Free Will, Consciousness, Identity (Identity)

by dhw, Tuesday, July 24, 2012, 13:19 (4265 days ago) @ romansh

ROMANSH: Just looking at things from a deterministic or indeterministic point of view makes the concept of free will a non sequitur.
 
This discussion is constantly running into problems of definition. Determinism and indeterminism are the polar options, just like the existence or non-existence of God. Matt says the concept is irrelevant, and I have asked "for whom and to what?" You say it's a non sequitur. How does having two options make it a non sequitur, and to what preceding statement is it unconnected?-ROMANSH: Of course compatibilists will move the goal posts to allow the existence of free will. I would argue they miss the point completely.-As I understand it (please correct me if I'm wrong), both sides use different concepts of freedom ... i.e. a different set of goalposts. Incompatibilists argue that you can never be free from the endless chain of causes that lead to a decision, and compatibilists argue that you are free from coercion. Under normal circumstances, we all feel that the decision is "ours" (uncoerced), even if it is influenced by factors or causes that make "us" what "we" are. In other words, whatever constitutes our personal identity is the autonomous decision-maker. With those two very different definitions in mind, and having no idea what is the source of consciousness (of which the will is one manifestation), I don't see how we can know the extent to which the will is "free". But for me that does not make the subject a non sequitur, or invalid, or irrelevant. It simply means that the question ... like that concerning the existence of God ... is unanswerable except in terms of subjective belief.


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