> > I would offer that the definition that should be used for free will contain these elements:
> > 
> > 1. An explicit assertion of conscious control. 
> > 2. An ability to create. 
> > 3. An ability to do something contrary to solid reasoning. 
> > 
> > So using these three points I'll take my first stab at the definition of free will.
> > 
> > FREE WILL: Free will is the ability to alter circumstances of some situation through innovation. 
> So we are back to having an intelligence so we can innovate, reason and create?
> Plus we need a consciousness. Two more imponderables? We should throw in life as the final imponderable as well to complete the set. Sorry I don't mean to be a :wiseguy: :)
> -To me, the problem with your definition is purely that robots fit the bill as well. And at the present stage of the game, I can safely say that robots do not have free will under any definition that I have heard of. So... something is missing. -> 
> > This statement brings in my point #2. The definition espoused by Romansh and David doesn't take into account the human ability to act in innovative way. Choosing among options is far too simplistic for what humans are capable of doing--and lest one forget--the power of spontaneous intuition is something that can never be set aside. And as a definition, it is broadly applicable.
> 
> Not surprisingly I tend to disagree. Speaking personally I'm not aware of anything innovative that I have created. I have used my education, experience observation and combined various concepts which could be considered by some as innovative. 
> 
> So according your defintion if I decide to continue doing nothing , then I'm not exerting my free will?-The issue here, is that for me to empirically observe free will and set it aside as some actual property, than we need to be able to clearly separate "degrees" as they were of free will. Or we will never be able to guarantee we're observing free will.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"

6603 views

Just as an aside, Einstein on free will:-> If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was travelling its way of its own accord ... So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.
He was being fairly mystical here. :)

6584 views

I think this is a case of action preceeding understanding. I'll explain, but first, let me start by saying that I believe in free will. Second, let me say that I do not think humans excercise it.-Lets start by assuming that there are two types of choices, predictable, and unpredictable. A predictable choice is made when a person is reacting to influence, whatever influence that might be. If all the influences where known (i.e. personality, environment, history, etc) You could (and we do) predict the behavior of the person with a surprising degree of accuracy. This is because the person does NOT understand all of the influences, and for the moment, it is impossible for us to understand all of them due to a lack of knowledge. So, it could be said that predictable behavior, lack of free will, or the illusion of free will, is the result of action(choice) preceeding knowlege preceeding understanding, or at best, knowledge preceeding action preceeding understanding. The best case scenario here is that a person makes an independent choice, but is swayed by factors that are irresistable to them, like Einstein's analogy of them moon. If the moon understood gravity and inertia, and possessed some ability to affect its position(movement wise) it could choose several options. But not understanding gravity, it would consider it to be an unalterable state, and make choices that do not revolve around manipulating that gravity to its own ends.-Unpredictable action, or free will, by necessity must follow a different pattern, in which understanding preceeds the choice, and knowledge preceeds understanding. In this scenario, a person would know the inlfuencing factors, understand how/why/when and under what conditions these factors would affect them. Additionaly, because they fully understand the influencing factors, they would be able to choose apath that was antithetical to those influences, essentially removing the influence. The fact that full understanding allows the removal of influences that might normally be assumed as unalterable makes the action unpredictable. Particularly if the observer does not have the same understanding. That is true free will.

6519 views

Balance_Maintained believes in free will, but does not think humans exercise it. I don't know whether we have it or not, or to what extent we may have it, because I think it's impossible to gauge the degree of influence exercised on us by factors that are beyond our control. However, I FEEL that we have it, and would like to examine your arguments by referring to the person I know best in the whole world, which is me. My observations, however, can be taken to apply to anyone else.-You seem to base your assessment of free will on predictability. I'm able to predict many of my own decisions, not because I do or don't know what has influenced me, but because I've experienced similar situations in the past. You equate free will with unpredictable action. If I'm unable to predict my own actions, that will be because I have never experienced anything comparable. For instance, if you give me a choice between chocolate and ginger, I know from past experience that I will choose chocolate because I don't like ginger and I do like chocolate. (And my wife will go the opposite way!) However, if you ask me to predict how I would behave if a gunman was holding my family and me hostage, the answer is I don't know. In my view, this has nothing to do with free will.-You argue that if someone fully understands the influencing factors (which I think is impossible) "they would be able to choose a path that was antithetical to those influences, essentially removing the influence". In some situations that is obviously true ... after all, it is the basis of psychotherapy. But even after the "cure", we would still never know all the factors influencing the new behaviour. The most we can say is that the potential range of freedom will have been extended. In any case, your hypothetical "full" understanding would still only have limited application. If science discovered that I have chocophile gingerphobic taste buds, would I then be able to choose ginger instead of chocolate? Apart from in extreme cases, such as trauma, I doubt very much if knowing the influences would change people's character or decisions (but I fully acknowledge that this is a subjective opinion based on non-scientific observation of myself and those closest to me). -To sum up, my view is that we can neither know nor remove all influences. Predictability of our behaviour or that of others will depend on experience, not on knowledge of influences. And finally, if we do have free will, our decisions will rarely depend on our knowledge of the influences, but on our inborn nature interacting with the influences themselves (whether conscious or unconscious) that shape our identity.

6534 views

RSS Feed of thread

powered by my little forum