In Conclusion... (Adler\'s \"Difference of Man\" Book) (Humans)

by xeno6696 , Sonoran Desert, Tuesday, August 04, 2009, 00:30 (5589 days ago) @ xeno6696

Well, his central argument is a well-delivered payload, I'll give it that. I fully feel however that what he takes as his philosophical implications are off-base however. - His central thesis on that is a pretty traditional Catholic argument (funny from a self-described Pagan that later turned Catholic) that I felt Nietzsche had already adequately dealt with. His argument is more or less that the rational basis to treat "lower men" with the same rights and respects would be destroyed, and more or less that "the Nazis would then be technically right." (We wouldn't be able to morally condemn the acts of the Nazis as if humans are only different by degree to other animals.) He also asserts that it destroys free will. I disagree with the latter by simply saying that all it means is that the Aristotelian/Thomistic model is wrong, not that free will doesn't exist at all. We are simply back to needing to readdress the problem--if we were followers of one of those two doctrines. It also shows some lack of finesse on his part... just because we would show that the mind has a material cause doesn't negate the very obviously advanced use we have of those primeval rudiments that it would (theoretically) have been shown to exist in other animals and in machines. - Nietzsche attacks this idea by simply by saying that the distinction that man MUST differ radically from everything else for morality is a false distinction. Building on that general position, I can point to the observation that we have already removed ourselves from most of the pressures of nature. Adler himself discusses that man is the only animal that appears to be able to delay action on primeval drives. Nietzsche would argue that a strong man has the capability to write new values from old. So we wouldn't be able to base morality on man being radically different. To me this just means that work must be done to find a new basis for morality, N's answer (and my own) is to base it upon life itself, as it is one of only two universal truths that the human condition has foisted upon it, namely life. Coincidentally, this is essentially the *exact* foundation for Buddhist ethics. - I center my own concept of a universal morality on the observation that social animals fare better than solitary animals, and that humanity is so interconnected that there is no way to abrogate the social contract. It is written into our genes. This also means that valuing man as an end is something that must be *actively* promoted to each concurrent generation as it is *not* dogma, and cannot simply be passively instilled. - If the immaterial hypothesis were falsified, it would negate the basis for a great many rational arguments that center on man being different. The combination of my own Self + Nietzsche + Wittgenstein + Heidegger + Rand would be unaffected. I acknowledge that I do not have a solution to the free will problem, yet I can tell you by personal experience that I am aware of free will and can even tell you when my free will seems to be abrogated. (Such as right now when I should be studying for my GRE Wednesday. I don't want to write this, but feel compelled to do so.) - Tying in to some of what you were discussing about your thoughts that the Turing test won't be successful: While recognizing that the challenge has not been met, I also don't think that we're anywhere close to making anything with enough complexity. Adler accounted for this, but takes the position that every failure that occurs marginally strengthens the moderate immaterialist position. I disagree with that claim purely for the reason stated above. If we make a machine that we know isn't as complex as the human brain, should we really be astounded if it fails? We should only be astounded if it works, because that would mean that the critical threshhold might be smaller than predicted, which would instantly open the philosophical floodgates.

--
\"Why is it, Master, that ascetics fight with ascetics?\"

\"It is, brahmin, because of attachment to views, adherence to views, fixation on views, addiction to views, obsession with views, holding firmly to views that ascetics fight with ascetics.\"