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Do "you" really exist?-http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/03/inquiring-minds-jennifer-ouellette-science-of-self-"Out of this unimaginable complexity emerges the self as we think we know itâand scientists have identified many of the component parts. For instance, there are specific brain regions associated with recognizing yourself in the mirror, feeling that you're in your own body, feeling that your body begins and ends somewhere, and recognizing where you are in space. So how then can anyone argue that there is not actually such a thing as a self?"

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GPJ

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George: Do "you" really exist?
> 
> http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/03/inquiring-minds-jennifer-ouellette-scien... 
> "Out of this unimaginable complexity emerges the self as we think we know itâand scientists have identified many of the component parts. For instance, there are specific brain regions associated with recognizing yourself in the mirror, feeling that you're in your own body, feeling that your body begins and ends somewhere, and recognizing where you are in space. So how then can anyone argue that there is not actually such a thing as a self?"-Great find. The answer in the same article is:-"More specifically, Ouellette ultimately concludes that the self is an emergent property of the billions of neurons of our brain all interacting with one another. What's emergence? "A system in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts," writes Ouellette."-My 'self' is a part of my emergent consciousness. But it is hard to go much further.

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I must admit I always find the word emergent a bit of a none word. -Many modern psychologists and scientists in general have doubts about the self-Bruce Hood (from your neck of the woods DHW) wrote the the Self Illusion.-You tube
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZIDWcWn21gg

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Romansh:I must admit I always find the word emergent a bit of a none word. 
> 
> Many modern psychologists and scientists in general have doubts about the self
> 
> Bruce Hood (from your neck of the woods DHW) wrote the the Self Illusion.
> 
> You tube
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZIDWcWn21gg-Thanks for dropping in. A great contribution Especially since what we experience in consciousness and self is created biochemically into electrical impulses which are then interpreted for us as a seamless reality. Taht iswhy the word 'emergent' is so important, as it papers over what we do not understand, but constantly experience. It is illusory, but it is all we have!

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Thanks for dropping in. A great contribution Especially since what we experience in consciousness and self is created biochemically into electrical impulses which are then interpreted for us as a seamless reality. Taht iswhy the word 'emergent' is so important, as it papers over what we do not understand, but constantly experience. It is illusory, but it is all we have!-Not a problem David-Emergent - complex systems behaving in complex ways? ... Even very simple systems can behave in complex ways. Having said that I agree it is papering over the cracks (or gaps). Again having said that I would not necessarily fill those gaps with other impossible to understand concepts.-Illusory? I would agree. Understanding that it is illusory is pretty good step towards advancement. I am confident that with a bit of ingenuity and time we can progress towards understanding the absence of self and the consequences of such a worldview.-If indeed the self is illusory, then a belief in free will is becomes more difficult ... at least for me.

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> Romansh; If indeed the self is illusory, then a belief in free will is becomes more difficult ... at least for me. -Well, not for me. I'm still convinced I tell my brain what to do. For example,I just told my body's fingers to type this for you. I've just written a book which dhw suggested I do. He made a choice and asked me out of his free will. I responded out of mine. I realize that the whole episode is biochemically orchestrated, but we both were in control of the event. What do you call that? It is freedom of action. Isn't that free will? All those synapses dance around using the connections my brain createdd for me as I developed from cbhildhood to now. My thoughts and memories went into planning and writing the book, all added by a brain operating about three parts of separation from what I experience. That is why the word 'emergent' is so fuzzy and yet so important a concept. One day we may understand how it all works, but frankly I doubt it.

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Well, not for me. I'm still convinced I tell my brain what to do. For example,I just told my body's fingers to type this for you. I've just written a book which dhw suggested I do. He made a choice and asked me out of his free will. I responded out of mine. I realize that the whole episode is biochemically orchestrated, but we both were in control of the event. What do you call that?
compatibilism or prhaps soft determinism. 
William james called it a quagmire of evasion.
Kant called it a wretched subterfuge.
> It is freedom of action. Isn't that free will? 
No
> All those synapses dance around using the connections my brain created for me as I developed from childhood to now. My thoughts and memories went into planning and writing the book, all added by a brain operating about three parts of separation from what I experience. That is why the word 'emergent' is so fuzzy and yet so important a concept. One day we may understand how it all works, but frankly I doubt it.-Is not the self's recollection of it's choices a confabulation of all the bioelectrochemical actions?

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> Romansh: Is not the self's recollection of it's choices a confabulation of all the bioelectrochemical actions?-Confabulate is to lie. I think that is the wrong conclusion. Just because we don't understand how the brain gives us what it does give, is no reason to suspect we are not in control of our brain and self. We are unaware, as kids, that we are creating ourselves in memories and personal conclusions. The brain's plasticity conforms all of it, and, poor choice of word but fits, we emerge. In some way miraculous, but it happens to all of us, and then some of us doubt when we see a glimpse how it is being done. We don't understand enough yet to be critical of the process, or suspect it is nefarious.

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Romansh: Is not the self's recollection of it's choices a confabulation of all the bioelectrochemical actions?
> 
> Confabulate is to lie. I think that is the wrong conclusion. 
It would be be if confabulate just meant lie ... confabulate-> Just because we don't understand how the brain gives us what it does give, is no reason to suspect we are not in control of our brain and self. We are unaware, as kids, that we are creating ourselves in memories and personal conclusions. 
Books like Subliminal (Leonard Mlodinow) and The Self Illusion (Bruce Hood) give us (well me) plenty of examples why we my be a little suspect that we are, at least, not in complete control. Ultimately it is bioelectochemical reactions that are doing the 'controlling'. -> The brain's plasticity conforms all of it, and, poor choice of word but fits, we emerge. In some way miraculous, but it happens to all of us, and then some of us doubt when we see a glimpse how it is being done. We don't understand enough yet to be critical of the process, or suspect it is nefarious.-I agree we don't understand how it is done, but I am not taking it hook, line and sinker that it is done at all. I think a little skepticism is warranted here. And if the self and free will are illusory, it has been worthwhile for me to examine the ramifications of the no(t) self.

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Romansh: Is not the self's recollection of it's choices a confabulation of all the bioelectrochemical actions?
> > 
> > Dsvid: Confabulate is to lie. I think that is the wrong conclusion. 
> It would be be if confabulate just meant lie ... confabulate-Good point. It does have that other meaning also.-> 
> Romansh: I agree we don't understand how it is done, but I am not taking it hook, line and sinker that it is done at all. I think a little skepticism is warranted here. And if the self and free will are illusory, it has been worthwhile for me to examine the ramifications of the no(t) self.-So who are you? We all experience 'self'-ness, and I don't question it. Life is confusing enough.

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So who are you? We all experience 'self'-ness, and I don't question it. Life is confusing enough.
Pragmatically speaking - I suspect pretty much the same as anyone else.-Philosophically and metaphorically speaking - an eddy in an unfolding universe.-> I think they are all on autopilot, molded by what we want.
I would include our wants, wishes and wills being on autopilot ... they are of the same substance as our autopilots.

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GEORGE: Do "you" really exist?-http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/03/inquiring-minds-jennifer-ouellette-scien...-QUOTE: This also means the self is very fragile. Damage the brain or cease its function, and the self may dissipate. Die, of course, and the story is the same. "I expected people to object more to my take on what happens to your conscious self after you die," Ouellette confesses. "Because I basically say there is no soul. Or rather, your soul is this conscious thing that is emergent, and once all that activity that leads to the emergent phenomenon disappears, so does that, it's gone."-ROMANSH: I must admit I always find the word emergent a bit of a none word.
 -We have in the past, I think, all accepted Ouellette's definition of "emergence" as "a system in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts". I'm not keen on her example of a traffic jam. A much better one, I think, would be the motor car itself. None of its constituent parts on their own will produce the energy to make the car move. It's only their interaction that does this. Take away certain parts, and the car won't function. Some folk believe that the self is an emergent property of the interaction between the brain (with all its different functions), the rest of the body, the environment and experience. Given the above definition, I'd say the word is extremely useful!-I do have a problem, though, with David's belief that this emergent property can survive the death of the brain. That could only mean that what emerges takes on a form that is INDEPENDENT of the brain ... like a car's automotive energy surviving the loss of its engine and wheels.-ROMANSH: Many modern psychologists and scientists in general have doubts about the self
Bruce Hood (from your neck of the woods DHW) wrote the the Self Illusion.
You tube-http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZIDWcWn21gg-ROMANSH Understanding that it [the self] is illusory is pretty good step towards advancement. I am confident that with a bit of ingenuity and time we can progress towards understanding the absence of self and the consequences of such a worldview.
If indeed the self is illusory, then a belief in free will is becomes more difficult ... at least for me.-I am almost certain, Romansh, that it was you who pointed out to us a long time ago ... as Hood does here ... that "illusory" does not mean something does not exist. It means that something is not what it seems. This is a very important distinction. I would argue that the self does exist, and that everyone has the ability to take his or her own decisions in certain contexts ... if we make that a defining element of "free will" ... but that neither the "self" nor "free will" are as self-contained or as free as they appear to be. The combination of brain, body, environment and experience mentioned above clearly entails factors over which we have no control, and so both our identity and our ability to take decisions are under influences we may not be aware of. Nevertheless, that particular combination is what gives each of us our uniqueness, even if we do find it impossible to separate our "selves" and our decisions from the influences that have shaped and continue to shape them.

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We have in the past, I think, all accepted Ouellette's definition of "emergence" as "a system in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts".
While this is a common "acceptance" of the definition of emergence - it is really more akin to synergism (antagonism is the antonym).-If I have a 10% solution of reagent A that extracts 50% of a metal and a 20% solution of reagent B that also extracts 50% of that metal, and if make a solution of 10% A and 20% B, and say I get a 99% extraction of the metal then I can say I have synergism. (If there was no synergism I would have expected 75% extraction). -Were any laws broken? Does the second law of thermodynamics still hold? Did I get something for nothing? Plainly not, I would argue. What happened was I errected a model, and when the system deviates positively from that model I give it a special name ... synergism or perhaps emergence.-> I am almost certain, Romansh, that it was you who pointed out to us a long time ago ... as Hood does here ... that "illusory" does not mean something does not exist. It means that something is not what it seems. This is a very important distinction. 
Agree completely.-> I would argue that the self does exist, and that everyone has the ability to take his or her own decisions in certain contexts ... if we make that a defining element of "free will" ... but that neither the "self" nor "free will" are as self-contained or as free as they appear to be. 
I would say we have the ability to parse the universe into you, me and not me or you - essentially creating a model. -> The combination of brain, body, environment and experience mentioned above clearly entails factors over which we have no control, and so both our identity and our ability to take decisions are under influences we may not be aware of. Nevertheless, that particular combination is what gives each of us our uniqueness, even if we do find it impossible to separate our "selves" and our decisions from the influences that have shaped and continue to shape them.-No one is arguing against uniqueness. But I am questioning what exactly does the controlling of the bioelectrochemical reactions and the underlying fundamental physics? -In one interpretation all this bioelectrochemical/physics stuff is the thought, but compatibilists have a different definition of free will. So ultimately it is the stuff that has the free will. Libertarians (lower case l) have a more dualistic approach where the mind is somehow separate from the brain.-DHW, I can't tell which of the general positions you are proposing, but to me it seems closer to the second.

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> Romansh: No one is arguing against uniqueness. But I am questioning what exactly does the controlling of the bioelectrochemical reactions and the underlying fundamental physics? -I think they are all on autopilot, molded by what we want.

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dhw: We have in the past, I think, all accepted Ouellette's definition of "emergence" as "a system in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts".
ROMANSH: While this is a common "acceptance" of the definition of emergence -it is really more akin to synergism (antagonism is the antonym).-Why bring in a different term taken from such a specific field? The above commonly accepted definition of emergence can be applied to many different fields, philosophical as well as scientific. That is why it is so useful.-Dhw: I would argue that the self does exist, and that everyone has the ability to take his or her own decisions in certain contexts ... if we make that a defining element of "free will" ... but that neither the "self" nor "free will" are as self-contained or as free as they appear to be. 
ROMANSH: I would say we have the ability to parse the universe into you, me and not me or you - essentially creating a model. -I agree that we have that ability, and if by creating a model you mean we have a concept of what it is that constitutes a particular "self", I would agree with that too.-Dhw: The combination of brain, body, environment and experience mentioned above clearly entails factors over which we have no control, and so both our identity and our ability to take decisions are under influences we may not be aware of. Nevertheless, that particular combination is what gives each of us our uniqueness, even if we do find it impossible to separate our "selves" and our decisions from the influences that have shaped and continue to shape them.
ROMANSH: No one is arguing against uniqueness. But I am questioning what exactly does the controlling of the bioelectrochemical reactions and the underlying fundamental physics?-I think you have been asking two questions: 1) whether the self exists (you have talked of "the absence of self and the consequences of such a worldview"), and 2) whether we have free will. Clearly the latter depends on the former, but the problematical nature of free will does not mean that the attributes which make "me" do not constitute what we call a "self". -ROMANSH: In one interpretation all this bioelectrochemical/physics stuff is the thought, but compatibilists have a different definition of free will. So ultimately it is the stuff that has the free will. Libertarians (lower case l) have a more dualistic approach where the mind is somehow separate from the brain. DHW, I can't tell which of the general positions you are proposing, but to me it seems closer to the second.-I'm not proposing either. Firstly, I'm arguing that the self exists, because I can identify characteristics in myself which distinguish me from others, and vice versa. This has nothing to do with free will, because even if those characteristics are due to factors beyond my control, they are still what constitute "me". Secondly, I do not know if or to what extent I have free will, because I do not know the extent to which my decisions are governed by biochemistry, general heredity, the environment, experience etc. I don't understand how compatibilists can "escape" from these constraints without embracing the same mind/body dualism as libertarians. (What is "more dualistic"? As I see it, either the mind is separate from the brain or it isn't.) As regards dualism itself, until we have a convincing account of how materials can generate consciousness of themselves, I prefer to keep an open mind, which means that I neither accept nor dismiss the idea that some form of energy may influence our chemicals rather than the chemicals being the sole producers and controllers of that energy. This also leaves me open-minded in relation to some of the so-called psychic events we have discussed before on this forum.

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dhw: As I see it, either the mind is separate from the brain or it isn't.) As regards dualism itself, until we have a convincing account of how materials can generate consciousness of themselves, I prefer to keep an open mind, which means that I neither accept nor dismiss the idea that some form of energy may influence our chemicals rather than the chemicals being the sole producers and controllers of that energy. This also leaves me open-minded in relation to some of the so-called psychic events we have discussed before on this forum.-I would remind you that the researchers into NDE's tend to favor the brain as a kind of receiver like a radio to allow for consciousness to be maintained during the experience, but that suggests free will is not so free. However, if individual consciousness can be free-floating in the quantum realm of reality and cross back over a la Kastner's idea of quantum transactions, perhaps it is free.

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Why bring in a different term taken from such a specific field? The above commonly accepted definition of emergence can be applied to many different fields, philosophical as well as scientific. That is why it is so useful.
The definition you provided for emergence is the same as that for synergism I have no problem with that.-What's the problem with providing a synergic example?
 
> I agree that we have that ability, and if by creating a model you mean we have a concept of what it is that constitutes a particular "self", I would agree with that too.
We create all sorts of models: ourselves, others, communities, unicorns, trees, griffins, dragons, consciousness. Some our plainly just concepts, others we may think are a bit more substantial. -> I think you have been asking two questions: 1) whether the self exists (you have talked of "the absence of self and the consequences of such a worldview"), and 2) whether we have free will. Clearly the latter depends on the former, but the problematical nature of free will does not mean that the attributes which make "me" do not constitute what we call a "self". 
And yet I found by dismissing the latter the perception I have of the former becomes problematic. If I have no free will what exactly is this self that perceives itself as free?
 
> I'm not proposing either. Firstly, I'm arguing that the self exists, because I can identify characteristics in myself which distinguish me from others, and vice versa. This has nothing to do with free will, because even if those characteristics are due to factors beyond my control, they are still what constitute "me". Secondly, I do not know if or to what extent I have free will, because I do not know the extent to which my decisions are governed by biochemistry, general heredity, the environment, experience etc. I don't understand how compatibilists can "escape" from these constraints without embracing the same mind/body dualism as libertarians. 
They [compatibilists] change the definition of free will subtly as we did before to something like the ability to make conscious choices. We have to throw in conscious here because computers make choices.-> (What is "more dualistic"? As I see it, either the mind is separate from the brain or it isn't.) As regards dualism itself, until we have a convincing account of how materials can generate consciousness of themselves, I prefer to keep an open mind, which means that I neither accept nor dismiss the idea that some form of energy may influence our chemicals rather than the chemicals being the sole producers and controllers of that energy. This also leaves me open-minded in relation to some of the so-called psychic events we have discussed before on this forum.-The question remains are we actually conscious? ... I know Blackmore gets a lot of flack here, but in my opinion undeservedly so.-And "some form of energy" does not allow the free will believer escape the clutches of cause and effect. Unless we deny cause and effect, then logically it leaves our ability to make choices independently of bioelectrochemistry or the interactions of unidentified forms of energy on shaky ground. A belief in even the possibility of free will is hard to rconcile.

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ROMANSH: The definition you provided for emergence is the same as that for synergism I have no problem with that. What's the problem with providing a synergic example?-Ouellette made a straightforward comment about the soul as an emergent phenomenon, so I was surprised that you dismissed "emergent" as "a bit of a none word" and wanted to substitute the more recondite term "synergic". The example of reagents and metals and solutions is not a problem, but it rather distracts from the discussion on whether there is such a thing as an emergent self and free will!
 
ROMANSH: If I have no free will what exactly is this self that perceives itself as free?-Again I think you are conflating two different questions. I would describe (define is too precise) the self as being an individual's identity, which consists of attributes in a combination that is unique to him or her. These attributes obviously include individualized intelligence, memory, emotion, and ... crucially for our discussion ... will. Whether ANY of them are under our control remains a moot point, but whether they are or aren't does not prevent us from accepting that they are what constitute the "self".-Dhw: I don't understand how compatibilists can "escape" from these constraints without embracing the same mind/body dualism as libertarians. -ROMANSH: They [compatibilists] change the definition of free will subtly as we did before to something like the ability to make conscious choices. We have to throw in conscious here because computers make choices.-Whose earlier definition excluded consciousness? (Yes, we have clashed on this before!) For me, free will automatically entails CONSCIOUS decision-making. Of course that does not mean that the conscious decision is not subject to unconscious influences, and it is those that throw into question the term "free".
 
ROMANSH: The question remains are we actually conscious? ... I know Blackmore gets a lot of flack here, but in my opinion undeservedly so.-Why not go the whole way and ask if we actually exist? There is no limit to what we can question. That is why at the start of any discussion we have to agree to certain basic premises. For instance, if you and I wish to discuss whether we have free will or not, I will assume you exist and our correspondence is an exchange between two people who are aware (conscious) of their own and each other's words. The starting point is then what you and I mean by "free will" and what criteria we use to define freedom. Not whether we are conscious.
 
ROMANSH: And "some form of energy" does not allow the free will believer escape the clutches of cause and effect. Unless we deny cause and effect, then logically it leaves our ability to make choices independently of bioelectrochemistry or the interactions of unidentified forms of energy on shaky ground. A belief in even the possibility of free will is hard to rconcile.-I thought the compatibilists argued that it was not causal determinism but compulsion and constraint that were the antithesis of freedom ... an argument I do not understand, because I can't see a dividing line between causal determinism and the constraints of bioelectrochemistry, the environment, past history and experience, all of which may be beyond our control. But I cannot ignore the fact that I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision, and I feel that in most cases those decisions are "mine" and under "my" control. No matter how much I may rationalize about the influences, and acknowledge that these may have moulded my choice, I simply do not know enough about the source and nature of consciousness to assume that it is robotic ... or on autopilot, as David puts it. Whether that sense of control is a delusion or stems from some form of personalized energy (perhaps emergent, perhaps not), I simply do not know. I can only repeat that until consciousness itself is explained, along with those psychic phenomena that appear to defy all materialistic explanations, I remain open-minded. "Shaky ground" is fine with me, though. It's an image I'd apply to most of the areas I peep at from my agnostic picket fence!

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Again DHW we go off in many directions here.
> Ouellette made a straightforward comment about the soul as an emergent phenomenon, so I was surprised that you dismissed "emergent" as "a bit of a none word" and wanted to substitute the more recondite term "synergic". The example of reagents and metals and solutions is not a problem, but it rather distracts from the discussion on whether there is such a thing as an emergent self and free will!-According to 'your' definition emergent and synergic are synonymous. So I would argue my example of an emergent synergic phenomenon is relevant.-Chemical and metals ions etc as far as I can tell are very definitely connected to consciousness, self, free will etc.-> Again I think you are conflating two different questions. I would describe (define is too precise) the self as being an individual's identity, which consists of attributes in a combination that is unique to him or her. These attributes obviously include individualized intelligence, memory, emotion, and ... crucially for our discussion ... will. Whether ANY of them are under our control remains a moot point, but whether they are or aren't does not prevent us from accepting that they are what constitute the "self".-I don't think I am conflating the two DHW, I see them as connected. If you see them as sepearate I would argue that is purely a semantic issue.
 
> Whose earlier definition excluded consciousness? (Yes, we have clashed on this before!) For me, free will automatically entails CONSCIOUS decision-making. Of course that does not mean that the conscious decision is not subject to unconscious influences, and it is those that throw into question the term "free".
Mine.-> Why not go the whole way and ask if we actually exist? There is no limit to what we can question. That is why at the start of any discussion we have to agree to certain basic premises. For instance, if you and I wish to discuss whether we have free will or not, I will assume you exist and our correspondence is an exchange between two people who are aware (conscious) of their own and each other's words. The starting point is then what you and I mean by "free will" and what criteria we use to define freedom. Not whether we are conscious.-No need. I do not revert to a backward form of solipsim.
No one is saying that things don't exist. Just that they are not what they seem.-> I thought the compatibilists argued that it was not causal determinism but compulsion and constraint that were the antithesis of freedom ... an argument I do not understand, because I can't see a dividing line between causal determinism and the constraints of bioelectrochemistry, the environment, past history and experience, all of which may be beyond our control. But I cannot ignore the fact that I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision, and I feel that in most cases those decisions are "mine" and under "my" control. No matter how much I may rationalize about the influences, and acknowledge that these may have moulded my choice, I simply do not know enough about the source and nature of consciousness to assume that it is robotic ... or on autopilot, as David puts it. Whether that sense of control is a delusion or stems from some form of personalized energy (perhaps emergent, perhaps not), I simply do not know. I can only repeat that until consciousness itself is explained, along with those psychic phenomena that appear to defy all materialistic explanations, I remain open-minded. "Shaky ground" is fine with me, though. It's an image I'd apply to most of the areas I peep at from my agnostic picket fence!-Take the bolded bit ... This assumes that your "weighing up" is actually conscious. Your bioelectrochemistry did it for you unconsciously quite nicely without your assistance thank you. Unless you are suggesting your thoughts are somehow manipulating your bioelectrochemistry?-There are probably as many compatibilisms as there are compatibilists. But generally the one thing they have in common is that our decisions etc are caused either by deterministic processes or perhaps quantum phenomena. The hard determinist has trouble seeing freedom in this, the soft determinist lowers the bar.-That you don't know wrt free will is fair enough. Philosophically speaking I would say the same, but in the same breath I would say it is a concept that makes absolutely no sense to me.

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ROMANSH: Again DHW we go off in many different directions here.-Too true, and I'm going to summarize some of the points as I see them (you may disagree with my viewpoint!) before moving on to what I consider the nub of the matter.
1) You consider "emergence" to be a non word, and prefer "synergism", which means the same thing. Well, so long as we understand each other...
2) When you say "the absence of self", you don't mean the self doesn't exist, but the self is not what it seems to be. I have described what I mean by the self (see also below), and you have not disagreed (yet).
3) Like Blackmore, you think we are not "actually conscious". I think we are, or we would not be having this discussion.
4) You say the compatibilists (who go back at least 250 years!) have subtly changed your definition of free will to incorporate "conscious", as in "the ability to make conscious choices". I don't know of anyone other than you who would associate the term with choices that are not conscious ... though of course that does not mean that we have such an ability.-Here is the main point I would like to discuss with you: I wrote that "I cannot ignore the fact that I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision."-ROMANSH: This assumes that your "weighing up" is actually conscious. Your bioelectrochemistry did it for you unconsciously quite nicely without your assistance thank you. Unless you are suggesting your thoughts are somehow manipulating your bioelectrochemistry? -Our thoughts "manipulate" our bioelectrochemistry all the time. That is how we perform our deliberate actions. But your contention seems to be that our thoughts are the product of our bioelectrochemistry as well. (I'll refer to cells from now on, for brevity's sake). So our cells manipulate our cells. And I hope you won't deny that we are conscious of our deliberate actions (otherwise, as I said, we wouldn't be having this conversation), which according to you means our cells are conscious of our cells manipulating our cells. And that statement alone shows that I am conscious of this consciousness, which means our cells are conscious of our cells being conscious of our cells manipulating our cells. All of this may be true. I do not know how consciousness works. And that is why I am unwilling to make assumptions, as you do (see below).-With regard to free will ... the ability to make conscious choices ... I was confronted with a striking example yesterday. I am currently working against strict deadlines to complete some translation work. However, it was a beautiful day, and I looked into my wife's garden and saw the blossoming trees and the profusion of flowers that she had planted. And the thought came to me (uncontrolled) that it would be nice if I put some of her flowers on her grave. (She died two months ago, and "I" grieve for her ... "I" being my unique combination of body, emotion, memory, reason, will, experience, past history etc.) I faced a clear choice: reason told me that I couldn't spare the time; emotion told me to go. I chose (controlled) to go. You may quite rightly argue that whatever unconscious factors influenced that decision may have been beyond my control, and that is why I say I do not know if I have free will. But since you assume that consciousness, will and self are physical (as stated in your latest post to David), I would like you to explain HOW you think my cells are physically manipulated by the loss of my wife (or indeed by any other experience or outside influence), and HOW you think my cells produced the conflict I have described between the cells I call my reason and the cells I call my emotions, and HOW you think my cells resolved the conflict through the cells I call my will, independently of the cells I call my consciousness.
 
Just to repeat my own view on this: I am not discounting your theory. I simply do not understand how such a process could work, and therefore I make no assumptions and remain open to the (for me) equally inexplicable possibility ... exemplified by NDEs and OBEs and other psychic experiences ... that there may be a form of personalized energy that is not restricted to the cells.

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> dhw: But since you assume that consciousness, will and self are physical (as stated in your latest post to David), I would like you to explain HOW you think my cells are physically manipulated by the loss of my wife (or indeed by any other experience or outside influence), and HOW you think my cells produced the conflict I have described between the cells I call my reason and the cells I call my emotions, and HOW you think my cells resolved the conflict through the cells I call my will, independently of the cells I call my consciousness.
> 
> Just to repeat my own view on this: I am not discounting your theory. I simply do not understand how such a process could work, and therefore I make no assumptions and remain open to the (for me) equally inexplicable possibility ... exemplified by NDEs and OBEs and other psychic experiences ... that there may be a form of personalized energy that is not restricted to the cells.-And this is where I step in with my favorite theory about cnsciousness: it may well be 'personalized energy' at a quantum level which each of us carries around without direct recognition. Gives Romansh a starting point for his theory.

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1) You consider "emergence" to be a non word, and prefer "synergism", which means the same thing. Well, so long as we understand each other...
Exactly. But you missed my point, we make a model - reality does not quite fit we call it emergence or synergy.
> 2) When you say "the absence of self", you don't mean the self doesn't exist, but the self is not what it seems to be. I have described what I mean by the self (see also below), and you have not disagreed (yet).
For me the self is an arbitrary boundary we draw around ourselves. Quite literally every bit of your self has come from elsewhere and temporarily is considered dhw. Quite pragmatic, but has certain consequences.-> 3) Like Blackmore, you think we are not "actually conscious". I think we are, or we would not be having this discussion.
Not quite ... I can see Blackmore's point of view with a little bit of introspection.
> 4) You say the compatibilists (who go back at least 250 years!) have subtly changed your definition of free will to incorporate "conscious", as in "the ability to make conscious choices". I don't know of anyone other than you who would associate the term with choices that are not conscious ... though of course that does not mean that we have such an ability.
Not just mine. -
> Here is the main point I would like to discuss with you: I wrote that "I cannot ignore the fact that I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision."
I would have written
"I cannot ignore that I think I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision." This is I think a little more agnostic on the subbject. 
 
> Our thoughts "manipulate" our bioelectrochemistry all the time. ....
Here we dip our toes into Cartesian dualism.
 
> With regard to free will ... the ability to make conscious choices .......-That you think you could have done otherwise is interesting. Thinking that you could do otherwise does not mean you have free will dhw.-And condolences on your loss. My heart goes out to you.-Sorry ... bit of a hurry tonight.

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Newspaper philosophy with a dollop for both Romansh and for dhw. I think it is right on. Folks with intellectual drive override some more basic urges:-http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/opinion/brooks-the-deepest-self.html?emc=edit_th_20140314&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=60788861&_r=0 -"We originate with certain biological predispositions. These can include erotic predispositions (we're aroused by people who send off fertility or status cues), or they can be cognitive (like loss aversion).-"But depth, the core of our being, is something we cultivate over time. We form relationships that either turn the core piece of ourselves into something more stable and disciplined or something more fragmented and disorderly. We begin with our natural biases but carve out depths according to the quality of the commitments we make. Our origins are natural; our depths are man-made â engraved by thought and action. -"This amendment seems worth making because the strictly evolutionary view of human nature sells humanity short. It leaves the impression that we are just slightly higher animals â thousands of years of evolutionary processes capped by a thin layer of rationality. It lops off entire regions of human possibility. 
 
"In fact, while we are animals, we have much higher opportunities. While we start with and are influenced by evolutionary forces, people also have the chance to make themselves deep in a way not explicable in strictly evolutionary terms. -"So much of what we call depth is built through freely chosen suffering. People make commitments â to a nation, faith, calling or loved ones â and endure the sacrifices those commitments demand. Often this depth is built by fighting against natural evolutionary predispositions.

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We are very aware of our body positions called proprioception in medical terms. This is also closely connected to visual work. Brain coordiation processes are studied in this paper, nothing really surprising, just confirmatory to me:-http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/03/140313123139.htm-"Your brain's ability to instantly link what you see with what you do is down to a dedicated information 'highway,' suggests new research. For the first time, researchers have found evidence of a specialized mechanism for spatial self-awareness that combines visual cues with body motion. The newly-discovered system could explain why some schizophrenia patients feel like their actions are controlled by someone else."

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Here's a link to some videos that deal with our perception.
Fun I thought.

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Romansh: Here's a link to some videos that deal with our perception.-> Fun I thought.-More than fun. True ways to fool the brain. The brain isn't a perfect observer of everything. But purposely fooling the brain does not disprove 'self' in ordinary life where experiences are more controlled. But it does show there can be disconections. With purposeful understanding, study and restudy we can overcome much of this.-Thanks for joining us again and adding to the discussions. You bring a lot to the table.

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More than fun. True ways to fool the brain. The brain isn't a perfect observer of everything. But purposely fooling the brain does not disprove 'self' in ordinary life where experiences are more controlled. But it does show there can be disconections. With purposeful understanding, study and restudy we can overcome much of this.-I agree it is not proof. But then it is somthing we have to consider when we give anecdotal evidence for a self as evidence for a consciousness.-But ultimately when it comes to consciousness, anecdotal stories is a powerful source of our positions. Interestingly Blackmore suggests that external examination of the mechanics of consciousness will only get us so far and that we we should try examining our anecdotal perceptions in a bit more detail and scientifically.
 
> Thanks for joining us again and adding to the discussions. You bring a lot to the table.-You are welcome David ... I serve to please ... 
At work I am known as a contrarian ... for the life of me I don't know why.

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> Romansh You are welcome David ... I serve to please ... 
> At work I am known as a contrarian ... for the life of me I don't know why.-And Blackmore, whom you seem ot follow is the ultimate skeptic. She blames her out of the body experience on Pot, and her book Dying to Live is something I slashed apart in my first book. Her skepticism had her twist the interpretation of medical reviews I obtained and I found she was denying what was in the reports. I'm the doctor and she is not. I hope she has improved since then.

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She is a psychologist and you are not? She has written a text book on consciousness and you have not?-Irrelevant-Having said that I would love to meet her and discuss stuff with her. She seems like an interesting and lively person with a whole bunch of different views. -I always wondered about posts like these. If she were a member of this forum would you actually write what you do?

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Romansh: She is a psychologist and you are not? She has written a text book on consciousness and you have not?
> 
> Irrelevant
> 
> Having said that I would love to meet her and discuss stuff with her. She seems like an interesting and lively person with a whole bunch of different views. 
> 
> I always wondered about posts like these. If she were a member of this forum would you actually write what you do?-I would ask her outright, why she offered differing opinions on medical findings by physician authors. She may be a psychologist, but as an internist I had training in psychiatry and using it. I'll take her on any day. In my last book, I spent a good part of a chapter using her as the resident skeptic and chewing up her observations.

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I'll take her on any day. -Indeed

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Ed Feser to the rescue. Bits from his blog.-"Similarly, when Gelernter points out that "computers can be made to operate precisely as we choose; minds cannot," I would argue that this is a consequence of the deeper point that the conceptual content of thought cannot be reduced to any set of relations between material symbols. There can in principle never be anything more than a very rough and general correlation between, on the one hand, the structure of corporeal states (whether in the brain, the organism as a whole, or the organism together with its environment), and, on the other hand, the conceptual content of our thoughts. Hence, even if we had total technological mastery of the relevant corporeal features of a human being, we would still never be able, even in principle, to predict and control the content of human thought with precision."-"Now for the Aristotelian, the point isn't that the moderns' conception of matter is wrong so much as that it is incomplete. The trouble is not with thinking of matter the way Galileo, Descartes, and their successors have, but with taking this to be an exhaustive conception, as something other than a mere abstraction from a much richer concrete reality. And if it is taken as an exhaustive conception, then a Cartesian form of dualism is hard to avoid. For to say that matter is essentially devoid of qualitative features like color, sound, taste, etc. and that these exist only as the qualia of conscious experience just is to make of qualia something essentially immaterial. And to say that matter is essentially devoid of anything like "directedness" or "finality" is ipso facto to make of the "directedness" or "intentionality" of desires, fears, and other such states also something essentially immaterial. Cartesian dualism was not a rearguard reaction against the early moderns' new conception of matter, but on the contrary a direct consequence of that conception. (I addressed this issue at length in my series of posts on the critics of Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos, and it is a point Nagel himself has also emphasized.)"-"The concept of information, properly understood, is fully sufficient to do away with popular dualistic schemes invoking spiritual substances distinct from anything in physics. This is Aristotle redivivus, the concept of matter and form united in every object of this world, body and soul, where the latter is nothing but the formal aspect of the former. The very term 'information' clearly demonstrates its Aristotelian origin in its linguistic root." -http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/03/gelernter-on-computationalism.html#more- -I have always considered information to be the root of everything.

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Gelernter quoting Braitenberg: "The concept of information, properly understood, is fully sufficient to do away with popular dualistic schemes invoking spiritual substances distinct from anything in physics. ..." -Do you actually agree with this David?-This I think allows us to do away with a panentheistic view of matter being imbibed with god?

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that should have been Feser not Gelernter

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Gelernter quoting Braitenberg: "The concept of information, properly understood, is fully sufficient to do away with popular dualistic schemes invoking spiritual substances distinct from anything in physics. ..." 
> 
> Romansh: Do you actually agree with this David?
> 
> This I think allows us to do away with a panentheistic view of matter being imbibed with god?-I know you mean Feser. I don't think so. As a follower of Feser, who supports Aristotilian philosophy, I think basic information is embedded in everything and supports everything, just as the ID folks do. They use Shannon information theory to support their views.

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I think basic information is embedded in everything and supports everything, just as the ID folks do. They use Shannon information theory to support their views.
You might enjoy this then David (if you have not seen it before)
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1001/1001.0785v1.pdf-But we have to be a little bit careful here ... correlation of a description (using information) of phenomenon does not mean that the phenomenon is that description. It could be reversed or there could be a third variable the correlates with with both the description and the phenomenon.-interestingly the closer to random the information/data appear/s the more information it contains:
eg
010010000110010101101100011011
000110111100100000010101010110
111001010010011001010100000101
001100001011000010000001101110
011110010010000001101110011000
010110110101100101001000000110
100101110011001000000111001001
101111011011010110000101101110
011100110110100000101110
versus
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101010101
010101010101010101010101

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DAvid: I think basic information is embedded in everything and supports everything, just as the ID folks do. They use Shannon information theory to support their views.
> Romansh: You might enjoy this then David (if you have not seen it before)
> http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1001/1001.0785v1.pdf
> interestingly the closer to random the information/data appear/s the more information it contains:-I admire your knowledge and training. I was able to get a small gist of the article, but my math traing stopped at analytic geometry. Their conclusions care quite interesting, but based in string theory, I have no idea how valid their final opinion really is, having read Woit and Smolin on the negative views of string theory and whether it is really valid in any important sense.

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I admire your knowledge and training. I was able to get a small gist of the article, but my math traing stopped at analytic geometry. Their conclusions care quite interesting, but based in string theory, I have no idea how valid their final opinion really is, having read Woit and Smolin on the negative views of string theory and whether it is really valid in any important sense.-I did not mean to imply I understood this in any sort of detail.-I thought it was interesting that gravity could be described in terms of information.

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Romansh: I did not mean to imply I understood this in any sort of detail.
> 
> I thought it was interesting that gravity could be described in terms of information.-Thank you for your admission, but I got lost tryig to follow it. Today's announcement of the CMB b waves conformation of gravitaional waves indicate that quantum mechanics and general relativity are joined at the hip. A GUT is possible. And quantum mechanics means information is necessary.

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Dhw: You consider "emergence" to be a non word, and prefer "synergism", which means the same thing. Well, so long as we understand each other...-ROMANSH: Exactly. But you missed my point, we make a model - reality does not quite fit we call it emergence or synergy.-Since we do not know what "reality" is, all our concepts are models. I don't understand the rest of your sentence.-ROMANSH: For me the self is an arbitrary boundary we draw around ourselves. Quite literally every bit of your self has come from elsewhere and temporarily is considered dhw. Quite pragmatic, but has certain consequences.-We draw boundaries round ourselves and others, but I'm not sure how arbitrary they are. Of course we can never know 100% of anyone's character (including our own), but that doesn't necessarily mean that what we know is without foundation (which I take to be the implication of "arbitrary"). I agree with the rest of what you say, but the totality of my parts is still me, temporary though they and I undoubtedly are.-Dhw: "I cannot ignore the fact that I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision."
ROMANSH: I would have written "I cannot ignore that I think I consciously weigh up options before I take certain types of decision." This is I think a little more agnostic on the subbject.
 
Or maybe: I think I cannot ignore that I think I consciously weigh up options before I think I take certain types of decision.-dhw: Our thoughts "manipulate" our bioelectrochemistry all the time. ....-ROMANSH: Here we dip our toes into Cartesian dualism.-Yes, we do, but my argument continued: "...your contention seems to be that our thoughts are the product of our bioelectrochemistry as well", which to me means that our bioelectrochemistry manipulates our bioelectrochemistry. Of course the whole discussion centres on dualism versus materialism. I think you are right to question the former, but you have ignored the problems that arise out of the latter. I did not defend dualism but asked you to explain how you think cells can be conscious of cells being conscious of cells manipulating cells.-Dhw: With regard to free will ... the ability to make conscious choices .......
ROMANSH: That you think you could have done otherwise is interesting. Thinking that you could do otherwise does not mean you have free will dhw.-Of course it doesn't. I wrote: "You may quite rightly argue that whatever unconscious factors influenced that decision may have been beyond my control, and that is why I say I do not know if I have free will." You have said you were in a hurry, so perhaps when you have a bit more time, you might put my arguments back in their contexts! (I do sympathize, though. You have complained before, I think, about the length of my posts!)-ROMANSH: And condolences on your loss. My heart goes out to you.-Thank you.-***********-Like George, I am having difficulty keeping up!-GEORGE: I find I largely agree with DT and DHW about 
the meaning of self and the existence of limited free-will, 
and with Romansch that 'emergence' is not a very helpful word.-Interestingly, if I put on my materialist hat, I find the term extremely useful, because if thought and consciousness and emotion and memory really are produced solely by materials, it describes (but does not explain) how the process must happen, i.e. that somehow these apparently immaterial phenomena emerge from the interplay between our material cells, which individually could not produce them. However, if I put on my dualist hat, I agree that it doesn't help.

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Since we do not know what "reality" is, all our concepts are models. I don't understand the rest of your sentence.
Sorry DHW I wrote it a bit hurriedly. I think David said it fairly succinctly:
>>>Emergence is not a helpful word because it is used to express something we do not understand. We describe not understood concepts this way all the time.
The difference with synergism is that we do have some understanding of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts or at least the understanding we feel is within grasp.
 
> We draw boundaries round ourselves and others, but I'm not sure how arbitrary they are. Of course we can never know 100% of anyone's character (including our own), but that doesn't necessarily mean that what we know is without foundation (which I take to be the implication of "arbitrary"). I agree with the rest of what you say, but the totality of my parts is still me, temporary though they and I undoubtedly are.-So what it the boundary for say dhw? Your skin? Particular body parts? Your brain, do you include your nervous system in that? Is it your thoughts? I understand the pragmatic view that the self exists. It's the philosophical belief of the self exists I don't understand.- 
> Yes, we do, but my argument continued: "...your contention seems to be that our thoughts are the product of our bioelectrochemistry as well", which to me means that our bioelectrochemistry manipulates our bioelectrochemistry. 
Is there not plenty of evidence that at least this true. We can apply things that manipulate our biolectrochemistry ... oxytocin and a nice single malt are a couple that come to mind.-> Of course the whole discussion centres on dualism versus materialism. I think you are right to question the former, but you have ignored the problems that arise out of the latter. I did not defend dualism but asked you to explain how you think cells can be conscious of cells being conscious of cells manipulating cells.
Remember Dhw I am not claiming consciousness. I take a look at Choprian (and David's) view of conscious and contrast it with Blackmore's where by implication we might assume nothing is conscious and ask what is the difference.-I can't help thinking they are just different sides of the same coin.-
> Of course it doesn't. I wrote: "You may quite rightly argue that whatever unconscious factors influenced that decision may have been beyond my control, and that is why I say I do not know if I have free will." You have said you were in a hurry, so perhaps when you have a bit more time, you might put my arguments back in their contexts! (I do sympathize, though. You have complained before, I think, about the length of my posts!)-If our definition of free will is we make conscious choices ... assuming consciousness exists we have free will. No problem. But hard determinist asks is there any thing in our lives that is independent of cause? -If not, how is that free? If yes, how is that not random and consequently somehow free?
This is an ancient dilemma and nothing new. But if we still insist on freedom, even a little bit of limited free will, we end up in the world of libertarian of free will!-Unless we move back to a different definition. But the problem does not actually go away. This is why James (who believed in free will), called compatibilism a quagmire of evasion and Kant called it a wretched subterfuge.

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DAVID: Emergence is not a helpful word because it is used to express something we do not understand. 
ROMANSH: The difference with synergism is that we do have some understanding of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts or at least the understanding we feel is within grasp.-I can only repeat that the materialist me finds the term useful as a description: consciousness and self emerge from interactions between materials which individually could not produce such phenomena. I can't see its application to dualism, but perhaps David can.
 
Dhw: We draw boundaries round ourselves and others, but I'm not sure how arbitrary they are. [...] the totality of my parts is still me, temporary though they and I undoubtedly are.
ROMANSH: So what it the boundary for say dhw? Your skin? Particular body parts? Your brain, do you include your nervous system in that? Is it your thoughts? I understand the pragmatic view that the self exists. It's the philosophical belief of the self exists I don't understand.-As I said, the "totality of my parts": skin, body parts, brain, nervous system, thoughts, emotions, memories. That does not mean permanence. But temporary does not mean unreal, or arbitrary. I would argue (pragmatically and philosophically) that I possess an individual combination of characteristics, physical and mental, which distinguish me from others and constitute my "self".-Dhw: ...your contention seems to be that our thoughts are the product of our bioelectrochemistry as well", which to me means that our bioelectrochemistry manipulates our bioelectrochemistry. 
ROMANSH: Is there not plenty of evidence that at least this true. We can apply things that manipulate our biolectrochemistry ... oxytocin and a nice single malt are a couple that come to mind.-It's certainly true. Our brain sends messages to the rest of our body all the time in order to produce deliberate actions. (BBella's post concerning the influence of emotion on cellular behaviour also illustrates the point.) But the question we are grappling with is whether our cells produce the thoughts as well as triggering and implementing the actions that are the result of the thoughts, and as well as being aware of producing the thoughts that trigger the actions etc. Nobody knows how this could work, just as nobody knows how dualism could work. -ROMANSH: Remember Dhw I am not claiming consciousness. I take a look at Choprian (and David's) view of conscious and contrast it with Blackmore's where by implication we might assume nothing is conscious and ask what is the difference. I can't help thinking they are just different sides of the same coin.-Perhaps I tend to be more pragmatic than philosophical on this issue! Are you claiming that you are not or might not be aware of what you are writing in these posts? Awareness = consciousness, and although there are different levels (e.g. being conscious of being conscious), if we cannot agree on this basic premise, we cannot continue the discussion on whether there is such a thing as free will. You can't have free will without consciousness, even if having consciousness does not mean having free will.-ROMANSH: If our definition of free will is we make conscious choices ... assuming consciousness exists we have free will. No problem. But hard determinist asks is there any thing in our lives that is independent of cause?-Yes, that is the big question, and I agree that compatibilism is "a quagmire of evasion", because as I said before, the line between "cause" and "compulsion" is impossible to draw. One can simply argue that our decisions are CAUSED by our bioelectrochemistry (and/or our environment, our history, our experiences etc.), which COMPELS us to act in a certain way.
 
ROMANSH: This is an ancient dilemma and nothing new. But if we still insist on freedom, even a little bit of limited free will, we end up in the world of libertarian of free will!-I don't think we can deny cause and effect, but most of us do feel that we have freedom, and so the compatibilists play with questionable distinctions, and the libertarians fall back on dualism or latterly on the weirdness of quantum mechanics. Nobody has a clue, which is why I cannot make the assumption, as you do, that consciousness, will and the self are purely physical.-*****-ROMANSH: At work I am known as a contrarian.-COLLEAGUE: No you're not.

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> dhw;I don't think we can deny cause and effect, but most of us do feel that we have freedom, and so the compatibilists play with questionable distinctions, and the libertarians fall back on dualism or latterly on the weirdness of quantum mechanics. Nobody has a clue, which is why I cannot make the assumption, as you do, that consciousness, will and the self are purely physical.-I think there are different levels of cause and effect. At the purely physical/ material level it is easy to observe and understand, but not when we encounter quantum effects. With quantum mechanics cause and effect are not clear unless we introduce information and consciousness. When we discuss the brain and its interpretation of of our senses, we know we are somewhat removed from reality by a series of elecrochemical and biometric processes, which end up giving us the interpretive sight, hearing, feeling or seeing we accurately need. That fact we are removed from a more direct connection should not make us doubt our senses. This observation point to the fact that we are experiencing our consciousness in the same somewhat removed fashion. And the only way I can put it together is to assume that as in the material world there is this strange quantum effect, and it must also be operational at the brain/consciousness level to explain why we cannot fully explain it. Which makes me comfortable with the idea that the dualism proposal suggests two parts of the same quantum brain, at two levels. The determinism is in the way the electrobiochemical mechanism must function to provide the result we have. We determine the colnscious results we want, but the underlying mechanism runs on its own, responding to us. Why else should the brain exhibit the plasticity and alteration of function and neurons based on our repeated practice with the brain, as in playing an instrument or a sport. We have a very definite effect on brain function as we now see how plastic the brain really is. A fully deterministic brain would not exhibit this flexibility. We are truly in charge.

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dhw
OK Emergence - if we are using the term where a particular set of conditions a behaviour emerges or that set of conditions results in - no problem. if you literally mean the whole is greater than the sum of the parts ... this is literally contrary to the first law of thermodynamics. You better have some pretty good evidence to corroborate this possibility dhw.-Temporary does not mean unreal, agreed. I have never claimed that and I have tried to make that extremely clear. I am using illusion and delusion as having separate meanings. But when we say temporary are we not taking two arbitrary points in time and space and saying that is me?-The totality of my parts? Does this include the flora and fauna that make up our bodies? Does it include the DNA from othe species, are you refering to your parental DNA? Everything that is what I consider my 'self' has come from outside of myself. Ideas, DNA, food, matter, energy you name it - they come together in me and are spat out as ideas, DNA, food, matter and energy.-Do cells produce our thoughts? Our cells are our thoughts I would argue. That nobody can explain how a particular dualism works after two millenia or more might just be a clue here. Nobody can explain (reasonably) how an Abrahamic god might work either, it does not mean I have to accept it as a hypothesis worth further consideration.-Caused versus compelled ... I think this belies being stuck in a libertarian quagmire as opposed to a compatibilist one. There are many benefits to a lack of belief in free will ... the primary one being we can cut some slack to other people and at a push ourselves too.->> I don't think we can deny cause and effect, but most of us do feel that we have freedom, and so the compatibilists play with questionable distinctions, and the libertarians fall back on dualism or latterly on the weirdness of quantum mechanics. Nobody has a clue, which is why I cannot make the assumption, as you do, that consciousness, will and the self are purely physical.-If you truly mean that you cannot deny cause and effect, then the second part of the paragraph does not make sense to me. My apparent consciousness, will and self can be manipulated by (interacts with) the physical. Are you denying this?
Even if these things are somehow immaterial they have to "one" with the physical ... otherwise they may as well be not here. ->> ROMANSH: At work I am known as a contrarian.
> COLLEAGUE: No you're not.
Not any colleague of mine dhw

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ROMANSH: OK Emergence - if we are using the term where a particular set of conditions a behaviour emerges or that set of conditions results in - no problem. if you literally mean the whole is greater than the sum of the parts ... this is literally contrary to the first law of thermodynamics. You better have some pretty good evidence to corroborate this possibility dhw.-Like David, I admire your "knowledge and training", but why do you make things so complicated? You have assumed that consciousness, will and self are physical. The term "emergence" is commonly used to suggest that these phenomena "emerge" from interaction between cells and cell communities which in isolation could not produce them, and so the product of the interaction between the parts is greater than the sum of the individual parts. Does this not describe the process you believe in?-ROMANSH: Temporary does not mean unreal, agreed. [...]. But when we say temporary are we not taking two arbitrary points in time and space and saying that is me?
 
Yes. We can never know ourselves 100%, since we can never experience all the things that can mould our "self". We can only identify the self that we know at any given moment.-ROMANSH: [...] Everything that is what I consider my 'self' has come from outside of myself. Ideas, DNA, food, matter, energy you name it - they come together in me and are spat out as ideas, DNA, food, matter and energy.-I don't know what you are trying to prove. It doesn't matter what I absorb or what I spit out ... it's still me. Is it not the one and only Romansh reading these posts and writing these replies?-ROMANSH: Do cells produce our thoughts? Our cells are our thoughts I would argue. That nobody can explain how a particular dualism works after two millenia or more might just be a clue here. Nobody can explain (reasonably) how an Abrahamic god might work either, it does not mean I have to accept it as a hypothesis worth further consideration.-Of course it doesn't. But since nobody can explain how cells can be our thoughts (what does that mean anyway?) why should anyone accept that as "a hypothesis worth further consideration"? There are questions to which we have no answers, and so we theorize. Until you can explain how a cell can "be" a thought, your own theory is as flawed as any other, though you are naturally at liberty to have faith in it if you consider it more reasonable than others. That's how David justifies his theism.-ROMANSH: Caused versus compelled ... I think this belies being stuck in a libertarian quagmire as opposed to a compatibilist one. There are many benefits to a lack of belief in free will ... the primary one being we can cut some slack to other people and at a push ourselves too.-I think both theories are equally flawed, though that doesn't mean free will is a delusion. If "benefits" are your criterion for accepting a theory, think of all the benefits of believing in a benign god! You can cut slack through human empathy, and still believe people are responsible for their actions. Even in courts of law, where responsibility is usually assumed, allowance is made for mitigating circumstances.-Dhw: I don't think we can deny cause and effect, but most of us do feel that we have freedom. [...] Nobody has a clue, which is why I cannot make the assumption, as you do, that consciousness, will and the self are purely physical.
ROMANSH: If you truly mean that you cannot deny cause and effect, then the second part of the paragraph does not make sense to me. My apparent consciousness, will and self can be manipulated by (interacts with) the physical. Are you denying this? Even if these things are somehow immaterial they have to "one" with the physical ... otherwise they may as well be not here.-Manipulation is one-way, and interaction is two-way. Consciousness etc. can be manipulated by the physical, through drugs, alcohol, diseases such as Alzheimer's and dementia etc. Consciousness manipulates the physical by sending instructions to the cells (write a response to Romansh, go and cook your supper, take yourself upstairs). If consciousness is immaterial, yes of course it has to interact with the physical, because we live in a physical world. So what doesn't make sense to you? Cause and effect will still apply whether consciousness is material or immaterial. However, if it is immaterial, there is the possibility ... as David has argued in his post of 11 March at 23.13 ... that it can make its own decisions independently of materials (and can even influence those materials). Then it becomes a question of the extent to which its decisions are influenced by other causes (experiences, the environment, upbringing, accident, past history), and that is where I chicken out. -*************-ROMANSH: At work I am known as a contrarian.
COLLEAGUE: No you're not.
ROMANSH: Not any colleague of mine dhw-Sorry, that was meant to be a contrarian joke.

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dhw: If consciousness is immaterial, yes of course it has to interact with the physical, because we live in a physical world. So what doesn't make sense to you? Cause and effect will still apply whether consciousness is material or immaterial. However, if it is immaterial, there is the possibility ... as David has argued in his post of 11 March at 23.13 ... that it can make its own decisions independently of materials (and can even influence those materials). Then it becomes a question of the extent to which its decisions are influenced by other causes (experiences, the environment, upbringing, accident, past history), and that is where I chicken out. -To correct this entry dhw has my comment date wrong. It is 3/15/14:-"This observation point to the fact that we are experiencing our consciousness in the same somewhat removed fashion. And the only way I can put it together is to assume that as in the material world there is this strange quantum effect, and it must also be operational at the brain/consciousness level to explain why we cannot fully explain it. Which makes me comfortable with the idea that the dualism proposal suggests two parts of the same quantum brain, at two levels. The determinism is in the way the electrobiochemical mechanism must function to provide the result we have. We determine the conscious results we want, but the underlying mechanism runs on its own, responding to us. Why else should the brain exhibit the plasticity and alteration of function and neurons based on our repeated practice with the brain, as in playing an instrument or a sport. We have a very definite effect on brain function as we now see how plastic the brain really is. A fully deterministic brain would not exhibit this flexibility. We are truly in charge."-And I would add not completely in charge. As we modify our activities the brain responds to accommodate us, but it does it automatically, just as our heart beats without our interference, and we breathe without thinking about it. These built-in automatic responses allow us to live without the interference of having to adjust our bodies by our own volition. Our bodies have an adaptablity way beyond just enlarging muscles by weight lifting. I look at it as a partnership, just as we have a huge number of friendly and not-so-friendly bacteria on board, generally working with us.-To use an other example, just when did you think about adapting the composition of your urine to fit your fluid balance in your body? Think about the brain and its plasticity in the same way. Our brain works in partnership with us to create an emergent consciousness adapted to our needs, according to our experiences and uses of the brain. In this way I think one can accept compatibilism. We do most of the determinism with our free will.

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A further exploration of the quantum effects on cognition and memory. I don't know if this explains anything, but shows the exploratory work being done:-http://phys.org/news/2014-03-quantum-theory-cognition-memories.html

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Like David, I admire your "knowledge and training", but why do you make things so complicated? You have assumed that consciousness, will and self are physical. The term "emergence" is commonly used to suggest that these phenomena "emerge" from interaction between cells and cell communities which in isolation could not produce them, and so the product of the interaction between the parts is greater than the sum of the individual parts. Does this not describe the process you believe in?
emerge, result from - I have no problem with. I do have a problem with the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. You know, the first law of thermodynamics etc.
 
> Yes. We can never know ourselves 100%, since we can never experience all the things that can mould our "self". We can only identify the self that we know at any given moment.
> 
Agreed, can we know anything 100%? Noumenon versus phenomenon etc.
Personally, I would avoid the word know being agnostic 'n all-> I don't know what you are trying to prove. It doesn't matter what I absorb or what I spit out ... it's still me. Is it not the one and only Romansh reading these posts and writing these replies?
> 
I am not trying to prove anything ... just show my reasoning. All the things that we think of self are not intrinsically 'self'
 
> I think both theories are equally flawed, though that doesn't mean free will is a delusion. If "benefits" are your criterion for accepting a theory, think of all the benefits of believing in a benign god! You can cut slack through human empathy, and still believe people are responsible for their actions. Even in courts of law, where responsibility is usually assumed, allowance is made for mitigating circumstances.
> 
I presume you are referring to libertarianism and compatibilism here? I have not come across a theory for free will that does not fall into one of these camps dhw. -I can hold people responsible for people slacking in the same way as I can hold the Gulf Stream moderating the British rain. -> 
> Manipulation is one-way, and interaction is two-way. Consciousness etc. can be manipulated by the physical, through drugs, alcohol, diseases such as Alzheimer's and dementia etc. Consciousness manipulates the physical by sending instructions to the cells (write a response to Romansh, go and cook your supper, take yourself upstairs). If consciousness is immaterial, yes of course it has to interact with the physical, because we live in a physical world. So what doesn't make sense to you? Cause and effect will still apply whether consciousness is material or immaterial. However, if it is immaterial, there is the possibility ... as David has argued in his post of 11 March at 23.13 ... that it can make its own decisions independently of materials (and can even influence those materials). Then it becomes a question of the extent to which its decisions are influenced by other causes (experiences, the environment, upbringing, accident, past history), and that is where I chicken out. 
I don't think manipulation is a one way street. We may think it is.-This devolves into a semantic game.-Either way ... free will (the definition I use) is an incoherent proposition, even in David's hypothesis. 
> *************
> 
> ROMANSH: At work I am known as a contrarian.
> COLLEAGUE: No you're not.
> ROMANSH: Not any colleague of mine dhw
> 
> Sorry, that was meant to be a contrarian joke.-Actually I had worked that out the wonder of having no intonation or eye contact.

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> Romansh: Either way ... free will (the definition I use) is an incoherent proposition, even in David's hypothesis.-Please define your definition.

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> > Romansh: Either way ... free will (the definition I use) is an incoherent proposition, even in David's hypothesis.
> 
> Please define your definition.-The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe.-And my thoughts:
http://www3.telus.net/romansh/juris/freewill.htm

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> > > Romansh: Either way ... free will (the definition I use) is an incoherent proposition, even in David's hypothesis.
> > 
> > Please define your definition.
> 
> Romansh:The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe.
> 
> And my thoughts:
> http://www3.telus.net/romansh/juris/freewill.htm-Thank you for exposing us to that essay. as you know I view life, itself, as an emergent phenomenon from a bunch of chemical reactions. I view consciousness the same way. Yes, we are based on the apparent quicksand of quantum mechanics, but life has been invented to handle it. Note this article on Yoga changing the brain. it is this feedback arrangement that tells me our 'selves' are on equal footing with our underlying living mechanisms.-http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-yoga-changes-the-brain/?&WT.mc_id=SA_WR_20140319

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ROMANSH: emerge, result from - I have no problem with. I do have a problem with the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. You know, the first law of thermodynamics etc.-You say later that "this devolves into a game of semantics", and that is the game you are playing here. If you put a billion cells side by side, they will not produce what they produce when combined in a certain way. The product emerges (results) from the combination, and we say the whole is greater than the sum of its parts because when the parts are combined they produce something which the billion cells cannot produce without being combined in that particular way. Put thousands of letters side by side and they will mean nothing. Arrange them in a certain way, and you will get King Lear. You know this as well as I do, but you are a contrarian (and it is fun playing contrarian games with you!).-Dhw: I don't know what you are trying to prove. It doesn't matter what I absorb or what I spit out ... it's still me. Is it not the one and only Romansh reading these posts and writing these replies?
ROMANSH: I am not trying to prove anything ... just show my reasoning. All the things that we think of self are not intrinsically 'self'.-No, it is the combination that creates the self. The self emerges from the combination of its parts. But I'm pleased to hear that you are not trying to prove anything. Just playing games, I guess.-Dhw: I think both theories are equally flawed, though that doesn't mean free will is a delusion.
ROMANSH: I presume you are referring to libertarianism and compatibilism here? I have not come across a theory for free will that does not fall into one of these camps dhw.
 
Of course I am. That's why I said "both theories".-dhw: Manipulation is one-way, and interaction is two-way. Consciousness etc. can be manipulated by the physical, through drugs, alcohol, diseases such as Alzheimer's and dementia etc. Consciousness manipulates the physical by sending instructions to the cells (write a response to Romansh, go and cook your supper, take yourself upstairs). If consciousness is immaterial, yes of course it has to interact with the physical, because we live in a physical world. So what doesn't make sense to you? Cause and effect will still apply whether consciousness is material or immaterial. However, if it is immaterial, there is the possibility ... as David has argued in his post of 11 March at 23.13 ... that it can make its own decisions independently of materials (and can even influence those materials). Then it becomes a question of the extent to which its decisions are influenced by other causes (experiences, the environment, upbringing, accident, past history), and that is where I chicken out.
 
ROMANSH: I don't think manipulation is a one way street. We may think it is. This devolves into a semantic game.-My apologies to David for giving the wrong date. I gave examples of how the physical manipulates consciousness and of how consciousness manipulates the physical, and these are clearly one-way, which is how I interpret "manipulate" in this context. We should always define or clarify our terms, in the hope that we can then discuss the content (do we have free will?) rather than the semantics (let's argue about the meaning of "emergence", "manipulate"). I note that you have ignored the content.-ROMANSH: Either way ... free will (the definition I use) is an incoherent proposition, even in David's hypothesis.-David has asked you for your definition, though you gave it to us last time we discussed this topic. (It would take too long for me to find it and to find my own.) I see nothing incoherent in the proposition that we have the ability to make conscious choices. You don't believe the self can control its own mental processes owing to the endless chain of cause and effect. David presumably believes that an immaterial consciousness may be capable of influencing the chain of cause and effect (as opposed to being coerced by it). Two different beliefs. You may disagree, but that does not make the proposition incoherent. Your move.

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ROMANSH: Either way ... free will (the definition I use) is an incoherent proposition, even in David's hypothesis.
> 
> dhw: David has asked you for your definition, though you gave it to us last time we discussed this topic. (It would take too long for me to find it and to find my own.) I see nothing incoherent in the proposition that we have the ability to make conscious choices. You don't believe the self can control its own mental processes owing to the endless chain of cause and effect. David presumably believes that an immaterial consciousness may be capable of influencing the chain of cause and effect (as opposed to being coerced by it). Two different beliefs. You may disagree, but that does not make the proposition incoherent. Your move.-The fact of the interplay of our actions, under our self-control and decision-making, dictate to the brain how it must develop, is a feed-back mechanism which refutes Romansh's contentions. Not just contrary, but really not accepting the import of current findings.-This study is in support of my view that we interact with our brain and can change what is memorized there:-http://medicalxpress.com/news/2014-03-suppressing-unwanted-memories-unconscious-behavior.html-"Dr Pierre Gagnepain, lead author at INSERM in France said: "Our memories can be slippery and hard to pin down. Out of hand and uncontrolled, their remembrance can haunt us and cause psychological troubles, as we see in PTSD. We were interested whether the brain can genuinely suppress memories in healthy participants, even at the most unconscious level, and how it might achieve this. The answer is that it can, though not all people were equally good at this. The better understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying this process arising from this study may help to better explain differences in how well people adapt to intrusive memories after a trauma.'"

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The fact of the interplay of our actions, under our self-control and decision-making, dictate to the brain how it must develop, is a feed-back mechanism which refutes Romansh's contentions. Not just contrary, but really not accepting the import of current findings.-Here we assume a self to have free will.
Having said that there is an interative process within our brain and its environment does not negate my postion at all David. At least in my opinion. -I don't consciously control the how my brain is shaped. I may think that I consciously deliberate decisions but end of the day this is a perception my 'self' has.

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Emergent
I have no problem with emergence if synonymous withresults from (in). I must admit I have said this plainly enough. This can be classified as weak emergence-but take a look at strong emergence ... from wiki
Here is an interesting quote
>>Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? 
Again we go back to how can a whole be greater than the sum of its parts? -As an aside Lawrence Krause in one of his lectures put up this equation:
Left = Right
And immediately said this was for the benefit for the biologists in the room.
If you catch my drift.->No, it is the combination that creates the self. The self emerges from the combination of its parts. But I'm pleased to hear that you are not trying to prove anything. Just playing games, I guess.-Yes and do we include our experiences, our parents' genes and quantum phenomena in that combination. If not why not?-> Of course I am. That's why I said "both theories".
Then I would like to hear your explanation for free will that does not fall into either of those camps?
> I note that you have ignored the content.
And I could say you have not addressed mine. For example I keep harping on about the whole being greater. Is the universe greater than the sum of its parts? The universe is its parts I would argue.-
Your definition vesus mine
Again we play a semantic game.
If we are truly conscious then yes we have free will by that definition. 
But the problem does not go away. Is there anything and I mean anything in that choice that was independent of cause?

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It is becoming increasingly clear that the disagreements between us boil down to matters of definition.-ROMANSH: (re emergence) Again we go back to how can a whole be greater than the sum of its parts?-I have given two examples of what I mean by this. 1) If it's true that we are nothing but our cells, a few billion cells combined higgledypiggledy will not produce the mental capacities of the organized combination we call the brain. This particular combination ADDS something to the collection of cells, and that is the sense in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 2) A few million letters combined higgledy-piggledy will not produce the same effects as those letters combined into King Lear. The particular combination ADDS something to the collection of letters. If you believe that the particular combination ADDS nothing to the higgledy-piggledy cells/letters, so be it. I think it adds a great deal, and that is what I and others mean when we say the whole is (or may be) greater than the sum of its parts.-Your definition of free will is "The ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe". In the finely argued article you have referred us to (and most of which I agree with), you write: "I can't help wondering if it is the definition of free will that I have chosen that makes free will difficult to defend." It makes free will impossible to defend! The universe contains everything, and so of course no choice can be independent of it. If we did not exist and if the subjects of choice did not exist, we could not choose. We and they are in and dependent on the universe. We have had this discussion before. I came up with the following definition of free will: "an entity's conscious ability to control the decision-making process within given constraints" ... the latter being imposed by the situation and by Nature (no problem), but also by factors connected with the decision-making process itself, i.e. chemicals, heredity, our environment, experience etc. It is the latter category that causes us so many problems. Your definition is like an atheist defining God as "a power that does not exist". If your definition precludes discussion, there is not much point in having a discussion!-ROMANSH: If we are truly conscious then yes we have free will by that definition.-By my definition, being "truly" conscious still doesn't mean we have free will, since we do not know the extent to which our consciousness is influenced by factors beyond our control.-ROMANSH: I would like to hear your explanation for free will that does not fall into either of those camps.-I argued that both theories (compatibilism and libertarianism) were flawed. So is your own theory, or supposition, that we are entirely physical. You cannot explain consciousness, and by entertaining the possibility that we are not conscious, you fly in the face of all experience (which in my view is not a factor to be ignored until it is proven to be fallacious). However, the explanation for free will would have to be the libertarian belief that there is an immaterial form of mind that can influence the chain of cause and effect rather than be coerced by it. I can't subscribe to that, any more than I can subscribe to the idea that my awareness of my "self" and of my ability to make decisions is a delusion. I can only echo your own well chosen words in the article: "...just because I cannot see a mechanism for free will, it does not mean free will does not exist." That is why I remain agnostic on the subject.

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It is becoming increasingly clear that the disagreements between us boil down to matters of definition.
> 
> I have given two examples of what I mean by this. 1) If it's true that we are nothing but our cells, a few billion cells combined higgledypiggledy will not produce the mental capacities of the organized combination we call the brain. This particular combination ADDS something to the collection of cells, and that is the sense in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 2) A few million letters combined higgledy-piggledy will not produce the same effects as those letters combined into King Lear.-True but then you have forgotten to add the enrgy that goes into assembling the the brain cells. When I get a dendritic crystal of copper growing in an electrolysis experiment it would be churlish of me to omit the energy that goes into making that crystal ie energy should be included sum of the parts side of the equation. Similarly for arranging 'cells into a brain'-And should I find meaning in Shakespeare's words, I also find meaning in a crystal.
> 
> .... definition of free will: "an entity's conscious ability to control the decision-making process within given constraints" ... the latter being imposed by the situation and by Nature (no problem), but also by factors connected with the decision-making process itself, i.e. chemicals, heredity, our environment, experience etc. It is the latter category that causes us so many problems. 
You will have to make this clear to me ... 
especially in the light of the following sentence.
> Your definition is like an atheist defining God as "a power that does not exist". If your definition precludes discussion, there is not much point in having a discussion!
I am asking is there anything we can do that is not influenced by: 
"i.e. chemicals, heredity, our environment, experience etc."
All of which are part of the universe. You are asking here exactly the same question as I am. My answer is I don't see how. So I should not hold a belief in free will. (Note I did not say have an active disbelief).-As far as I can tell, while philosophically speaking you have an agnostic position on free will (as I do), but pragmatically in your day to day activities you are with the free will side (it's OK the universe shaped you that way, ) Whereas I have been shaped to be less pragmatic about the prevailing belief.-> 
> By my definition, being "truly" conscious still doesn't mean we have free will, since we do not know the extent to which our consciousness is influenced by factors beyond our control.-This is only true-> ROMANSH: I would like to hear your explanation for free will that does not fall into either of those camps.
> 
> I argued that both theories (compatibilism and libertarianism) were flawed. So is your own theory, or supposition, that we are entirely physical. You cannot explain consciousness, and by entertaining the possibility that we are not conscious, you fly in the face of all experience (which in my view is not a factor to be ignored until it is proven to be fallacious). However, the explanation for free will would have to be the libertarian belief that there is an immaterial form of mind that can influence the chain of cause and effect rather than be coerced by it. I can't subscribe to that, any more than I can subscribe to the idea that my awareness of my "self" and of my ability to make decisions is a delusion. I can only echo your own well chosen words in the article: "...just because I cannot see a mechanism for free will, it does not mean free will does not exist." That is why I remain agnostic on the subject.-While my position may well be flawed, a position where something "immaterial" that does not respond to cause and yet can cause effects is also more than just a little flawed. I sincerely hope you are not suggesting we should take this at all seriously?-So my question remains why should we have free will as our default position in our pragmaticism? Can we not take up a lack of free will as default position?

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Dhw: 1) If it's true that we are nothing but our cells, a few billion cells combined higgledypiggledy will not produce the mental capacities of the organized combination we call the brain. This particular combination ADDS something to the collection of cells, and that is the sense in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 2) A few million letters combined higgledy-piggledy will not produce the same effects as those letters combined into King Lear.

ROMANSH: True but then you have forgotten to add the energy that goes into assembling the brain cells. [...] And should I find meaning in Shakespeare's words, I also find meaning in a crystal.
-You can find meaning in whatever you like, and you can bring in as much energy as you like, but energy, cells, letters as individual units will not produce the brain or King Lear unless they combine in a certain way, and that is what most of us mean when we use 'emergence' to indicate that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.-dhw: .... definition of free will: "an entity's conscious ability to control the decision-making process within given constraints" ... the latter being imposed by the situation and by Nature (no problem), but also by factors connected with the decision-making process itself, i.e. chemicals, heredity, our environment, experience etc. It is the latter category that causes us so many problems. 

ROMANSH: I am asking is there anything we can do that is not influenced by: 
"i.e. chemicals, heredity, our environment, experience etc."
All of which are part of the universe. You are asking here exactly the same question as I am. My answer is I don't see how. So I should not hold a belief in free will. (Note I did not say have an active disbelief). 
-I agree with your conclusion ... we should neither believe nor disbelieve. But your definition of free will is: "the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe". That is not the same as questioning the degree to which our decisions are influenced by chemicals etc. If the universe did not exist, we would not exist and the subjects of our choice would not exist (the endless chain of cause and effect), therefore your definition makes free will impossible. My definition allows for what most of us FEEL we have ... namely, the ability to control the above influences, and even to choose between them if we are aware of them. (My body says: "Chocolate!" My reason says: "Weight!" My will decides.) Experience sometimes teaches us that "feelings" are more reliable than reason, so they should not be dismissed, but as I see it, whether we have control or not depends initially on there being an immaterial part of the self (see later).-ROMANSH: As far as I can tell, while philosophically speaking you have an agnostic position on free will (as I do), but pragmatically in your day to day activities you are with the free will side [...] Whereas I have been shaped to be less pragmatic about the prevailing belief.

I do not believe for one moment that when faced with a choice in your pragmatic day to day activities you turn yourself into a zombie and allow all your subconscious influences to take you over. They may do so, but I'd be shocked if you said you did not FEEL responsible for your decisions and act as if you were.
 
ROMANSH: While my position may well be flawed, a position where something "immaterial" that does not respond to cause and yet can cause effects is also more than just a little flawed. I sincerely hope you are not suggesting we should take this at all seriously?-Of course it is flawed, and I said so in the passage you responded to. If there was a theory without flaw we'd have nothing to discuss and we'd all know the truth. However, I did not say that the something "immaterial" does not respond to cause. If it did not respond to cause, there would be no choice to make. The question is (a) whether it exists, and (b) whether as a part of the unique combination of elements that is "me" it can overcome the influences we have listed and can control my decision-making process. I don't know the answer to that, but yes, I take it very seriously, because I don't know the source or nature of consciousness, and I don't understand vast areas of human experience, including some so-called psychic experiences. If you don't take this seriously, and since we are all clearly dependent on the universe, may I ask why you do not actively disbelieve in free will?
 
ROMANSH: So my question remains why should we have free will as our default position in our pragmaticism? Can we not take up a lack of free will as default position?

I would suggest that if you managed to convince everyone that nothing they do is their responsibility, you might find yourself living in a society that is even more chaotic than the one we live in now. But if you are prepared to limit the discussion to a philosophical level, I would say the default position ought to be that we just don't know.

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You can find meaning in whatever you like, and you can bring in as much energy as you like, but energy, cells, letters as individual units will not produce the brain or King Lear unless they combine in a certain way, and that is what most of us mean when we use 'emergence' to indicate that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
> 
So very simply what I am saying is (trying to say):
The left hand side of the equation equals the right hand side.
so if:
The whole is greater and does not equal the sum of the parts
Fix the equation.
> 
> I agree with your conclusion ... we should neither believe nor disbelieve. But your definition of free will is: "the ability to act or to make choices independently of the environment or of the universe". That is not the same as questioning the degree to which our decisions are influenced by chemicals etc. If the universe did not exist, we would not exist and the subjects of our choice would not exist (the endless chain of cause and effect), therefore your definition makes free will impossible. My definition allows for what most of us FEEL we have ... namely, the ability to control the above influences, and even to choose between them if we are aware of them. (My body says: "Chocolate!" My reason says: "Weight!" My will decides.) Experience sometimes teaches us that "feelings" are more reliable than reason, so they should not be dismissed, but as I see it, whether we have control or not depends initially on there being an immaterial part of the self (see later).
> 
The degree to which they are influenced by chemicals etc?
Yes my definition does make free will impossible or at least an incoherent concept. We can redefine it all we want ... the original concept of doing things independent of cause and the consequences of this does not go away.-Skirting the issue with alternative definitions does not avoid determinism.-> I do not believe for one moment that when faced with a choice in your pragmatic day to day activities you turn yourself into a zombie and allow all your subconscious influences to take you over. They may do so, but I'd be shocked if you said you did not FEEL responsible for your decisions and act as if you were.
>
In my pragmatic life on observation I am surprisingly zombie like . 
Its fun watching the moment I get out of bed ... how I choose it.
Yes I have a sense of 'moral' responsibility. I also have a sense of the colour blue. Do I think the colour blue actually exists. I have my severe doubts.-> Of course it is flawed, and I said so in the passage you responded to. If there was a theory without flaw we'd have nothing to discuss and we'd all know the truth. However, I did not say that the something "immaterial" does not respond to cause. If it did not respond to cause, there would be no choice to make. 
I would argue and yet rivers 'choose' a path as the meander across a plain. Of course you will say they are not conscious. David might say everything is conscious, I say the concept of conscious is irrelevant. Whether I have conscious or not it is responding to cause. 
> The question is (a) whether it exists, and (b) whether as a part of the unique combination of elements that is "me" it can overcome the influences we have listed and can control my decision-making process. I don't know the answer to that, but yes, I take it very seriously, because I don't know the source or nature of consciousness, and I don't understand vast areas of human experience, including some so-called psychic experiences. If you don't take this seriously, and since we are all clearly dependent on the universe, may I ask why you do not actively disbelieve in free will?
> 
The unique combination of phenomena that is me does not arbitrarily stop at my epidermis dhw. It took a whole universe to make you and each everyone of us.-If I don't take this seriously? I perceive myself as taking it seriously. Indeed. Otherwise I would not be here?-I have explained this ... simply because I can never be sure and I take an agnostic stance. But end of the day in the pragmatic world I have take up the mantle of a believer or disbeliever. I have chosen the latter; because I trust my logic more than I trust my perception. And this is despite 'feelings' can sometimes be right. I have very little control over my feelings other be aware of them and accept them for what they are.
> I would suggest that if you managed to convince everyone that nothing they do is their responsibility, you might find yourself living in a society that is even more chaotic than the one we live in now. But if you are prepared to limit the discussion to a philosophical level, I would say the default position ought to be that we just don't know.-This is utter supposition. The sun is responsible for hurricanes. Do you wish to argue against this? You put, I would say, a very poor interpretation into my mouth and then try to beat it. I am sorry if this comes across in a negative way.-I could argue we might live in a society without retribution and guilt ... much of the nonsense that traditional Abrahamic religions give us.

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ROMANSH: So very simply what I am saying is (trying to say): The left hand side of the equation equals the right hand side. so if: The whole is greater and does not equal the sum of the parts
Fix the equation.-Why must you have an equation? I've tried to explain what people mean by consciousness being an emergent property. If the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, obviously the two are not equal so there can be no "equation". What does that prove?
 
ROMANSH: Yes my definition does make free will impossible or at least an incoherent concept. We can redefine it all we want ...-You seem to think that your definition making free will impossible is standard. I have a large number of dictionaries and philosophical reference books, and none of them offer a definition that specifies independence from the UNIVERSE! (God and Fate are pretty popular, though.) So who is "redefining" it?-ROMANSH: ...the original concept of doing things independent of cause and the consequences of this does not go away.
-Agreed. You cannot have something to choose from if you don't exist and if the alternatives don't exist.
 
ROMANSH: Skirting the issue with alternative definitions does not avoid determinism.
-My definition does not avoid determinism either. Your definition amounts to a statement that free will does not exist. Mine makes no statement either way. It merely states what people MEAN by free will, and that is the purpose of definitions. Whether or not it exists is then the subject of discussion.
 
ROMANSH:Yes I have a sense of 'moral' responsibility. I also have a sense of the colour blue. Do I think the colour blue actually exists. I have my severe doubts.

I also have my doubts about free will, but I act as if I had it.-dhw:I did not say that the something "immaterial" does not respond to cause. If it did not respond to cause, there would be no choice to make. 
ROMANSH: I would argue and yet rivers 'choose' a path as the meander across a plain. Of course you will say they are not conscious. David might say everything is conscious, I say the concept of conscious is irrelevant. Whether I have conscious or not it is responding to cause
.
And I said so in the passage you quoted! However, I see consciousness as indispensable to free will, and so if you believe we are not conscious, then of course you cannot believe in free will. For me the issue is whether our conscious decisions are always forced upon us by factors outside our control. -ROMANSH: The unique combination of phenomena that is me does not arbitrarily stop at my epidermis dhw. It took a whole universe to make you and each everyone of us.

I have never disagreed with this. But that doesn't justify your definition of free will as something clearly impossible, and it doesn't mean that what the universe "made" has no autonomy (which is the heart of the free will debate). -ROMANSH: If I don't take this seriously? I perceive myself as taking it seriously. Indeed. Otherwise I would not be here?-
You wrote, with reference to something immaterial: "I sincerely hope you are not suggesting we should take this at all seriously?" I do, and I explained why I do.-ROMANSH: I have explained this ... simply because I can never be sure and I take an agnostic stance. But end of the day in the pragmatic world I have take up the mantle of a believer or disbeliever. I have chosen the latter; because I trust my logic more than I trust my perception.-Of course we are all agnostics once we accept the fact that we cannot KNOW the truth. No problem for me if you believe your logical cells have forced you into disbelief against the wishes of your perceptive cells, but I can't help feeling that expressions like "I have chosen" and "I trust" sound rather self-conscious! -dhw: I would suggest that if you managed to convince everyone that nothing they do is their responsibility, you might find yourself living in a society that is even more chaotic than the one we live in now. But if you are prepared to limit the discussion to a philosophical level, I would say the default position ought to be that we just don't know.

ROMANSH: This is utter supposition. The sun is responsible for hurricanes. Do you wish to argue against this? You put, I would say, a very poor interpretation into my mouth and then try to beat it. I am sorry if this comes across in a negative way.
-You asked why we should have free will and not lack of free will as our default position. I offered you a possible answer! But perhaps I should have said "we", not "you". My apologies.-ROMANSH: I could argue we might live in a society without retribution and guilt ... much of the nonsense that traditional Abrahamic religions give us.

That too is a perfectly reasonable answer, and it would also apply if we adopted the default position of "We don't know".

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dhw: it would also apply if we adopted the default position of "We don't know".-I have found the best answer to your discussion: see the bolded line:-"Of course, Plato wins every argument hands down, though his interlocutors generally fail to see that. For instance, in a well-aimed chapter on the pretensions of contemporary neuroscience, Plato volunteers as a subject in a brain-imaging experiment. The smug and overbearing Dr. Shoket treats Plato and philosophy with jocular contempt, all the while demonstrating his utter ignorance of that whereof he speaks. Plato has no trouble refuting his naÃ¯ve reductionism, according to which there are no persons, intentions, beliefs or other psychological states but only synapses firing mechanically in the void. The neuroscientist is confusing the physical mechanisms that make mental phenomena possible with mental phenomena themselves. I recommend this chapter to all those zealots who think they are on the verge of replacing traditional philosophy with brain science."-http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579395281102610124

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> dhw; I am almost certain, Romansh, that it was you who pointed out to us a long time ago ... as Hood does here ... that "illusory" does not mean something does not exist. It means that something is not what it seems. This is a very important distinction.-Excellent point.-> dhw: I would argue that the self does exist, and that everyone has the ability to take his or her own decisions in certain contexts ... if we make that a defining element of "free will" ... but that neither the "self" nor "free will" are as self-contained or as free as they appear to be. The combination of brain, body, environment and experience mentioned above clearly entails factors over which we have no control, and so both our identity and our ability to take decisions are under influences we may not be aware of. Nevertheless, that particular combination is what gives each of us our uniqueness, even if we do find it impossible to separate our "selves" and our decisions from the influences that have shaped and continue to shape them.-Your analysis is why Freud invented psychoanalysis, which has fallen out of favor for being too long, too expensive, and too involved, and is why directive psychotherapy and drugs are used so much now.

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I started this thread just before I went away for the weekend. 
I now find on my return that there are 22 responses. 
It's very difficult to keep up with you all!-I enjoyed the Bruce Hood video talk. 
The illustration of the "illusory square" 
where he removes the four 3/4-circular black spots 
and leaves a blank area is just one interpretation. 
He could just as well remove the central white square 
and reveal that it is covering four complete spots 
with nothing cut out of them. 
Or maybe it is covering a more elaborate pattern. 
There is no one "right" interpretation.-I find I largely agree with DT and DHW about 
the meaning of self and the existence of limited free-will, 
and with Romansch that 'emergence' is not a very helpful word.

--
GPJ

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> George: I find I largely agree with DT and DHW about 
> the meaning of self and the existence of limited free-will, 
> and with Romansch that 'emergence' is not a very helpful word.-Emergence is not a helpful word because it is used to express something we do not understand. We describe not understood concepts this way all the time.

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Going back through the New Scientists I have been remiss in reading:
Came across this:-https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730340-200-consciousness-evolved-for-the-greater-good-not-just-the-self/-and it leads to:
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg16822653-700-greatest-myth-of-all-I presume we have access to the complete opinion pieces.

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Romansh: Going back through the New Scientists I have been remiss in reading:
> Came across this:
> 
> https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730340-200-consciousness-evolved-for-the-great... 
> and it leads to:
> https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg16822653-700-greatest-myth-of-all&#... 
> I presume we have access to the complete opinion pieces.-I've not paid for access. It smells like they trust Libet's findings, which have been rejected by some.

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David: It smells like they trust Libet's findings, which have been rejected by some.-Is that like the stench that comes from the Discovery Institute's interpretations that have been rejected by most knowledgeable scientists?-Really David, you should know better.

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I've not paid for access. It smells like they trust Libet's findings, which have been rejected by some.-It would be foolish to completely discount the results of Libet.-Here is a quote from the earlier article
>> Peter W. Halligan David A. Oakley: Even if you look carefully at your own experience of decision making, it is evident that you don't make up your own mindif you are honest, and you take the time, you discover that your mind makes itself up.-This captures in part why I keep asking what would confabulation look like for you.

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DavidI've not paid for access. It smells like they trust Libet's findings, which have been rejected by some.
> 
> Romansh:It would be foolish to completely discount the results of Libet.
> 
> Here is a quote from the earlier article
> >> Peter W. Halligan David A. Oakley: Even if you look carefully at your own experience of decision making, it is evident that you don't make up your own mindif you are honest, and you take the time, you discover that your mind makes itself up.
> 
> This captures in part why I keep asking what would confabulation look like for you.-I don't accept their view and if I took time I could drag up opposite opinions. I accept what I experience and that is enough for me.

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David: I accept what I experience and that is enough for me.-David this is not an attribute I would share with your more scientifically astute readers.

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David: I accept what I experience and that is enough for me.
> 
> Romansh: David this is not an attribute I would share with your more scientifically astute readers.-There are experts who agree with me. Your opinion is equal to mine, no more.

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David: I accept what I experience and that is enough for me.
> > 
> > Romansh: David this is not an attribute I would share with your more scientifically astute readers.
> 
> David: There are experts who agree with me. Your opinion is equal to mine, no more.-This I think is plainly false.
I would trust your opinion more than mine regarding a medical issue, and I would trust mine more regarding the beneficiation of metals from ore.-There is no reason to believe intrinsically that our abilities to handle logic and assess data are equal.-The fact that there are experts that share our opinions is moot. There are "experts" that disbelieve anthropogenic global warming too. There are experts who believe in the literality of the Bible.-But if your experts accept their experience and claim that is enough for them too, I would not share that particular homily with their readers

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